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ABSTRACT 
The theoretical framework of the pecking order and trade-off theories of capital 
structure has suggested the potential for exhibiting asymmetrical financing behaviour 
for firms with leverage below or above the target level of leverage or for firms with 
financial surplus or deficit.  Such analyses shed light on how firms choose their capital 
structure under pecking order and trade-off theories and mainly when they have 
leverage target with leverage above-or below-target leverage or surplus or deficit. 
However, a lack of empirical studies on these issues can be noted in both developed and 
developing countries. This thesis examines a variety of pecking order and trade-off 
asymmetric models and compares their performance with the symmetric alternative.  
Using data from 114 non-financial Jordanian firms (of which 62 are industrial firms and 
the remaining are services firms), we report evidence suggesting that firstly, equity 
issues track the financing deficit relatively more closely, suggesting that equity is not 
the last resort for financing as the pecking order theory predicts Secondly, Jordanian 
firms are more sensitive in retiring debt to take up surplus than in expanding debt to 
meet their financing requirement, implying that financial surplus and deficit affect 
leverage differently. Thirdly, Jordanian firms have a target leverage ratio and adjust 
their leverage at rate higher for above-target leverage than for below-target leverage and 
at rate higher for firms with financial surplus than those with financial deficit. Finally, 
we report evidence suggesting that the rates of adjustment vary depending on whether 
the deviation from the target level is large or small, with rates higher for large size 
deviation than for small size deviation. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Jordan is a small Arab country in the Middle East region, with a population of 5.3 
million and a population growth rate of 2.4%. The majority (62.6%) reside in the central 
region, while 27.7% and 9.7% of the population reside in the Northern and Western 
regions respectively. The total area of Jordan is 89.3 thousands sq. km; approximately 
7.8% is agricultural land (Department of Statistics, 2005). 
After gaining its independence, Jordan was confronted with many problems relating to 
social and economic development. The lack of financial resources has hindered its 
efforts and ambitions to achieve a sustainable economic growth and development, 
increasing its dependency on external income flows in the form of grants from other 
countries in the region and remittances from Jordanians working, mainly, in rich Arab 
oil countries. Like other developing countries, Jordan has chosen a state–sponsored 
route for development with the Jordanian private corporate sector playing a minor role. 
Therefore, many development banks have been established to meet its investment 
financing requirements. The considerable role of the Government with its extensive 
involvement in the financial system during the period of 1960-1990 has adversely 
impacted the efficiency of the financial system, the allocation of financial resources and 
has resulted in structural imbalance in all sectors of Jordanian economy (Maghyereh, 
2004). This necessitated a comprehensive programme of economic reforms, which 
aimed to bring about fiscal and monetary stability and structural transformation in the 
economy.  
Therefore, Jordan, since 1990, has been implementing comprehensive economic, social, 
and structural reform programmes. These programmes aim to improve the efficiency 
and competitiveness of the economy, to integrate Jordan with the international economy 
and to create a favourable investment environment. They also paid significant attention 
to the problems of poverty and unemployment through providing loans to small 
industries and handicraft professions through specialised financial institutions.  
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In order to achieve their goals,  the Jordanian government put forward a range of 
policies and procedures which can be summarised as: freeing interest rates, adopting a 
flexible policy to manage exchange prices, reviewing investment encouragement laws, 
removing lending limits, increasing the dependence on the private sector and updating 
the financial regulations to international standards (Al-Otoom, 1996). In 1999, the 
government’s effort to liberalise and increase the openness of the economy was 
intensified, and yielded significant achievements that were crowned with Jordan’s 
accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the attainment of free access to 
the largest consumer market in the world, the United States, through the Qualifying 
Industrial Zones (QIZ,s) and the Free Trade Agreements (Saket, 2000). 
In fact, the entry of the country in the World Trade Organization and the US-Jordan 
Free Trade Agreement represents new competitive threats for the Jordanian firms. 
While on the one side, it offers Jordanian firms a chance to compete in the international 
market, on the other, it also offers the foreign companies a free access to the Jordanian 
market.  For Jordanian firms, competition requires keeping a flow of high quality 
products and services while reducing costs. This requires Jordanian firms to obtain low 
cost funds to finance their investment activities to increase their competition in the local 
and foreign markets. However, Jordanian firms have limited choices of financing 
sources. The Jordanian banking sector is the main source of financing for the industrial, 
services and commercial operations. Since the mid 1990s, and as a result of the 
uncertainties that have overshadowed the regain, however, the Jordanian banks have 
adopted conservative credit policies which reduce the available funds for financing. At 
the same time, the barriers that may face the Jordanian companies when seeking funds 
externally from the Amman Financial Market make it difficult to use this market as a 
major alternative to the banking sector.1 This, along with the fact that none of the 
Jordanian firms have experience in raising money abroad, made the Jordanian 
government increasingly pay attention to the Amman Financial Market as an important 
pillar of the economy (Central Bank of Jordan, 2000). 
The Amman Financial market was founded in 1976, started operations in 1978 and was 
renamed Amman Stock Exchange in 1997 in accordance with the security law of 1997. 
Although it is largely affected by the uncertainty that overshadowed the region, it has 
                                                          
1According to El-Khouri and Hmedat (1992) these barriers might be classified into two categories. The 
first category includes general environmental factors such as the economic and political instability which 
gives rise to capital flight. The second category includes the complicated listed procedures, high issue 
costs, high transaction costs and investors desire for current dividend income.  
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witnessed significant developments and qualitative transition. New laws and regulations 
are set such as the Securities Law of 1997, Companies Law of 1997 and the 
Transparency Law of 1998. Moreover, since 1997, and in response to the governments’ 
promotional policies for stock market expansion, foreigners are allowed to own up to 
100% of the stocks of any listed firms. Consistent with the Government policy of 
improving its efficiency and making it work in accordance with international standards, 
the new Electronic Trading System is used.             
These changes are aimed at increasing competition, giving transparency and safety for 
traders and investors by computerizing all selling and buying transactions, matching 
supply and demand for securities and finally, electronically setting the prices. It is 
assumed that these qualitative transitions make the market function more efficiently and 
transparently and signal clearly the price information to outsiders, making these 
investors rationally willing to discount less. As a result, the Amman Stock Exchange 
(ASE) has experienced remarkable increases in trading volumes, market capitalization 
and in the number of corporations listed on the market.  
Because the government’s efforts to develop the market and improve its efficiency have 
not been matched by a parallel effort by scholars, the financing practices of Jordanian 
listed firms on Amman Stock Exchange are still less well-known. Therefore, the general 
purpose of this study is to extend our knowledge of how Jordanian listed firms set their 
capital structure and to what extent the financing behaviour of Jordanian firms is 
consistent with the theoretical explanations, namely the pecking order and trade-off 
(target adjustment) theories of capital structure. 
 
1.2  Motivations and Contribution of the study  
There are three major motivations for the current study: 
Firstly, although the capital structure policy is not a new area of research, it remains one 
of the most interesting and puzzling topics of research. The theories and explanations 
that have emerged have resulted in an enormous body of theoretical and empirical 
research. However, no consensus has been reached. Furthermore, the majority of the 
studies that addressed capital structure mixture have been conducted in the context of 
developed countries, in particular, USA and UK. There are relatively few studies that 
have tested the capital structure theories and their explanations using data from 
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developing countries. This scarcity in research came as a result of low concentration in 
the last decades on corporate finance as an area of research in developing countries. The 
main reason for this lack of studies is that countries, such as Jordan, usually choose a 
state-sponsored route of development with a relatively insignificant role for the private 
corporate sector (see Parasad et al., 2001). Recently most of the developing countries, 
including Jordan have implemented comprehensive economic reform programs to move 
towards the free market economy which influences their capital structure choice and 
consequently increases the need to address the issue of capital structure choice in these 
countries.  
 The puzzling issue of capital structure, besides the lack of research in developing 
countries in general and on Jordan in particular, motivates the conduct of this study on 
the financing practices of Jordanian listed firms where answers for many questions are 
still not clearly developed. The questions are: what are the main determinants of the 
financing behaviour for the Jordanian companies? And whether the explanatory power 
of main stream capital structure theories are applicable to the Jordanian capital market?  
The existing studies that have used Jordanian market data have been based on small 
and, in some respect, biased samples, from large firms, making their findings unreliable 
such that they can then not be generalized.2  In addition, they have not tested the capital 
structure theories by using the models that have been proposed and tested in the context 
of developed countries such as those developed by Frank and Goyal (2003) and Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999), amongst others. 
Secondly, although the theoretical framework of pecking order suggests that financial 
deficit and surplus affect leverage differently, no attempt has been made to empirically 
investigate this difference. Addedeji (2002) argues that it is the positive values of funds 
deficit not the negative values that matter. Therefore, he asserts that including these 
values could have reduced the effect of deficit values on the change in total debt. In the 
context of pecking order theory, it is only the internal funds deficit not the surplus that 
forces firms to raise funds externally.3 Myers (1994) argues that surplus may be used to 
                                                          
2
 To best of the researcher’s knowledge, the only prior studies in Jordan context are those that have been 
conducted by Al-Khouri and Hmedat (1992); Diranyeh (1992) and Al-Hayjneh (2001) (determinants of 
capital structure). Rawashdeh and Quadah (1997) (pecking order theory) and Maghyereh (2004) (Target 
adjustment theory). These studies will briefly be discussed in chapter two (literature review chapter).  
3
 Under pecking order theory, there is no well-defined optimal debt ratio. Each firm’s debt-equity level 
reflects its cumulative requirements for external finance, while the trade-off theory suggests that there is a 
target level of debt-equity ratio for each firm, and it will move gradually towards the target level if any 
deviation from that target exists (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984; and Shyam-Surnder and Myers, 
1999). 
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retire debt or invest on marketable securities or retire equity. Hence, raising debt when a 
firm has a surplus cash flow is consistent with the free cash flow theory of Jensen 
(1986) not the pecking order theory. Moreover, firms may be more (less) sensitive to 
financial deficit than financial surplus, making the impetus of expanding debt for 
financing higher (lower) than that of retiring debt for soaking up financial surplus (free 
cash flow).  
To best of the researcher’s knowledge, nothing is available in literature about what is 
actually happening when the firms follow the pecking order theory having surplus not 
deficit. It was this shortage, in fact, that motivated the researcher to carry out this study 
and fill the gap by developing new models to investigate whether the firms respond 
differently or similarly to deficit and surplus and whether they are more or less sensitive 
in expanding debt for financing than in reducing (retiring) debt for absorbing surplus.  
The models can also investigate how sensitive the regression results are to the way 
surplus values are treated.  
Thirdly, the trade-off (target adjustment) theory of capital structure suggests that firms 
may not fully adjust their leverage ratio if adjustment is costly. In this context, the 
decision to adjust leverage is taken when the costs of being away from target are higher 
than those of moving toward that target (adjustment costs). The extant research testing 
the dynamic behaviour of the capital structure assumes the costs as well as the benefits 
of moving back toward the target level of leverage are symmetrical for adjustment from 
below and above the target leverage ratio. However, these costs and benefits need not be 
symmetric, making the rates of adjustment vary depending on whether the firm’s 
leverage ratio is above or below its target leverage ratio. Asymmetric adjustment costs 
and benefits of increasing and reducing leverage make firms experience different rates 
of downward and upward adjustment.4 Furthermore, if the adjustment costs constitute a 
major portion of the total costs of changing leverage, firms with leverage away from 
their target leverage ratio will adjust their leverage ratio only if they are sufficiently far 
away from the target (optimal) leverage ratio. This makes the probability of adjustment 
positively related to the difference between the target and the observed leverage ratio 
because firms will not make adjustment until the benefits from adjusting leverage 
                                                          
4
 It is worth noting that after submitting this thesis on Nov, 2008, new study has been published on Dec, 
2008 by Byoun (2008) ‘How and when do firms adjust their capital structures toward targets?’. This study 
examines the capital structure adjustment conditional on the required external capital changes as 
measured by a financial deficit/surplus. It also investigates the asymmetrical adjustment towards the 
target leverage ratio. For the comparison purposes, Byoun (2008) will be included in the literature review 
chapter (Ch.2) and some of its model will be tested and discussed in chapter 5.  
  6
outweigh the costs of moving back towards the target level. At large deviation below 
the target leverage ratio, for example, target reversion requires large debt issuance, 
reducing the per-unit cost of target reversion compared with the tax savings of an 
additional unit of debt, and consequently increasing the desire of firms to revert back 
towards their target level.   
The current study tries to fill this gap in the literature by testing the hypothesis of 
asymmetric adjustment toward the target leverage ratio. For this purpose, symmetric 
and asymmetric partial adjustment models are used. Asymmetric adjustment models 
allow for the rates of adjustment to vary depending, firstly, on whether the firms’ 
leverage ratios are below or above their target leverage ratios and, secondly, on whether 
the deviations from the target leverage ratio are large or small. In addition, it develops a 
new model to estimate the short run and long run effects of target leverage on actual 
leverage.   
These motivations constitute the main contributions to the current study. Another 
contribution of this study stems from the investigation of determinants of capital 
structure of the Jordanian firms listed on ASE over the period 1997-2005. In general, 
the study is expected to highlight the knowledge of the importance of the Jordanian 
capital market as one of a developing market. It also helps gain a practical insight into 
the financing practices of non-financial Jordanian firms. The Jordanian capital market is 
a market that has been supported by international institutions, it has adopted an 
advanced trading pattern, and it seeks to be a symbol of the regional stock market. 
Moreover, extensive efforts have been made to integrate this market into the world 
market. Therefore, it may provide an ideal ground for examining the most influential 
theories of capital structure, the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory and their 
implications for developing countries.   
 
1.3  Objectives of the study  
The focus of this study is on the financing behaviour of Jordanian firms listed on 
Amman Stock Exchange over the period 1997-2005. More precisely, the study aims at: 
1.        Investigating empirical evidence on the determinants of optimal capital structure 
for the  Jordanian listed firms by using a static model based on previous studies (e.g., 
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Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Titman and Weasels, 1988; Booth, et al., 2001; Bevan and 
Danbolt, 2002, and 2004). 
2.       Investigating the empirical evidence on the pecking order theory in the Jordanian 
market as a developing market. The study employs three models to achieve this aim. 
Firstly, the study uses the models proposed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and 
Frank and Goyal (2003). In their proposed models, the change in total debt level is 
regressed on the internal funds deficit. Secondly, it extends their work and suggests new 
models to test whether the suggestion of the pecking order theory that, the financing 
behaviour may differ depending on whether the firms have a financial surplus or deficit. 
The models proposed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) 
assume that the pecking order theory is not affected by whether the deficit variable has 
positive (financial deficit) or negative (financial surplus) values. Adedeji (2002) argues 
that negative values are not internal funds deficits or requirements for external finance 
to be covered by issuing debt. In the context of pecking order theory, firms finance their 
investments from internal funds first, then from debt, and as a last resort from the 
equity. When firms have surpluses, they are likely to pay back their debt first and then 
to invest that surpluses in cash or marketable securities and finally, buy back their own 
equity.  
The current study estimates two separate models to test the pecking order theory in the 
Jordanian market. The dependent variable in the first model is the change in total debt 
regressed on the internal fund deficits and it is regressed on the internal fund deficits 
and internal fund surpluses on the second one5. Finally, it uses the static model that the 
current study suggests to investigate determinants of optimal leverage ratio in order to 
examine the suggestion of pecking order that firms raise external funds only under 
pressures of an internal funds deficit.  In this model, internal funds deficit will be added 
as additional explanatory variable. 
 3.       Investigating the empirical evidence of trade-off (target adjustment) theory. In 
addition to the partial adjustment model (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999), the study 
employs asymmetric adjustment model to examine the hypothesis of asymmetric 
adjustment costs of increasing and reducing debt. It also uses the Error Correction 
Mechanism (ECM to investigate the short and long run effect of target leverage ratio on 
                                                          
5
 The current study re-estimates these models with the change in equity issued by each firm as a 
dependent variable. This investigation examines the prediction of pecking order theory that firms with 
surplus may use that surplus to pay back their equity. 
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the actual debt level. To investigate pecking order theory against trade-off theory, this 
study nests the pecking order model and trade-off model in the same regression. 
Because the target leverage ratio is unobservable, the current study uses three 
instruments or proxies for the target: the estimated fitted values from the conventional 
leverage equation (Ozkan, 2001; Miguel and Pindado 2001, and Flannery and Rangan, 
2006), the mean of firm’s leverage ratio over the study period (March, 1982 and 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999) and the industry mean over the study period (Claggett, 
1991; Cai and Ghosh, 2003 and Nuri and Archer, 2001).  It is worth noting that all the 
empirical models will be discussed jointly with the estimation results in the empirical 
chapters. In what follows, we present the econometrics techniques that the current study 
uses to test the empirical models of pecking order and trade-off theory. We also present 
a brief discussion of the source of data collection and sample of the study. 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
To accomplish the above objectives, the study employs pooled and panel data analysis 
techniques, where panel data analysis are usually estimated by fixed effects and random 
effects techniques.6 In the pooled model, all observations are put together and the 
regression coefficients describe the overall influence with no specific time or individual 
aspect. It assumes that the error term captures the differences between the firms (across-
sectional units) over the time. 
Pooled model: 
 
                                                                   
ititit XY εβα ++= 1
                              (1.1) 
 
The pooled model is simply estimated by Ordinary Least Square (OLS). However, OLS 
will be appropriate if no individual (firm) or time–specific effects exist. If they do, the 
unobserved effects of the unobserved individual and time specific factors on the 
dependent variable can be accommodated by using one of the panel data techniques 
(Gujarati, 2003). A panel data technique helps researchers to minimize the problems 
substantially that arise when there are omitted variable problems such as time and 
                                                          
6
 The study uses Gujarati (2003) and Green (2003) to discuss these econometric techniques. 
  9
individual-specific variables. It also provides robust parameter estimations rather than 
time series and/or cross-sectional data. It is usually estimated by fixed effects model and 
random effects models.  
The fixed effect model allows control for unobserved heterogeneity which describes 
individual specific effects that are not captured by observed variables. The term “fixed 
effects” is attributed to the idea that although the intercept may differ across individuals 
(firms), each individual’s intercept does not vary over time; that is, it is time invariant. 
This model will be estimated by using OLS. 
The fixed effects model: 
 
                                                                  
ititiit XY εβα ++= '
                               (1.2) 
 
Unlike the fixed effects model, the unobserved effects in a random effects model are 
captured by the error term ( )itε  consisting of an individual specific one ( )tu  and an 
overall component ( )itv which is the combined time series and cross-section error. 
The random effects model: 
 
                                                         
( ) ititiit XuY εβα +++= '
                               (1.3) 
                                                          
itiit vu +=ε
                                                  (1.3a) 
 
The random effects model will be estimated by the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) 
technique. This is because the GLS technique takes into account the different 
correlation structure of the error term in the random effects model (Gujarati, 2003). 
The main objective of using three alternative techniques is to find out which technique 
will produce the best specification for the datasets. To identify the best option, the study 
uses Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier (LM) for testing random effects 
models against pooled OLS model under the null hypothesis that the cross–sectional 
variance components are zero (H0: б2 =0). The significant Lagrange multiplier (LM) test 
leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis, and suggests that the individual effect is not 
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equal to zero and that the estimate coefficients obtained from pooled model are not 
consistent. To discriminate between fixed effects and the random effects model, we use 
the Hausman test. It tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the 
efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent 
fixed effects estimator.7  The rejection of the null hypothesis, on the other hand, 
suggests that fixed effects estimations are more appropriate than random effects 
estimations. 
The data for pooled and panel econometrics techniques is extracted from the firm’s 
annual reports, and from Amman Stock Exchange’s publications (The Yearly 
Shareholding Companies Guide and Amman Stock Exchange Monthly Statistical 
Bulletins). Data is also readily available in CD format and on the web site of the 
Amman Stock Exchange8. The total number of the companies listed in ASE at the end 
of year 2005 was 205. Officially, these companies are divided into four main economic 
sectors; banks sector, insurance sector, services sector and finally industrial sectors. The 
data set of the study is constructed to cover the period of 1997 to 2005 on annual basis. 
The reason for the study period selection is to minimise the missing observations for the 
sample companies.  
The sample data is constructed according to the following sample selection criteria; 
1. Firms that operate in banking and insurance sectors (financial sectors) are excluded. 
The reasons for excluding the financial sector are that; firstly, the capital structure of 
financial firms has special characteristics in comparison with the capital structure of non 
financial firms; they also have special tax treatment (Lesfer, 1995). Secondly, the 
financial firms have a higher leverage rate, which may tend to make the analysis results 
biased (Rajan and Zingals, 1995). 
2.  All firms engaged in merger or acquisitions during the study period are excluded.  
3. All firms with missing data are excluded. 
4. All firms that have been liquidated or stopped their operation (whose stocks are 
desisted in ASE through out the study period) are excluded from the sample. 
                                                          
7
 It is worth noting that the random effects estimator is efficient and consistent under the null hypothesis 
and inconsistent under the alternative hypothesis, and the fixed effects model is consistent under both the 
null and the alternative hypothesis. 
8
 The Company act of 1997 and the modification of 1998 require publicly held companies to prepare and 
publish their financial reports at least in two daily newspapers and for two weeks continuously. 
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5. All firms that have been incorporated after year 1997 are excluded. 
The application of these criteria excludes 45 financial firms and 46 non-financial firms 
(22 industrial companies and 24 services companies). Thus, the study is confined to 114 
non-financial companies (62 industrial companies and 52 services companies) with data 
continuously available between 1997 and 2005. This number corresponds to 55.61% of 
all companies listed in ASE at the end of year 2005 and 71.25% of the total number of 
non- financial companies listed in ASE at the end of year 2005. In general, the study 
sample consists of significant proportion of listed companies in the ASE during the 
nine–year–period 1997- 2005. 
In addition to the current chapter, this study encompasses another five chapters. Chapter 
two presents the theoretical considerations and relevant prior work that provides a 
rationale for explaining financial policy decisions of firms. Chapter three, four and five 
discuss the empirical models and the estimation results of the empirical investigations 
of the determinants of capital structure, pecking order theory and target-off (target 
adjustment) theory of capital structure.  Finally chapter six provides a summary of 
issues covered in this thesis as well as the theoretical and empirical conclusions and 
implications. Limitations of the study are presented and areas for further research are 
suggested. 
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CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The “classic” proposition made by Modigliani and Miller (1958) posits that the firm’s 
value is independent of its capital structure. They claim that the firm’s value depends 
upon the profitability of its assets and not on the way in which such assets are financed. 
The market value of a firm is invariant to whether the firm finances itself through debt 
and/or equity. The basic argument underlying their statement is that arbitrage 
transactions preclude the market value of a firm from being altered by a change in a 
firm’s financial policy for a given profit stream. They demonstrate that, if the firm’s 
value depends on the way of financing, the perfection of capital markets make such 
arbitrage transactions feasible. Modigliani and Miller based their argument on the 
assumption that a rational investor is able to borrow at the same interest rate as firms. In 
this case investors will have the same financial opportunities as firms, and hence, they 
can untie firms’ capital structure decisions on the financial markets. 
The Modigliani - Miller proposition is based on the assumptions of a perfect capital 
market in which there are no transaction costs, no information asymmetry (investors 
have the same information as management about the firm’s future investment 
opportunities), no bankruptcy costs (debt is risk-free regardless of the amount used), so 
no firm goes bankrupt, no taxes (no taxes exist either on individuals or companies) and 
investors can borrow at the same rate as corporations. Finally, management acts on the 
exclusive behalf of shareholders. These assumptions can be criticised on the grounds 
that imperfections in capital markets do exist, suggesting that different sources of 
financing may be relevant to the investment decision of the firm. One of these 
assumptions is broken down by Modigliani and Miller themselves. In their seminal 
paper, Modigliani-Miller (1963) who again ignore the bankruptcy and agency costs of 
debt, argue that debt provides a tax benefit shield and hence, the value of the firm is 
maximised by using as much debt as possible. 
Following their seminal papers in 1958 and 1963, firm financing patterns have therefore 
attracted a large number of theoretical and empirical research papers. The most 
influential theories of capital structure are the pecking order theory and trade-off, or 
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target capital theory. In general, these alternatives are based on examining what happens 
if Modigliani and Miller’s assumptions do not hold: the existence of bankruptcy costs 
(e.g. Warner 1977), agency costs (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986), 
signalling and information asymmetry (e.g. Ross, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Myers, 1984) and the existence of non-debt tax shields (e.g. DeAngelo and Masulis, 
1980) have all been examined. In Jordan, where the capital market is imperfect, all of 
these considerations are relevant and may affect firms’ policies in borrowing and 
issuing equity.  
Therefore, the aims of  this chapter are to outline the theories and explanations of the 
capital structures, mainly, the theories which are expected to be relevant in the 
Jordanian context, review the empirical studies on corporate financing policy and 
outline some of the gaps in the existing body of knowledge about it.  The chapter is 
structured as follows: Section 2.2 presents the theoretical and empirical literature of 
trade-off (target adjustment) theory. Section 2.3 presents the theoretical and empirical 
literature of pecking order theory and section 2.4 provides a summary and some 
conclusions. 
 
2.2  Trade-off theory (Target capital theory) 
In their second seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller (1963) have altered the underlying 
argument of their classical proposition of capital structure. They incorporate the 
corporate income tax and contend that the value of the firm, if levered, equals the value 
of the firm if unlevered plus the value of the generated tax benefit. Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) as Modigliani and Miller (1958) ignore the agency and bankruptcy costs 
of debt.  To certain limits, the presence of agency and bankruptcy costs of debt may 
outweigh its tax benefit, suggesting that there is some threshold level of debt, under 
which the firm’s value is maximised. This threshold of debt is generally called the 
optimal (target) level of capital structure and is defined by the trade-off between costs of 
debt and its benefits. More precisely, it will be at the point where the marginal benefits 
of each additional unit of debt equal to its marginal costs. In what follows, we provide a 
brief discussion of the costs and benefits of debt that derive the optimal capital structure 
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such as the tax benefits, costs of financial distress (direct and indirect costs) and agency 
costs of shareholders/mangers and shareholders/debt holders conflicts.9 
2.2.1 Tax advantage and reduction of free cash flow agency costs 
 
2.2.1.1 Tax advantage of debt 
It has been argued that the corporate profit tax treatment allows for the deduction of 
interest payments in computing taxable income (Modigliani Miller, 1963). 
Consequently, using debt decreases a firm’s expected tax liability and increases its 
after-tax cash flow, making profitable firms employ more debt to increase the value of 
their debt tax shield.10   However, Taggart (1985) contends that corporate debt enjoys a 
net tax advantage when corporate tax rates exceed marginal personal tax rates. This 
violates the earlier Modigliani- Miller conclusion regarding corporate income tax, 
making corporate tax deductions at least partially offset by additional personal tax 
liabilities of the acquiring debt holders. Miller (1977) claims that even in a world in 
which interest payments are fully deductible in computing corporate income taxes, the 
value of the firm, in equilibrium will still be independent of its capital structure. Miller 
(1977) concludes that personal income taxes paid by investors in corporate debt just 
offset the corporate tax shield provided that the firm pays the full statutory tax rate. 
Miller (1977) concludes that the firm should be indifferent to the level of outstanding 
debt since there is no optimal level of debt for the firm; it exists only for the whole 
economy. Hence, the presence of a personal tax rate with corporate income tax induce 
investors to demand premiums to compensate for the reduction in the net income 
(Graham, 2003), making the use of debt negatively related to the personal tax rate and 
positively related to the corporate income rate. 
However, the significance of the debt tax shield depends widely on the nature of the tax 
system applied by each country, whether it allows for loss to be carried forward or loss 
to be carried back or both.  Ashton (1989) and Adedeji (1998) point out that the tax 
system in UK does not encourage firms to use debt as much the classical tax system 
does in US. Compared with the UK tax regime, the US tax system allows firms to 
sustain a loss for the year to carry-back and /or carry-forward such losses. It permits 
                                                          
9
 Tong and Green (2005) has argued that the modern version of trade-off theory is based on trade-offs 
among agency costs.  
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them to receive a cash refund of prior taxes paid or a tax reduction in the future. 
Therefore, US companies are expected to depend more heavily on debt to finance their 
investment opportunities and make quick target reversion when their leverage has 
deviated from its target level. Since the Jordanian tax system only allows loss to carry 
forward not loss to carry backwards, Jordanian firms are not expected to gain much tax 
benefits from debt. The tax advantage of debt financing will not be high for high risk 
firms where, profitable years with significant tax payments could be affected by a 
succession of dab years (Booth et al., 2001). Hence, Jordanian firms are expected to use 
less debt in their capital structure and show a weak desire to adjust their capital structure 
when they are out of their target level.  
Moreover, raising debt for tax considerations may be largely affected by the presence of 
other tax shields such as depreciations, allowances of research and development 
expenses and investment tax credits. DeAnglo and Masulis, (1980) argue that firms with 
tax deductions for depreciation and investment tax credits can consider these deductions 
as a substitute for the tax shield.11 They conclude that the positive tax shield substitute 
suggests that the expected marginal corporate tax advantage decline as leverage is added 
to the capital structure. Debt is thus more expensive for firms with a high level of non 
debt tax shield because the marginal tax savings from an additional unit of debt 
decreases with increasing non-debt tax shields. This is because of the probability that 
bankruptcy increases with leverage, which makes the marginal benefit low.12  Hence, 
firms with a substantial amount of non-debt tax shields will have less incentive to raise 
debt for tax considerations, implying a negative association between debt and non-debt 
tax shields. 
 
2.2.1.2 Reduction of free cash flow agency costs. 
It worth noting that the tax advantage of debt is not the sole reason for using debt; this 
has been suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) as a mechanism 
to mitigate the agency costs of managers-shareholders conflicts. The agency theory of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
10
 Fama and French (1998) and Panno (2003) provide evidence suggesting that in Modigliani and Miller’s 
(1963) tax model, profitability is the main determinant of leverages, and a positive relationship between 
profitability and leverage is predicted.  
11
 DeAnglo and Masulis, (1980) conclude that the inclusion of non-debt tax shields lead to a unique 
interior optimal capital structure for each firm under which its value is maximized. DeAnglo and Masulis, 
(1980) who generalized the Miller (1977) model argue that the existence of non-debt tax shields will be 
enough to change the leverage irrelevancy theory. 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) addresses the incentive problems that could arise due to the 
separation between ownership and control.13 This separation may provide them with the 
incentive to maximize their wealth in a way that may harm stockholders. They may 
conduct actions that are costly to shareholders, such as consuming excessive perquisites 
or over-investing in managerially rewarding but unprofitable activities or to overvalue 
the investment requirements and to take the difference between the dummy value and 
real value of investment. Gillan and Starts (2003) claim that the separation between 
ownership and control is not the only factor that gives rise to the agency problems, the 
diffuse nature of corporate ownership may motivate the agency problem, where no 
incentive exists for small shareholders to bear the cost of monitoring the management 
behaviour.14  
The conflict of interests between managers and shareholders and thereby its costs, will 
significantly increase when managers have free cash under control.  Jensen (1986) 
addresses the agency problem in his free cash flow theory which is formally modelled 
by Stulz (1990). Jensen (1986: 323) defines free cash flow as “cash flow in excess of 
that required funding all projects that have positive net present value when discounted at 
the relevant cost of capital”. Accordingly, when managers have more cash flow than is 
needed to fund all of the firm’s available profitable projects, they will have the incentive 
to invest the excess cash in unprofitable projects (Jensen, 1986). Stulz (1990) calls this 
cost an over-investment cost of managerial discretion and defines it as “the expected 
cost to the shareholders that arise because management invest cash flow in excess of 
that available to fund positive NPV projects in negative NPV projects”. Hence, 
profitable firms are expected to experience high costs of free cash flow because the 
probability of having excess cash for consuming more perquisites or investing in less 
profitable projects will be high. These firms are expected to have more debt to reduce 
the amount of funds available under management control. 
Jensen (1986) points out that since debt commits the firm to pay out cash, it reduces the 
amount of discretionary funds available to managers to engage in the type of pursuits 
                                                                                                                                                                          
12
 Kraus-Litzenberger (1973) argues that the present value of the debt tax shield increases at a decreasing 
rate since the probability of bankruptcy is rising with the increase in debt. 
13
 Managers of the Jordanian firms do not have a large percentage of investment. On average, it is not 
more than 4% (Amman stock exchange, 2005) which may give rise to the agency conflicts between 
managers and shareholders. 
14
 Gillan and Starts (2003) argue that  the conflict of interest which is  referred to the agency theory is 
attributed firstly to the heterogeneity of the participants’ preferences and seek to achieve different goals, 
and secondly  to the asymmetric information, where they have imperfect information  as to each other’ 
actions and preferences, taking in consideration that managers are better–informed than  stockholders 
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that managers want but are not in the interests of equity holders. Hence, using debt, 
without retention of the proceeds of the issue, forces the managers to meet their promise 
to pay future cash flows to the debt-holders. By doing so, managers give the 
bondholders the right to take the firm to the bankruptcy court if they do not maintain 
their commitment to make the interest and principle payments. Here, debt works as a 
disciplining tool because default allows creditors the option of forcing the firm into 
liquidation (Harris and Raviv, 1990). Furthermore, Lasfer (1995) argues that debt 
finance creates a motivation for managers to work harder and make better investment 
decisions.  
However, the benefit of debt in mitigating the agency cost of free cash flow is more 
effective in firms that generate a substantial amount of free cash flow but have poor 
investment opportunities, where the probability of investing free cash flow in 
unprofitable projects is high (Jensen, 1986). While, for rapidly growing firms with large 
and good investment opportunities but who have no free cash flow, debt will not be 
effective. It exacerbates the conflict between debt holders and shareholders and thereby 
its costs. In addition to its role in mitigating the agency cost of free cash flow, debt 
provides management with the benefit of maintaining control where, a high control 
benefit induces stockholders to issue debt rather than equity because debt holders have 
no voting right as equity (Stulz, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1990).  If it is the case, the firm 
will prefer debt not equity for balancing control considerations, (Baskin, 1989 and Alen, 
1993) 
In summary, the introduction of debt decreases stockholder-manager agency costs, but 
as the use of debt increases, stockholders and bondholders agency costs arise. For a 
large amount of debt, these costs will exceed the stockholder-manager agency costs 
savings. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the trade-off between these costs 
results in an optimal capital structure. In a traditional tax/bankruptcy trade-off model, 
the stockholder-manager agency costs savings and stockholders and bondholders 
agency costs are not considered. Tong and Green (2005) have argued that the modern 
version of trade-off theory is based on trade-offs among agency costs, implying that 
value-maximizing firms consider all the costs and benefits of debt when setting their 
optimal or target capital structure. The following section analyzes the 
bankruptcy/financial distress and agency costs of debt. 
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2.2.2 Costs of debt 
As discussed in section (2.2.1), Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) tax model suggests that 
the firm can maximize its value by using as much debt as possible. The underlying 
assumption behind this suggestion is the perfection of the capital market. However, the 
existence of bankruptcy and agency costs of debt makes debt not being freely used and 
forces value-maximizing firms to trade-off the costs and benefits of debt, typically tax 
savings and the reduction in the agency costs of free cash flow. In this section, we 
provide a brief discussion of the expected costs of debt such as the costs of financial 
distress and agency conflicts: 
 
2.2.2.1 Costs of financial distress  
These costs are incurred when the occurrence of default reduces the market value of the 
firm’s assets. It arises when a firm uses too much debt in its capital structure so that it 
could not meet its financial obligation. According to Warner (1977) and Barclay et al. 
(1995), financial distress has both direct and indirect costs. The direct costs are incurred 
in bankruptcy and reorganization. These include the legal and administrative costs of 
the liquidation and the costs of shifting down operations and dissipated of assets. This is 
because shareholders have little incentive to run a bankrupt firm efficiently which may 
lead to the firm’s assets and overall value being easily dissipated when it goes bankrupt. 
This effect might also arise prior to the firm going bankrupt; the possibility of 
bankruptcy may cause shareholders to take on excessively risky projects to expropriate 
wealth from the firm’s bondholders (Cornelli and Felli, 1995).  
It is worth noting that bankruptcy is not the cause of decline in the firm’s value, it is the 
result. This argument is supported by Wijist and Thurik (1993) who defined the 
bankruptcy costs as the difference between the firms operating value and its liquidation 
value.15 Hence, one could argue that a reduction in a firm’s marginal bankruptcy costs 
will increase the use of debt financing. As Ficher et al. (1989) point out, high-
bankruptcy-cost firms should, on average, have narrower debt ranges than firms with 
relatively low bankruptcy costs. Consistence with this, DeAnglo and Masulis, (1980, p 
21) argue that firms that are subject to greater marginal bankruptcy costs will employ 
                                                          
15
 It is worth noting that bankruptcy and liquidation are very different events. Bankruptcy is likely to 
happen when the firm cannot meet debt obligation, whilst the liquidation of the firm’s assets will occur 
only if the market value of the future cash flows generated by the firm is less than opportunity cost of the 
assets (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p 341). 
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less debt.  However, Warner (1977) argues that there are “scale economies” regarding 
bankruptcy costs, in that these costs constitute a larger proportion of the firm’s value as 
that value decreases. Therefore, they are higher for small firms than for large firms 
which make large firms less likely to be subject to bankruptcy risk, consequently, able 
to borrow at more attractive rate. 
With respect to the indirect costs of financial distress, they arise from the reluctance to 
do business with a firm that maybe financially distressed (Brealey and Myers, 2002). 
These include the costs of losing or retaining customers as well as employees. It also 
includes the distress costs of the suppliers who are averse to put effort into servicing the 
firm’s account or demand cash or they may raise inputs (raw material, intermediate 
goods, and financial capital) prices, remove discounts and demand better terms. 
Furthermore, debt also has costs associated with the ‘debt overhang’ problem (Myers, 
1977). This problem arises when a firm’s outstanding debt is at some risk of default and 
covenants give current debt priority for repayment which will be at the expense of 
shareholders because a portion of value created by new investments will go to the 
creditors through a reduced risk of default on currently outstanding debt. The “Debt 
overhang” problem becomes more severe when the probability of debt default is 
significantly high. In this case, firms may be forced to forgo value-maximizing 
investments and this may result in what is known ‘underinvestment problem (Myers, 
1977 and Calomiris, et al., 1994).  Based on the previous analysis, firms with high 
earnings volatility are expected to incur a higher cost of financial distress (Bradley et 
al.,1984), since the possibility of their earnings level dropping below their debt 
servicing commitments is high, making these firms have less leverage. 
In the context of Jordanian market, the nature of Jordanian bankruptcy law makes the 
costs of bankruptcy high. This law emphasises the role of lenders and puts less 
emphasis on the firm as an ongoing concern. It is not conductive to the re-organization 
of firms; in contrast, firms entering bankruptcy are usually liquidated at a higher cost. 
Moreover, the indirect costs of losing customers or retaining customers are significantly 
large for the Jordanian firms, where globalization offers the imported goods and 
services free access to the local market. Therefore, customer retention becomes a 
difficult task for firms’ going bankruptcy because customers prefer the stable supplier. 
However, the high rates of unemployment make the cost of losing employees, 
especially for unskilled, relatively low. Furthermore, there will be a supply side effect as 
the market will be reluctant to provide capital to those who are financially distressed. 
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Due to their conservative credit policies, Jordanian banks offer debt to the less risky 
firms. Hence, it is costly for risky Jordanian firms to raise debt at attractive rate.   
 
2.2.2.2 The agency costs of debt  
As mentioned above, debt exacerbates the conflict between debt holders and 
shareholders because the debt contract gives shareholders an incentive to invest sub-
optimally. Jensen and Meckling (1976) examine agency costs, including incentive 
effects of debt on investment choices of owner-managers and assert that shareholders 
can extract value from debt holders by using existing debt funds to over-invest in risky 
projects. This Shareholders’ behaviour creates what is known as the overinvestment 
problem. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), it is limited liability that gives 
shareholders greater value from investing in more risky projects. They profit from the 
likelihood of larger gains at the expense of larger potential losses. Firm value is reduced 
and wealth is transferred from creditors to owners. Creditors anticipate the expropriation 
behaviour of shareholders of transferring wealth and demand a premium for 
compensation, raising the costs of debt.16 This cost is known as the agency cost of assets 
substitution problem which will be more severe for financially distressed firms. On the 
other hand, if the benefits captured by debt holders reduce the returns to shareholders, 
an incentive to reject positive net present value projects is created, creating what is 
known as the underinvestment problem. This is because shareholders are residual 
claimants to the firm’s value after debt is paid and debt holders benefit more from a safe 
positive net value project than shareholders (Lasfer, 1995). 
 As with the assets substitution problem, the underinvestment problem is an increasing 
function of the probability of financial distress/bankruptcy risk, implying that it will be 
large for highly leveraged firms. Myers (1977) paid attention to debt capacity reserve to 
avoid the underinvestment problem, especially for growing firms. Myers (1977) argues 
that the high growth firm should finance its investment opportunities with equity not 
debt if it wants to be in the position to undertake all positive net present value projects 
in the future (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Moreover, he points out that the agency costs 
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 Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs as “the sum of the monitoring expenditures by the 
principal, the bonding expenditures by agent, and the residual loss”. Residual loss is defined as “the dollar 
equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal due to the divergence between the 
agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal”. While 
Williamson (1988) defines agency costs as the residual loss of “the reduction in the value of the firm that 
obtains when the entrepreneur dilutes his ownership” 
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of the asset substitution problem can be mitigated by issuing short term debt rather than 
long term debt, since the incentive for substituting assets is lower for short term than for 
long term debt.  
However, the firm’s opportunities to engage in asset substitution can be reduced by 
issuing secured debt. If the debt is collateralised, the borrower will be restrained or 
limited to using the funds for a specified project which reduces the agency costs of asset 
substitution and hence, the costs of debt. This suggests that firms with more fixed assets 
can raise debt at more attractive rates because of the higher liquidation value of 
collateral assets in the event of financial distress or bankruptcy (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995). This might be the reason why firms with more growth opportunities can not raise 
debt because they represent the expected growth of firm’s intangible assets which have 
no collateral value and decline rapidly in value if bankruptcy or financial distress 
occurs, shifting firms towards equity financing (Titman and Wessels, 1988) and Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995). 
 In summary, previous analysis suggests that trade-offs among the different costs and 
benefits of debt result in an optimal capital structure where increases in leverage beyond 
the optimum lead to expected marginal costs which exceed the marginal benefits of 
debt. While decreases in leverage below the optimum lead to a loss of marginal benefits 
of debt which exceeds the savings in expected marginal costs. Although the optimal or 
target capital structure is significantly important under the trade-off theory of capital 
structure, the costs and benefits of debt become increasingly important when a firm’s 
leverage ratio reverts to the target level. This implies that trade-off theory is not only 
confirmed by the importance of target capital structure but also by the costs and benefits 
of leverage itself (Brounen  et al., 2005). This might be the reason why many firms use 
far less debt than theory suggests which implies that the observed leverage ratio may 
not necessarily be optimal and hence, adjustment of leverage toward the optimal or 
target level of leverage is required.  
However, as Myers (1977) points out, leverage may be costly to adjust because of the 
adjustment costs (transaction costs).17 This suggests that the presence of transaction 
costs may prevent adjustment until the benefits from adjusting leverage outweigh these 
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 The transaction costs are the costs of substituting debt for equity or equity for debt. According to 
Rudebusch and Oliner (1989; 1992), there are two principal components to transactions costs (:the 
compensation for the dealer placing the issue, and other expenses such as legal, accounting and printing 
costs, registration fees and taxes). 
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costs. Therefore, firms must trade off the benefits of moving toward their target 
leverage ratio with the costs of moving toward that target level (adjustment or 
transaction costs) before taking the decision to rebalance their observed leverage ratio or 
not.18  It is optimal to make adjustment only if the benefits of moving toward (or the 
costs of being away from) the target level exceed or at least out weigh the costs of 
moving back to the target. 
Previous analysis assumes that the presence of adjustment costs may prevent firms from 
adjusting leverage ratios toward their target ratios, suggesting that a partial - not full 
adjustment-toward the target leverage ratio occurs. To the extent that this is the case, a 
static model of capital structure will not be able to capture the dynamic adjustment in 
leverage ratio. There is evidence that firms may deviate from their optimal leverage 
ratio, and then gradually work back to the optimum, suggesting that the observed 
leverage ratio is not always the optimal. Therefore, the following two sections assess the 
empirical studies on both static and dynamic trade-off theory to shed light on the factors 
that might determine the optimal leverage ratio and that might affect the adjustment 
process.  
 
2.2.3  Empirical evidence on determinants of capital structure (static trade-off) 
The common approach has been to study the determinants of optimal leverage ratio by 
investigating the relationship between the observed leverage ratio and a set of 
explanatory variable using a static model. This section will be divided into three sub-
sections as follows: 
 
2.2.3.1  Empirical evidence from developed market 
Using data from US industrial companies, Titman and Wessels (1988) try to extend the 
empirical work in capital structure theory by estimating the impact of unobservable 
attributes on the choice of corporate debt ratios. They regress the collateral values of 
assets, non-debt tax shields, growth, uniqueness of business (measured by the number of 
product lines and advertising expenditure), industry classification, firm size, volatility of 
earnings and profitability on three separate measures of short-term, long-term, and 
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 The benefits of moving toward the target leverage ratio are generally called the costs of being away 
from the target. 
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convertible debt. The study did not provide support for any effect on debt ratios arising 
from non-debt tax shields, volatility, collateral values of assets and firm growth. 
However, they find a negative relationship between debt levels and uniqueness of 
business. Profitability was negatively related to all measures of debt. Finally, short-term 
debt ratios are found to be negatively related to a firm’s size. This final result indicates 
that small US firms face relatively high transaction costs when long-term debt is issued.  
Therefore, they argue that transaction costs might be an important determinant of capital 
structure in US market, particularly for small firms.  
In a comparative study, Rajan and Zingles (1995) investigate whether the capital 
structure in other developed countries is related to factors similar to those influencing 
the US companies.19 Tangible assets, market to book ratio, firm size and profitability 
are suggested as determinants of capital structure in these countries. They find that firms 
with more collateralised assets are not highly levered. In addition, they found that 
profitability and market to book ratio are negatively related to leverage. However, they 
argue that the negative relationship with leverage appeared to be driven by firms with 
high market to book ratio rather than by firms with low market to book ratio. The study 
provides no evidence supporting the effect of the firm size on leverage. Finally, the 
findings were not varied across the G-7 countries so they concluded that capital 
structure in other countries was affected by factors similar to those that influence the US 
companies. 
Bevan and Danbolt (2002) who extend the work of Rajan and Zingales (1995) tested the 
determinants of capital structure in the UK non-financial firms by using four measures 
of financial leverage. They used non-equity liabilities to total assets, total debt to total 
assets, total debt to capital (where capital is defined as total debt plus common shares 
with preferred shares), and adjusted debt to adjusted capital.20 All the measures were 
regressed on market-to-book value, natural logarithm of sales (size), profitability, and 
tangibility of assets. They found that determinants of gearing were significantly 
changed with respect to each measure of debt used. With the same gearing definition as 
Rajan and Zingales, Bevan and Danbolt (2002) report similar results. However, they 
provide evidence suggesting that the determinants of gearing established by Rajan and 
Zingales are dependent on the definition of gearing used. 
                                                          
19
 The sample firms of their study are drown from USA, UK, German, France, Italy and Canada.  
20
 Adjusted debt is defined as the book value of total debt less cash and marketable securities, while the 
adjusted capital is defined as the total debt plus the book value of equity and reserve plus provisions and 
deferred taxes less intangibles. 
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In their later paper, Bevan and Danbolt (2004) provide evidence suggesting that the 
relationship between leverage and its determinants is affected by the methodology used 
to analyse the sample data, specifically whether it controls for firm and time-specific 
heterogeneity or not. They found that there have been significant differences in the 
results of pooled data and panel data analysis. Bevan and Danbolt (2004) as Bevan and 
Danbolt (2002) use market-to book value, natural logarithm of sales (size), profitability, 
and tangibility of assets as determinants of capital structure. In addition to the time- 
invariant and firm specific heterogeneity, the focus was on the variety of long - run and 
short run debts components rather than on the aggregate measures. They found that 
large firms use long and short term debt more than small ones. Tangibility is found to be 
positively related to both short and long-term debt, while profitability is found to be 
negatively related. However, they find that profitable firms tend to use short-term debt 
more than less profitable one. 
Banerjee et al. (2000) use a set of explanatory variables as determinants of optimal 
capital structure in the UK market, such as variability of earning, tangibility of assets, 
firm size and profitability, non-debt-tax shield, uniqueness and industry classification. 
They find that all explanatory variables used as determinants of optimal capital structure 
were as hypothesised in the UK (signs), except growth, where a limited support is found 
for a positive effect arising from growth opportunity on leverage. This result implies 
that little debt is available to finance growth in the UK.  
Previous studies suggest a set of explanatory variables as determinants of optimal 
capital structure in developed countries such as profitability, asset structure, size, non-
debt tax shields, growth opportunities and earnings volatility. The findings of these 
studies were significantly not varied across developed countries, indicating that the 
capital structure in these countries is affected by similar factors. The reason may be 
attributed to their institutional similarities. As developing countries have different legal 
and institutional traditions, the financial decisions in these countries may be different 
from those of developed ones. In what follows, we present the empirical studies that 
have been conducted in the context of developed countries.   
 
2.2.3.2  Empirical evidence from developing market  
In the context of developing countries, Kunt and Maksimovic (1994)  investigate the 
capital structure in a sample of the largest publicly companies in ten developing 
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countries; India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Zimbabwe, Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, 
Jordan, and Korea. Kunt and Maksimovic (1994) argue that, despite the difference in 
the level of financial market development between the US and the sample used in their 
study, the variables that determine capital structure in the US are also determinants of 
capital structure in the sample countries. They found variables that are suggested by 
agency theory explained more of the variation than those suggested by tax-based theory. 
Moreover, for both short-term and long-term debt in most countries, they found that 
assets structure, liquidity and industry effects had more explanatory power than firm 
size, growth and tax effects. Leverage is found to be negatively related to net fixed 
assets, suggesting that markets for long-term debt do not function effectively in the 
developing countries. 
In similar study, Booth et al. (2001) assess whether capital structure theory is portable 
across developing countries with different institutional structures. The sample firms in 
their study are from Malaysia, Zimbabwe, Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, Jordan, India, 
Pakistan, Thailand, and Korea. Booth et al. (2001) use three measure of debt ratio; total 
debt ratio, long-term book debt ratio, and long-term market debt ratio with average tax 
rate, assets tangibility, business risk, size, profitability, and the market to book ratio as 
explanatory variables. The study showed that the more profitable the firm, the lower the 
debt ratio, regardless of how the debt ratio was defined. It also showed that the more the 
tangible assets, the higher the long-term debt ratio but the smaller the total debt ratio.  
Booth et al. (2001) conclude that the debt ratio in developing countries seemed to be 
affected in the same way by the same types of variables that were significant in 
developed countries. However, they pointed out that the long-term debt ratios of those 
countries are considerably lower than those of developed countries. This finding may 
indicate that the agency costs of debt are significantly large in developing countries or 
markets for long term debt are not effectively functioning in these countries.  Finally, 
Booth et al. (2001) argue that their results are in line with Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
except for the tax and the market-to-book ratio. 
In India, as a developing country, Bhaduri (2002) finds that assets structure, growth, 
uniqueness, firm’s size, and cash flows played an important role in determining the 
optimal capital structure of Indian firms. They find that large size Indian firms depend 
more on the long-term borrowing, while the small firms depend more on short-term 
borrowing. Cash flows and uniqueness of firm are found to be negatively related to 
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leverage. Finally, a positive association appeared between growth factor and leverage 
(growth is measured by the growth rate in total assets). 
In their recent study, Huang and Song (2005) investigate the determinants of capital 
structure in Chinese market. They find that leverage (long-term debt ratio, total debt 
ratio, and total liability ratio) decreases with profitability, non-debt tax shield and 
managerial shareholdings, while it increases with firm size and tangibility. In addition, 
the tax rate positively affects long-term debt ratio and total debt ratio. Furthermore, they 
find a negative relationship between leverage and firm growth opportunities. The 
findings of Huang and Song (2005) are consistent with the findings of Chen (2004) in 
the same market.  
In more recent study conducted in the context of Central and Eastern European 
countries, Delcoure (2007) finds a positive relationship between firms leverage ratios on 
the one hand, and asset tangibility, non-debt tax shield, and taxes on the other hand. In 
addition, a negative relationship between leverage ratios and profitability is found. 
Furthermore, puzzling findings relating to the relationship between firm size and 
earnings volatility with the leverage ratios are found, as the significant signs change 
across countries and among the different dependent variables. Finally, Delcoure (2007) 
concludes that the pecking order hypothesis, the trade-off theory, and the agency theory 
explain the capital structure puzzle only partially in his sample countries. 
Previous studies showed that in despite of the difference in the level of financial market 
development between developed and developing countries, capital structure in  
developing  countries is affected by factors similar to those influencing the capital 
structure in developed countries. Although Jordan is a developing and Islamic country, 
its business culture is similar to those of developed ones. Moreover, Jordan, since 1990, 
has been implementing   comprehensive economic reform programs to move toward the 
free market economy. In what follows, we present the studies that have been conducted 
using data from the Jordanian market.  
 
2.2.3.3  Evidence from Jordan 
Using data from the Jordan market, Al-Khouri and Hmedat (1992) investigate the effect 
of the earnings variability on capital structure of Jordanian corporations listed in ASE 
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over the period (1980 – 1988). They use three measures of leverage: long-term debt 
over total assets, short-term debt over total assets, and short-term debt plus long-debt 
over total assets. The independent variables are the standard deviation of the earnings 
variability and the size of the firm. They conclude that the size of the firm is considered 
to be a significant factor in determining the capital structure of the firm, and an 
insignificant relationship is found between the earning variability and the financial 
leverage of the firm. Finally, the type of industry is not considered to be a significant 
factor in determining the capital structure choice of the firm. 
Although their sample are significantly small, Diranyeh (1992) and Al-Hayjneh (2001) 
provide evidence from the Jordanian market suggesting that optimal capital structure of 
Jordanian firms is affected by factors similar to those that influence the capital structure 
in developed and other developing countries.  Diranyeh (1992) investigates the 
determinants of capital structure in a sample of 24 industrial firms. He uses assets 
collateral ratio, non-debt tax shield, firm’s size, earning fluctuations, firm’s profitability, 
firm’s growth, and the uniqueness of the firm as explanatory variables. Diranyeh (1992) 
concludes that a significant relationship appears between capital structure of the firm on 
one hand, and assets collateral ratio, fluctuation in earnings, firm’s profitability, firm’s 
size, and the uniqueness of the firm on the other hand. However, he does not explain 
why the capital structure of the firm is related to both the non-debt tax shield and the 
growth of the firm.  
Al-Hayjneh (2001) examines the determinants of capital structure in12 Jordanian 
industrial firms. He uses assets collateral ratio, non-debt tax shield, financial leverage, 
uniqueness of the firm, firm’s size, operating risk, and ownership of the firm as 
determinants of capital structure. The findings of this study are in the line with the 
findings of Diranyeh (1992).  Al-Hayjneh (2001) also concludes that Jordanian 
industrial firms depend on two ways of financing; internal financing from retained 
earnings, and external financing from long-term debt. However, internal financing had 
the bigger share in the firms’ capital structure which represented 75 % of the firm’s 
capital structure, and only 25 % lifted for long-term debt. These studies can be criticised 
on the ground of their sample size, which may make results biased toward large firms. 
However, these studies provide evidence suggesting that the capital structure in the 
Jordanian market is affected by factors similar to those in developed and other 
developing countries.  
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In summary, capital structure in both developed and developing countries (including 
Jordan) are somehow affected by the same factors. However, they differ in the amount 
of long term debt used, since developing countries use long run debt less than developed 
countries, suggesting that the market for long run debt are not effectively functioning in 
these countries. Furthermore, it suggests that firms in developing countries face a severe 
assets substitution problem and hence, firms depend heavily in short run debt to avoid 
this problem.  The common approach that the previous studies used in investigating the 
determinants of optimal capital structure is the static model which examines the 
relationship between the observed leverage ratio and a set of explanatory variables. The 
main shortcoming of this model is that the observed leverage ratio may not necessarily 
be optimal. The observed ratio will be optimal only if no adjustment (or transaction) 
costs exist because the presence of transaction costs may prevent firms from moving 
back to their optimal leverage level, making the actual leverage ratio far away from its 
optimal level. If so, the static model of trade-off theory will be unable to correctly 
describe the firm’s financing behaviour. In what follows, we assess the studies which 
have addressed the dynamic nature of capital structure in both developed and 
developing countries. 
 
2.2.4  The empirical evidence on dynamic trade-off (target adjustment) theory  
Many studies have addressed the dynamic nature of the capital structure of firm and 
provided evidence in favour of the dynamic trade-off theory that firms adjust toward a 
target leverage ratio.  
Using data from the US market, Jalilvand and Harris (1984) find a significant 
adjustment coefficient, which they interpret as evidence that firms optimise debt ratios. 
They report a rate of adjustment of 55.7% per year which suggests that US firms back 
quickly to their target leverage ratio when their leverage ratios deviate from their target 
leverage ratio. Furthermore, they find that besides the costs and benefits of target 
reversion, the firm size, interest rates (the cost of debt itself) and stock price level have a 
significant impact on the speeds of adjustment toward the target. This finding may 
provide explanations as to why previous studies reported different rates of adjustment. 
 Consistent with the finding of Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Flannery and Rangan (2006) 
provide evidence suggesting that US firms do target a long run capital structure and 
revert back quickly to that target when their current leverage move away from the 
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target. They claim that the adjustment rate they found is roughly three times faster than 
what was reported in the literature, since they report a rate of adjustment of 34.2 %. 
They argue that this finding suggests that the costs of deviation from the target are 
significantly important for the US firms, making the benefits of moving back toward the 
target too important. It also suggests that US companies incur low transaction costs 
when they raise debt funds. Moreover, they argue that the rapid adjustment toward the 
target capital structure in the US firms implies that pecking order and timing theories do 
not dominate most firm debt ratio decisions. 
However, using data from the US market, Leary and Roberts (2005) provide evidence 
suggesting that information asymmetry costs are an important determinant in the 
financing decision of the US firms that follow a dynamic re-balancing strategy. They 
find that US firms are less likely to use external capital when they have sufficient 
internal funds, but are more likely to use it when they have large investment needs. 
Therefore, they conclude that firms may have target leverage ratio and still prefer 
internal over external funds. This finding is not consistent with the finding of Flannery 
and Rangan (2006). However, they find that US firms are more likely to increase 
(decrease) leverage if their leverage is relatively low (high). Moreover, they find that 
highly levered firms tend to reduce their book leverage the following year. Leary and 
Roberts (2005) report a rate of adjustment of 25 % per year. These findings suggest  
firstly, that leverage adjustment may be different between increasing or reducing 
leverage: i.e., above-target leverage or below-target leverage; secondly, that adjustment 
toward the target leverage ratio may take place in a way consistent with the suggestion 
of pecking order theory which provides another explanation as to why previous studies 
reported different rates  of  adjustment. 
Consistent with Leary and Roberts (2005), Hovakiman et al. (2004) who test the 
hypothesis that US firms tend to move toward the target debt ratio when they either 
raise new capital or retire or repurchase existing capital, find that firms who follow the 
dynamic trade-off theory choose the amount of debt and equity that offset the effects of 
earnings and losses accumulation on their capital structure. This suggests that 
adjustment toward the target leverage ratio may be different between financial surplus 
and deficit. Moreover, Hovakiman et al. (2004) conclude that if the target capital 
structure is the matter, highly profitable firms will be more likely to issue debt rather 
than equity because these firms are less subject to high bankruptcy risk and 
consequently, will be able to borrow at more attractive interest rates. Hence, they can 
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adjust their leverage faster than less profitable firms, indicating that firms may not 
revert quickly to their target leverage ratio if the costs of debt are significantly large and 
the adjustment requires an increase in debt level. In addition, they find firms with higher 
current stock prices (relative to their past stock prices) are more likely to issue equity 
rather than debt and repurchase debt rather than equity, suggesting that leverage may 
deviate from the target in response to timing consideration and capital market 
conditions. This finding is consistent the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2002). Baker 
and Wurgler (2002) find that low-levered firms tend to be those which raised funds 
when their valuations were high, and conversely high leverage firms tend to be those 
which raised funds when their valuations were low. Hence, one can expect that firms 
will show a weak desire to move back quickly towards target when stock markets 
experience an increase in stock prices. 
In a more recent study conducted in the US market, Huang and Ritter (2007) find that 
US firms slowly rebalance away the undesired effects of leverage shock. They report a 
rate of adjustment of 17.0% which indicates that US firms need 3.7 years to remove half 
of the effects of a shock on their leverage. Moreover, Huang and Ritter (2007) find that 
US firms finance a large proportion of their deficit with external equity, not debt, which 
explains the slower rate of adjustment in the US market. This finding suggests that US 
firms have less incentive to adjust leverage when the cost of equity is relatively lower 
than that of debt, suggesting that leverage may deviate in response to timing 
consideration and market conditions.  
Several studies have investigated the empirical evidence of static trade-off (target 
capital theory) in the UK market and other Europe countries. Marsh (1982) provides 
evidence from the UK market suggesting that UK companies had a target capital 
structure for both short-term and long-term debts ratios and make their choices of 
financing instrument accordingly. He found that these companies work to maintain their 
long-run target debt ratio, although they deviate from the target in the short-run in 
response to timing considerations and capital market conditions. Marsh (1982) argues 
that probability of issuing debts and/or equity varies with the deviation from the target 
level of capital structure. He points out that probability of equity issuance would be high 
(low) if the firm's capital structure is above (below) its target level. Although he does 
not empirically test this argument, it implies that UK firms experience both downward 
and upward adjustment towards their target debt ratio. 
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In a comparative study, Banerjee et al. (2000) test the dynamic model of capital 
structure to explore the capital structure adjustment process in UK firms compared to 
those in the US. Banerjee et al. (2000) conclude that US firms adjust their leverage 
faster than UK firms, implying that US leverage will be much closer to its target level. 
For the UK firms, the adjustment costs are significantly more important, which explains 
the slow speed of adjustment toward the target level in the UK sample firms compared 
to US sample firms. However, using data from the UK market, Ozkan (2001) provides 
evidence suggesting that UK firms have long-run target leverage ratio and adjustment 
towards their target ratios takes place relatively fast. He reports a rate of adjustment of 
44.3% per year which is higher than the rate reported by Banerjee et al. (2000). Ozkan 
(2001) argues that this finding suggests that the costs of being away from the target and 
the adjustment costs toward the target level are equally important for the UK firms.  
In more recent study, Antoniou et al. (2008) provide mixed results in countries which 
follow a market-based financial system and a bank-based financial system. Antoniou et 
al. (2008) have conducted a comparative study between capital market-based systems 
(USA and UK) and bank based financial systems (France, Germany, and Japan).  In all 
five countries, the results suggest that firms have target leverage ratios and adjust their 
leverage ratios regularly to maintain a target level. French firms are the fastest in 
adjusting their leverage (59.3 % per year), while Japanese firms are the slowest (11.1% 
per year). In Germany, they report a rate of adjustment of 23.6% per year. In the UK 
and US markets, they report 31.8 and 33.2% respectively. Moreover, they find that in 
both types of financial system, leverage ratio is found to be positively related to the 
tangibility and the size of the firm, while it is negatively related to the profitability, 
growth opportunities and share price performance. Antoniou et al. (2008) conclude that 
there are many factors influencing the capital structure of a firm such as the corporate 
governance, tax system, borrower-lender relation, and the level of investors’ protection. 
In Spanish markets, where the financial system is a bank-based financial system, 
Miguel and Pindado (2001) investigated whether the non-financial quoted Spanish firms 
have a target and move toward that target. Their results confirm that Spanish firms have 
a target debt ratio and bear transaction costs when the adjustment toward that target is 
made. However, the costs of adjustment are lower than the benefits of moving back to 
the target leverage   ratio which encourages firms to adjust their leverage too quickly. 
These costs are also lower than those of the US firms, due to their higher percentage of 
private debt.  Miguel and Pindado (2001) report a rate of adjustment of 79% per year.  
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 In developing markets, Singh (1994) finds results consistent with those in developed 
markets (i.e. Baker and Wurgler, 2002 and Huang and Ritter, 2007). He provides 
evidence suggesting that capital structure in developing countries is largely affected by 
equity timing considerations and the costs of debt. Singh (1994) investigated how the 
top hundred largest listed firms in 10 less developed countries (India, Brazil, Mexico, 
South Korea, Jordan, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey, and Zimbabwe) financed 
their investment during the period 1980-1990. He generally finds that firms in these 
countries rely heavily on external funds and new share issues to finance the growth of 
their investment. According to Singh (1994), the main reason is that the relative cost of 
equity capital fell significantly during the 1980s due to the large increase in stock 
prices. Together, with an increase in the cost of debt, equity issues become relatively 
more attractive for financing corporate investment. However, he emphasises that these 
conclusions refer only to large firms in these 10 less developed countries and are 
unlikely to be valid for smaller firms. This situation may be applicable now to the 
Jordanian market, where stock prices on ASE have witnessed a considerable increase 
and Jordanian banks have adopted conservative credit policies. In addition, the internal 
and external demand for equities rose recently in response to the governments’ 
promotional policies for stock market expansion, since foreigners are allowed to own up 
to 100% of the stocks of all listed firms.  
We did not find that studies in Jordan addressed the issue of dynamic capital structure 
except that conducted by Maghyereh (2004). Maghyereh (2004) provides evidence 
suggesting that Jordanian firms adjust their leverage ratio toward their targets very fast. 
Using a sample of the 36 largest Jordanian firms over the period 1990-2000, Maghyereh 
(2004) reports a rate of adjustment of 72.8% per year.  His study can be criticised on the 
grounds of sample size and the results may also be biased towards large firms. 
However, he provides evidence suggesting that Jordanian firms experience relatively 
low adjustment speed after liberalising the financial system in Jordan, since the 
estimated adjustment coefficient is lower in 1990-1995 (0.851) than it is in 1995-2000 
(0.682). The reasons for this reduction are the removal of restriction on interest rates 
and the adoption of conservative credit policies by the Jordanian banks.    
As seen above, the existing research on dynamic capital structure has provided mixed 
results on the speed of adjustment toward the target leverage ratio, suggesting that the 
costs and benefits of target reversion may differ from one country to another. It also 
suggests that there are other factors affecting the speeds of adjustment such as the firm 
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size, interest rates (the cost of debt itself) and stock price level. Moreover, some studies 
predict that adjustment toward the target leverage ratio may vary depending on whether 
the firm is below or above its target leverage ratio (i.e. Marsh, 1982; Cai and Chosh, 
2003 and Leary and Roberts, 2005).  
Cai and Chosh (2003) argue that by assuming the goal of the firm is to maximise the 
value, the firm must adjust its gearing upward when its gearing is below the optimal 
gearing ratio whilst it must reduce its gearing ratio when gearing is above the optimal 
ratio. Cai and Ghosh (2003) propose an answer to the question “why does a firm adjust 
its debt level toward the industry mean when it is above the mean, while it is indifferent 
to revert to target when it is below that target or mean?” Cai and Ghosh’s explanation is 
that when a firm’s debt level reaches a significantly high level (above the mean), the 
large bankruptcy and agency costs of leverage makes the reduction of the debt a 
meaningful task, while a firm whose debt level is below the average debt level of the 
industry does not put consideration of debt level as its first priority.  
However, these predictions are not empirically tested. In the context of the dynamic 
trade-off theory, firms trade off the costs and benefits of moving toward their target 
leverage ratio when they decide to rebalance their capital structure, indicating that the 
costs and benefits of moving back toward the target are the main determinants of the 
speed of adjustment. It is worth noting that the costs of being away from target include 
the tax benefit lost by the firm being below its target level of leverage, and the 
bankruptcy and agency costs of having above-target leverage.  
The extant literature on the dynamic capital structure has assumed that these costs are 
symmetric. In reality, the significance of these costs may not necessarily be symmetric 
or identical for firms: i.e., firms with below-target leverage ratio may benefit (tax 
benefit) from increasing leverage, however it is not as critical that they revert to their 
target as for those with above-target leverage ratio. This is because of the probability of 
bankruptcy increases with leverage. It is increasing at an increasing rate as firms move 
above their target level of leverage, while for those with leverage below their target 
leverage ratio, the marginal tax savings decline as a firm moves up to match it target 
level for the same reason.21  Moreover, leverage expansions may be constrained by the 
availability of debt at attractive rates and also by borrowing constraints such as 
bankruptcy and agency risks.  
                                                          
21
 The marginal tax savings decline significantly when firms have a substantial amount of non-debt tax 
shields (see, DeAnglo and Masulis, 1980 and Ross, 1985). 
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However, the firm will not adjust its leverage until the benefits from engaging in 
adjustment outweigh the costs of adjustment. The adjustment costs may be different 
between increasing and reducing leverage, suggesting different speeds of adjustment for 
leverage above and below the target level of leverage. As Olinear and Rudebusch (1989; 
1992) point out, new debt issues require a compensation for the dealer placing the issue, 
and other expenses such as legal, accounting and  printing  costs, registration fees and 
taxes. Firms may be forced to incur significant adjustment (transaction) costs when the 
adjustment requires an increase in the leverage level. However, these costs are at least 
less likely to be significant when the firm is reducing its leverage ratio. Olinear and 
Rudebusch (1989; 1992) find that the transaction costs consumed nearly 14% of the 
proceeds of small debt issues in the USA. Thus, if the adjustment costs constitute a 
major portion of the total costs of changing leverage, firms with leverage out of their 
target will adjust their leverage only if they are sufficiently far away from the target 
level of leverage, making the probability of adjustment a positive function of the 
difference between actual leverage ratio and target leverage ratio. This suggests that the 
rate of adjustment may vary depending on whether the observed or actual leverage ratio 
is above or below the target leverage ratio, and on whether the deviation from the target 
is large or small.  
Furthermore, Leary and Roberts (2005) find that firms may have a target leverage ratio 
but still follow the pecking order theory, suggesting that adjustment toward the target 
leverage ratio may take place in a way consistent with the suggestion of pecking order 
theory. Pecking order theory suggests that, due to the adverse selection costs, firms 
prefer internal financing over costly external financing, however, when external 
financing is needed, they prefer debt funds to equity funds. Hence, firms with financial 
deficit tend to issue debt rather than issuing equity, while those with financial surplus 
are expected to retire debt rather than equity to avoid the higher costs of re-issuing 
equity and to save their debt capacity for future financing requirement. If so, firms are 
expected to experience different speeds of adjustment depending on whether they have 
surplus or deficit, i.e. firms with financial deficit tended to increase their leverage, 
making leverage adjustment for these firms faster than those with financial surplus. 
Firms with surplus are expected to retire debt and consequently, move away from the 
target level, increasing the time required to revert to their target.  
However, firms with fund surplus may be less subject to the bankruptcy risk and hence, 
be able to raise debt funds at more attractive rates, implying that firms facing surplus 
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will be faster than those with financial deficit. This might also suggest that firms with 
fund surplus or deficit may experience different upward and downward speeds of 
adjustment: i.e., firms face surplus (deficit) with leverage below (above) the target level 
are expected to adjust their leverage slower than those with leverage above (below) the 
target. Most recently, Byoun (2008) examine the capital structure adjustment 
conditional on the required external capital changes as measured by a financial 
deficit/surplus. Byoun (2008) provide evidence suggesting that most adjustments occur 
when firms have above-target debt with a financial surplus or when they have below-
target debt with a financial deficit. The adjustment rates for firms with financial deficits 
are lower than those with financial surplus, suggesting that firms with financial deficit 
are more risky than firms with financial surplus. Although his results suggest that firms 
move toward the target capital structure when they face a financial deficit/surplus, 
adjustment towards the target leverage ratio does not occur in the way consistent with 
the predictions of pecking-order theory. He finds that surplus firms with above-target 
debt use all of their financial surpluses to pay off debt, whereas firms with below-target 
debt retire both debt and equity with their financial surpluses. Hence, firms with 
financial surpluses experience different adjustment rates for leverage below-and above- 
target leverage ratios, with higher rates for above-target leverage than for below-target 
leverage. In contrast, his results suggests that surplus firms with leverage below the 
target level move away from the target, increasing the time required for firms to revert 
back towards their target ratios. For comparison purposes, we test the empirical model 
which is used by Byoun (2008) to test the asymmetric adjustment for surplus and deficit 
firms.22 
It is worth noting that the critical assumption in the trade-off theory is that all market 
participants had homogeneous expectations and had the same information about the 
firm’s value and profitability. This assumption has been violated by Myers and Majulf 
(1984) and Myers (1984) on their pecking order theory of capital structure. In the 
context of this theory, there is no well-defined optimal leverage ratio. In what follows, 
we discuss the theoretical backgrounds and empirical evidence on the pecking order 
theory of capital structure. 
                                                          
22
 This study was published after submitting this thesis on Nov, 5. It is published in the journal of finance 
on Dec, 18, 2008. 
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2.3 Pecking Order Theory 
Pecking order theory predicts that due to the information asymmetry between a firm and 
outside investors regarding the real value of both current operations and future 
prospects, external capital (debt and equity) will always be relatively costly compared to 
internal capital (retained earnings). Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that information 
asymmetry will lead to a mis-pricing of a firm’s equity in the marketplace, causing a 
loss of wealth for existing shareholders.23 This is because of the adverse selection 
problem that arises because managers are more knowledgeable than outsiders 
(investors). Myers and Majluf (1984) claim that if the firm finances its new project by 
issuing new securities, these securities will be under-priced. This is because managers 
cannot credibly convey the quality of their existing assets and available investment 
opportunities to potential investors. As a result, outsiders may not be able to 
discriminate between good and bad projects, consequently interpreting the firm’s 
decision to issue new securities as a sign of possible bad news and then pricing new 
securities accordingly. They will demand a premium to invest, or firm can only issue 
equity at a discount. 
Aware of the resulting dilution of current shareholders’ wealth, firms may not issue new 
equity even for projects with positive net present values, causing what is known ‘under-
investment problem, therefore, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that borrowing through 
debt instruments, especially the less risky ones, helps firms mitigate the inefficiencies in 
their investment decisions that are caused by the information asymmetry.  Compared to 
equity, debt is likely subject to lower degree of miss-evaluation or adverse selection 
problem, simply because debt contracts are safer in that they limit the possible ways by 
which holders could loose.  
Since the Jordanian capital market is a small and thin market, information is not readily 
available to outside investors, which poses too much risk for outsiders. Therefore, it is 
expected that they will demand a premium on, or under price, new equity or debt issues 
because they are unable to monitor all aspects of investment projects and managerial 
behaviour. This will raise the costs of external finance and then induce Jordanian firms 
to rely on internally generated funds from retained earning rather than external funds, 
                                                          
23
 The main assumptions behind their argument are that, managers have better information about the 
firm’s value than potential investors and that managers act in the best interests of existing shareholders.  
 
  37 
and raising debt when external funds are needed. Hence, we could expect that the 
pecking order theory will be more applicable to Jordanian firms. 
However, many measures have been taken recently by the Jordanian government to 
make the market signal the price information to market participants (i.e. Transparency 
Act of 1998, Companies Act of 1997, Securities Act of 1997 and new Electronic 
Trading System). Moreover, foreigners are allowed to own up to 100% of the stocks of 
all listed firms. The government efforts are aimed at increasing competition, 
transparency and safety for traders and investors. As results, Amman Stock Exchange 
has witnessed a remarkable increase in the trading volumes, market capitalisations and 
number of listed corporations. It also witnessed an increase in stock prices. This, 
together with the increase in interest rates on loans due to the financial liberalisation and 
the adoption of conservative credit polices in the Jordanian banks, encourages Jordanian 
firms to go to the stock market for financing. It is worth noting that Jordanian firms 
have no experience in raising funds externally (outside the country) and the Jordanian 
bonds market is small and not developed well. This implies that the arguments of Myers 
(2001) and Myers and Majluf (1984) that firms issue equities when they are overvalued 
may be applicable to Jordanian firms.  According to Myers and Majluf (1984), 
managers would tend to issue equity only if the firm is overvalued, and debt when its 
value is undervalued. Moreover, they claim that external equity is issued when the risk 
of financial distress become significantly high, otherwise, straight debt and hybrid 
securities are issued at low and moderate risk of financial distress. 
Consistent with this argument, Myers (2001) contends that the equity issues occur only 
when debt is costly, i.e. at a dangerously high debt ratio where managers and investors 
foresee costs of financial distress. Myers demonstrates that equity issues are spurned by 
investors if debt is available on fair terms, and in equilibrium only debt is issued. 
Therefore, he argues that debt has the prior claim on assets and earnings, while equity is 
the residual claim. In the context of pecking order theory, firms should issue equity 
when they experience high stocks valuation for two reasons: firstly, the asymmetric 
information costs to the firm are expected to low when shares are overvalued, secondly, 
these firms are expected to have higher growth opportunities which induce them to 
finance their financing needs with equity in order to maintain their borrowing capacity 
for the future (see, Titman and Wessels, 1988 and Rajan and Zingles, 1995).   
Myers (1984) uses Myers and Majluf (1984) to provide a rationale for explaining 
financial policy decision of firms with what is known a pecking order theory of capital 
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structure. As described by Myers (1984:581), the pecking order theory suggests that 
firms first prefer internal sources of finance, and they adjust their target dividend pay-
out ratio to their investment opportunities. If the firms seek external finance, due to 
generous dividend policies, unpredictable fluctuations in profitability or investment 
opportunities, firms will choose debt (as the safest instrument), and then hybrid 
securities such as convertible bonds, and then equity as a last resort. The pecking order 
theory generally explains why firms might rationally let cash flows determine leverage. 
This suggests that firms turn to debt funds under pressure of an internal funds shortage. 
Therefore, the stronger the cash flow relative to investment, the less likely the firms will 
turn to debt and the more likely the leverage will fall for a given level of equity.  
Furthermore, Myers (1984) argues that if internally generated cash flow is greater than 
desired investment outlays, the firm first pays off debt or invests in cash or marketable 
securities. This suggests that pecking order theory predicts different financing behaviour 
for surpluses and deficits firms. This is one of the criticisms to those who test the 
suggestions of pecking order theory and assume that firms’ pecking order is not 
different for surpluses and deficits.  
Previous analysis suggests that firms exhibit a hierarchy of preference with respect to 
funding resources. As a result, firms will first use cash flow as the cheapest source of 
finance, then debt finance, and finally outside equity financing as a last resort. The 
underlying argument behind the prediction of pecking order theory is the information or 
adverse selection costs. However, there is evidence suggesting that information costs 
are not the only factor that encourages firms to follow the pecking order theory. Fazzary 
et al. (1988) who tested the sensitivity of investment to the availability of cash flow, has 
listed the main sources of costs hierarchy which induce firms to follow the pecking 
order theory. Beside information costs (has been discussed above), they list transaction 
costs and agency costs. These elements provide an explanation as to why firms prefer 
internal funds as the cheapest source of financing over the external ones. In what 
follows we provide a brief discussion of the transaction costs and agency costs as 
additional sources for financing hierarchy. 
 
1- Transaction costs 
Donaldso (1961) who provides the origin of pecking order theory has attributed the 
pecking order behaviour to the presence of transaction costs. These costs are usually 
associated with raising funds externally (debt/equity). According to Kadapakkam et al. 
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(1998), transaction costs involved in the use of external equity or debt result in a 
“financing hierarchy” in which the cheapest funds are utilised first. There are two 
principal components to transactions costs (Rudebusch and Oliner, 1989; 1992): the 
compensation for the dealer placing the issue, and other expenses such as legal, 
accounting and printing costs, registration fees and taxes. According to Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) data,24 the transaction costs consumed nearly 19% of the 
gross proceeds of small stock issues and about 14% of the proceeds of small debt issues, 
implying that the transactions costs are especially high for small issues. Consequently, 
they constitute a significant financing hierarchy for smaller firms. However, Olinear and 
Rudebusch (1989; 1992) show that these transaction costs became smaller in relative 
terms with increases in issue size, suggesting that these costs large are lower for large 
firms than for small firms. This implies that small firms are more likely to follow the 
pecking order theory. 
 
2. Agency costs 
Agency theory addresses incentive and moral hazard problems that could arise due to 
the separation between ownership and control, creating what is known in finance as 
shareholder-manager conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This conflict gives rise to 
agency costs which may increase the costs of raising funds externally, and consequently 
increasing the reliance on internally generated funds as a cheapest source of financing.25   
Another kind of conflict arise between manager/shareholder and debt holders due to the 
use of debt, increasing the cost of external funding and consequently shifting firms 
towards internally generate funds. These costs are the agency costs of assets substitution 
problem or underinvestment problem since firms may be forced to forgo some of its 
profitable investment opportunities, reducing their profitability and thereby its value. 
Therefore, firms with higher agency costs will tend to depend more heavily on 
internally generated funds for financing, following what is known in corporate finance 
theory as the pecking order theory.   
                                                          
24 The Securities and Exchange Commission is the authority who regulates U.S securities market. 
25 These costs are the sum of: (1) monitoring costs by the shareholders to control and observe the 
manager’s behaviour; (2) bonding costs by the manager to assure the shareholder that he will not take 
actions to harm the shareholder’s interest or to ensure that the shareholder will be compensated if he does 
take such actions; and (3) the residual loss which represents the costs resulting from differences in actions 
between the manager and the shareholder compared to those if the shareholder took the action himself 
(Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
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2.3.1 The critical criticisms of pecking order theory  
It is worth noting that the pecking order theory is criticised on the grounds of its 
underlying arguments and suggestions. Adedeji (1998) concludes that the suggestion of 
pecking order theory, that it is only the internal funds shortage that motivates firms to 
raise funds externally is questioned. This is because it ignores other theories and the 
effects of institutional factors that might affect the firm’s choice of financing 
instruments such as the level of interest rate, borrower-lender relations and finally, the 
government intervention. Cull and Xu (2005) argued that sometimes reinvestment of 
firm’s profits in the large scale projects is conditional by its ability to generate funds 
externally. He concludes that investment is lumpy, since internal and external funds are 
needed to finance the available profitable projects.  Moreover, he argued that the 
government intervention through the monetary policy during the financial crisis may 
make the cost of borrowing lower than the cost of internal funds. Consequently, firms 
use debt before internal funds.  
The underlying argument of Myers and Majulf (1984), Myers (1984) that information 
cost or the adverse selection problem induces firms to follow the pecking order 
behaviour, has been contradicted by Baskin (1989), Allen (1993) and Adedji (1998). 
They argue that transaction and information costs are not the only factors that might 
discourage the use of external financing, in general and for equity in particular. They 
conclude that control consideration may make firms reluctant to issue equities because 
of their effects on the existing balance of control, or even to issue debt which might 
impose the discipline of the capital market on them. Consistent with this, Myers (1984) 
has contended that firms’ reliance on internally generated funds is interpreted by others 
(i.e. Jensen and Makling, 1976), as the result of the separation of ownerships and 
control, where managers will be reluctant to raise funds externally to avoid the capital 
market discipline. Fazzary et al. (1988) who tested the sensitivity of investment to the 
availability of cash flow, provide empirical evidence supporting the above arguments. 
They list the main sources of costs hierarchy which induce firms to follow the pecking 
order theory such as transaction costs, agency costs and asymmetric information costs. 
Fazzary et al. (1988) provide evidence suggesting that the investment of US firms is 
highly sensitive to the availability of cash flow.  
Moreover, Fama and French (2005) argue that firms can avoid the information costs or 
the adverse selection by issuing the equities which are less subject to asymmetric 
information such as equity issues to employees in their compensation plan or to existing 
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stock holders. They argue that this kind of issues does not change the ownership 
structure and then the existing balance of control. Furthermore, it does not involve high 
costs of asymmetric information. If so, the grip of the information asymmetries 
approach is broken down because firms can issue equity at a low information cost. 
Hence, the need for issuing debt to finance new investment projects is reduced. 
However, the stock option plans for employees may be issued for considerations other 
than the information costs. Graham et al. (2004)   examine the stock option plans for 
employees as a non-debt tax shield. Their evidence about employees’ stock options 
suggests that options deductions work as important non-debt tax shields and firms tend 
to substitute option deductions for interest deductions. Moreover, stock option plans for 
employees are also suggested as techniques to mitigate the conflict between managers 
and stockholders and encourage managers to work for stockholders interest. This 
reduces the need for debt as a mechanism for mitigating the agency conflict as it has 
been suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986). In the Jordanian 
context, public shareholding companies are not allowed to issue any class of shares 
other than common shares (Company act 1997). This implies that equity issues to 
employees in their compensation plan or to existing stock holders are not allowed.  
 
2.3.2 Empirical evidence of pecking order theory 
Several studies have tested the suggestions of pecking order theory by using different 
models and techniques. Some of these studies have proposed a model suggesting that 
internal funds deficit is the main determinant of the change in debt level (i.e. Shyam-
Sunder and Myers, 1999 and Frank and Goyal, 2003), while the other tested the pecking 
order theory in terms of its predictions with respect to some of the explanation variables 
such as profitability, size and growth… etc (i.e. Tong and Green, 2005,   Allen, 1993; 
Baskin, 1989; Adedeji, 1998). These studies interpreted the negative sign of 
profitability coefficient in leverage equations as evidence supporting pecking order 
theory. As Baskin (1989) points out, most of the studies over the past fifty years 
reported a negative relationship between leverage and profitability. The negative 
relationship is taken as a support for pecking order theory against trade-off theory. 
 However, Hovakiman et al. (2004) claim that the negative relationship between 
leverage and profitability is not because profitability affects the leverage level, but 
because of its effect on the deviation of leverage level from the target level. They argue 
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that the negative relationship between profitability and leverage will persist for firms 
that follow pecking order because these firms have no incentive to offset the effects of 
profitability on leverage. In this section, we present literature for the both groups, 
starting firstly with those who test the pecking order theory on the basis of its prediction 
regarding profitability, size and growth variables 
Using data from the US market, Taggart (1985) examines how the US firms establish 
their own capital structure. The study findings revealed that debt financing varies 
constantly with capital expenditure relative to available internal funds, suggesting that 
debt only is used to accommodate the desired investment level. He finds that capital 
structure in these firms is determined in response to the need to finance new investment 
opportunities with available internal funds. Taggart (1985) concludes that the 
comparative costs of available financing sources induce firms to use internally 
generated funds as a first choice before turning to raise funds externally. However, he 
argues that when external funds are needed, firms turn firstly to debt funds before using 
equity funds. Taggart (1985) attributes this behaviour to the transaction costs   as well 
as to the asymmetric information costs which are usually associated with raising funds 
externally. Finally, his findings are consistent with the suggestion of pecking order 
theory which predicts that leverage is negatively related to a firm’s profitability. 
Consistent with these findings, Baskin (1989) provides evidence supporting the 
suggestion of pecking order theory. Baskin found that the pecking order theory is a 
descriptor of corporate finance behaviour in US.  He argues that although bankruptcy 
costs of debt do restrict the firms’ ability to borrow, the supply of debt funds is more 
elastic than that of equity funds. Baskin (1989) takes the positive association between 
leverage and past growth and the negative association between leverage and past 
profitability as evidence supporting the pecking order theory. Baskin (1989) attributes 
the reasons to the hierarchy behaviour in US firms to the transaction costs, information 
cost, and control considerations.  
Following Baskin (1989) in US, Allen (1993) in Australia tests the prediction of 
pecking order theory that there should be a negative relationship between debt ratios 
and profitability. The finding of Allen supports this prediction, where a significant 
negative relationship between leverage and profitability is found. Allen (1993) attributes 
that to the preference of firm to build its reserve debt capacity by generating funds 
internally if it was profitable. He argues that in the presence of asymmetric information 
and the resulting market misevaluation of equity, firms will avoid equity issuance and 
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turn to debt which is less subject to the adverse selection. According to Allen (1993), 
the amount of debt   needed will be determined as the residual between the desired 
investment and the supply of retained earning. He concludes that these findings are 
consistent with Baskin in US. 
Building on Baskin (1989) and Allen (1993), Adedji (1998) provides evidence 
supporting pecking order theory in the UK market. Adedji (1998) investigates the 
possible interaction among investment, leverage and dividend payout ratio. The results 
show that dividend payout ratio had the predicted negative interaction with investment 
and the expected positive interaction with financial leverage.26 No significant 
interaction between leverage and investment is found. However, Adedji (1998) finds 
that the effect runs only from investment to leverage. This conclusion supports the 
argument that firms use debt funds only to accommodate the desired investment as it 
has been argued by Allen (1993) in Australia and Baskin (1989) in the US. Finally, he 
concludes that the nature of the relationship between leverage either to dividend or to 
investment is influenced by the way a firm responds to its earning shortage.  
By using the same methodology used in the above study, Tong and Green (2005) test 
the predictions of pecking order theory using data from the Chinese market. They find a 
significant negative relationship between leverage and profitability and a significant 
positive relationship between leverage and past dividend. Tong and Green (2005) argue 
that their findings support the pecking order theory over trade-off theory.27 Therefore, 
they conclude that pecking order theory will be capable of explaining the financing 
behaviour of Chinese companies, although the sample size was not too large, with 42 
firms being included in their study sample. Moreover, they conclude that the 
conventional model of leverage can explain the financing behaviour in the Chinese 
market. 
 Syham – Sunder and Myers (1999) test the pecking order theory and trade-off theory in 
the US market.  For pecking order theory, they regress the firm’s net debt issues on its 
                                                          
26
 Paying dividend will reduce the amount of internal funds available for financing, implying a negative 
relationship between dividend pay out and investments. However, firms with more profitable projects 
may tend to reduce dividend to get enough funds for financing which reduce the need for raising debt. 
This suggests a negative relationship between dividend pay out and investments and a positive 
relationship between dividend payout and leverage.  
27
 Trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between leverage and profitability and a negative 
relationship between leverage and investment opportunities which is contrary to what is predicted by 
pecking order theory. 
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net financing deficit. They find that the estimated coefficient on the deficit variable is 
close to one.  Syham – Sunder and Myers (1999) interpret this result as evidence 
supporting pecking order theory because a shortfall in funds is first met by debt.  
Furthermore,  they find that the power of trade-off theory in explaining new debts issues 
is better than pecking order theory because when the pecking order model and trade-off 
model are nested in the same regression, all cases of pecking order model are rejected 
(they use the net financing deficit as an additional explanatory variable in their trade-off 
theory model). However, their study is criticised on the ground of its assumption and 
sample selection criteria.  
Chirinko and Singha (2000) argue that the assumption that the coefficient of deficit 
regressed on the net change in total debt, should be close to one is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for the pecking order theory to be valid. Therefore, they 
question the interpretation of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) regression test. Chirinko 
and Singha (2000) claim that the slope coefficient could fall well short of unity when 
the pecking order theory holds and be close to unity when it does not . This is because 
equity issues may create a degree of positive and negative bias in the Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999) test. They show that the predicted regression coefficient of deficit is 
actually 0.74 rather than one for the firms that actually follow the pecking order theory, 
but they issue an empirically observed amount of equity. This amount of bias is not 
trivial, but it still leaves the coefficients very far from the magnitudes of slope 
coefficients that are observed. Furthermore, Chirinko and Singha (2000) explanation 
implies that finding a coefficient near one would not disprove trade-off theory.  
Frank and Goyal (2003) who investigate the pecking order theory in US market, 
contend that Shyam-Sunder and Myers’ study sample is biased towards large firms. 
They vindicate their criticism on the ground that the pecking order theory appears to 
perform particularly poorly amongst small firms, for which adverse selection problem 
of raising external equity might have been expected to be most relevant. Adedeji (2002) 
points out that the sample selection procedures used in the study of Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) could have biased the results toward the pecking order hypothesis. 
However, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) already pointed out that the bias might exist 
but they claim that this bias is trivial because the predictions of the pecking order theory 
are the same for all sizes.  
Another criticism of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and of those who also test the 
pecking order theory (i.e. Frank and Goyal, 2003; Nuri and Archer, 2001) is that they 
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assume that pecking order theory pays no attention to the sign of deficit variable. So 
they use the positive and negative values of deficit in one variable in their regressions.  
Pecking order theory predicts that firms respond differently to financial surplus and 
deficit. More specifically, firms tend to expand debt when they have financial deficit 
and retire debt when they have financial surplus.  However, financial surplus may not 
necessarily be used up to retire debt; in contrast, shareholders may force mangers to 
employ debt to soak up surplus (free cash flow) which suggests that financial surplus 
and deficit affect the change in debt level similarly, not differently. Moreover, even if 
they affect the change in total debt differently, the impetus of expanding debt for 
financing may differ from that of retiring debt for soaking up surplus. As mentioned 
before, leverage expansions may be constrained by the availability of debt at attractive 
rates and also by borrowing constraints such as the bankruptcy and agency risks. It is 
also affected by the stock price level, i.e. when stock prices are overvalued; firms tend 
to finance their financing requirement by issuing equity, reducing the impetus to raise 
debt, especially when expanding debt involves higher costs of bankruptcy and assets 
substitution problems. Hence, including the negative values (surplus amounts) with 
positive values in the same variable may lower the estimated coefficient of the deficit 
variable in their regressions. Although Adedeji (2002) does not investigate how 
sensitive the firms are to their financial surplus and deficit, he provides evidence 
suggesting that considering the negative values with positive values in the same variable 
has reduced the estimated coefficient of deficit variable. 
Using Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Adedeji (2002) tests the prediction of pecking 
order theory in the UK market. The result showed that new debt issues did not have a 
one-to-one relationship with firms financing deficit as pecking order theory suggests 
where new debt issues financed only 22% of financing deficit. Adedeji (2002)  retests 
the pecking order model by considering only the positive values of financial deficit in 
the regression and sets the negative values equal to zero (the new variable is named as 
the adjusted deficit variable). Adedeji (2002) argue that these amounts are not internal 
funds deficits or requirements for external finance to be covered by issuing debt. The 
results showed that excluding the negative values (surplus amounts) from the deficit 
variable increased the estimated coefficient on the deficit variable from 22% to 39%, 
implying that including negative values can reduce the effect of deficit variable on the 
dependent variable which is the change in total debt level.  
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In another study, Frank and Goyal (2003) propose a model to test the pecking order 
theory on a broad cross-section of publicly traded US firms. The model suggests that the 
existence of pecking order theory requires new debts issuance to have a one to one 
relationship with all of the components of the financing deficit. Frank and Goyal (2003) 
claim that pecking order theory implies that the financing deficit should eliminate the 
effects of other explanatory variables. They find that the estimated coefficient  on  the 
deficit variable is far below one and  that equity issues track the financing deficit quite 
closely while debt did not that so. Moreover, they claim that if the pecking order theory 
is held, the deficit variable should overwhelm the effects of the other explanatory 
variables in the conventional leverage equation. However, Frank and Goyal (2003) find 
that adding the deficit variable to the convention leverage regression does not change 
the sign and the significance of other explanatory variables, implying  that  the adverse 
selection costs is one among other factors affecting the firm’s financing behaviour. 
Finally, French and Goyal conclude that the pecking order theory is more applicable to 
large firms than small firms, since their sample of large firms provides more support for 
the pecking order than their small-sample firms.  
 Using data from UK and Spanish markets, Benito (2003) examines the propensity of a 
firm to issue debt and equity as a function of its financial characteristics such as cash 
flow and investment. Benito contended that a higher cash flow firms tend to use low 
levels of debt while the higher investment level will increase it need for debt funds. The 
results have revealed that debt is largely responsive to cash flow and investment as 
pecking order theory suggests in both countries. He found that debt varies negatively 
with profitability and positively with investment. Although the UK and Spain follow 
different financial systems (market-based system in UK and bank-base system in 
Spain), the behaviour of UK and Spain firms is consistent with the existence of a 
hierarchy of finance. Therefore, Benito (2003) concludes that the results for both 
countries are in the line with pecking order theory over the trade-off theory. 
Using data of small and large US companies, Mayer and Sussman (2003) provide 
evidence consistent with both trade-off theory and pecking order theory at the same 
time, they found that large firms fund large investment projects with debt while small 
firm tend to use equity. They argue that funding large projects shift firms away from 
their prior levels of leverage which is consistent with the implication of pecking order 
approach where capital structure responds to their investment financing needs. Mayer 
and Sussman (2003) found little impact of the previous levels of leverage on a firm's 
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financing patterns, where firms give the priority to debt over equity when external funds 
are needed. Furthermore, the profitable large firms prefer debt to equity and increase 
debt according to their financing requirements. Although Mayer and Sussman (2003) 
found that new equity issues are generally associated with loss-making small firms, they 
also found that when both small and large firms encounter losses and debt would take 
them to the dangerous levels of leverage, issuing equity would be their financing choice. 
This result is in the line with Myers (2001) who contends that equity issues occur only 
when debt is costly. Finally they argue that firms revert to their previous levels of 
leverage in the long run consistent with predictions of static-trade-off-theory. Therefore, 
Mayer and Sussman (2003) conclude that the combination of trade-off and pecking 
order theories provide a good description of firms financing behaviour in the short run 
and longer run dynamics. 
In a survey study, Mayer (1990) examines the source of industry finance in eight 
developed countries28 and reveals a number of stylised facts regarding corporate 
financing behaviour, which support the existence of financing hierarchies. He finds: (1) 
retentions are the dominant source of financing in all countries; (2) the average firm in 
any of these countries does not raise substantial amounts of financing from securities 
markets in the form of short term securities, bonds, or equity; (3) small and medium size 
firms are considerably more reliant on external finance than large firms; and (4) the 
majority of external financing comes from bank loans in all countries. Mayer found 
evidence that bank loans are the primary source of external finance for firms in 
developed countries. He interprets his findings as showing that banks perform a central 
function in eliminating asymmetric information in financial markets by playing a vital 
role in collecting and processing information that markets are unable to do or only do so 
at high cost. 
In another survey conducted by Beattie et al. (2006) of 831 finance directors in 
industrial and commercial UK listed firms, they found that 60% of responding directors 
argued that they follow the financing hierarchy, where internally generated funds 
through retention are the preferable source of financing, followed by debts.  Beattie et 
al. (2006) found that UK companies tend to adopt pecking order approach if the 
information and transaction costs are significantly large. When internally generated 
funds become insufficient for financing, the company turns to raise debt funds to meet 
the finance requirement. Moreover, the survey results showed that investment 
                                                          
28
 These countries are Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and USA. 
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opportunities and dividend pay-out determine the amount of external financing 
requirement as the pecking order theory suggests.  The long term target dividend pay-
out is set based on the firm’s profitability and growth opportunities so that the need for 
external financing is minimised. The results also showed that 88% of responding 
directors agreed that they consider the market response to new issues of debt and equity. 
This implicitly suggests that the information asymmetry is accepted by respondents as a 
determinant of capital structure in UK market. 
Recent  studies have been conducted by Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Huang and 
Ritter (2007) using the models proposed by Frank and Goyal, 2003 and Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999) provide evidence suggesting that equity issues track the financing 
deficit of the US firms quite closely, implying that debt financing does not govern 
equity financing as pecking order theory predicts. The findings of these studies are 
consistent with the finding of Frank and Goyal (2003) in the same market. However, 
these studies find that firms tend to finance a large proportion of their financing deficit 
by equity when the price of equity is overvalued. This finding supports the view of 
Myers and Majluf (1984) that firms issue equity when the cost of equity is relatively 
low. However, they claim that the effects of pecking order considerations on the capital 
structure are swapped by reversion toward firm specific target leverage.  
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no study available and tests the 
pecking order theory in the Jordanian context by using the models proposed in 
literatures. The only previous work on the practice of Jordanian firms in financing their 
capital expenditures was undertaken by Rawashdeh and Quadah (1997). The financing 
alternatives examined in this study are retained earnings, debt, and external equity. 
Their results show that insurance companies finance their capital expenditures mostly 
through internal sources; services companies finance their capital expenditures through 
debt; while industrial companies use both sources (retained earnings and debt) because 
retained earnings are not enough to finance all their investment needs. They conclude 
that this behaviour is consistent with the pecking order theory, ranking the financing 
alternatives in order: retained earnings, debt and equity issues. 
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2.4 Conclusions 
The literature review in this chapter is classified into two groups. The first examines the 
determinants of optimal capital structure and trade-off (target adjustment) theory, whilst 
the second examines pecking order theory and also provides the theoretical background 
of both trade-off (target adjustment) theory and pecking order theory. 
The review has raised at least four important points or gaps in literature. First, there are 
virtually no studies dedicated to test the hypothesis of asymmetric adjustment toward 
the target leverage ratio. Empirical literature has examined the trade-off theory on the 
basis of symmetric adjustment costs and benefits. However, as mentioned before, the 
adjustment costs of increasing and reducing leverage ratio may not necessarily be 
symmetric. As well the benefits of increasing leverage when firms are below their target 
leverage ratio may differ from that of reducing leverage when they above their target.  
An understanding of how firms behave when they have above and below-target leverage 
ratio is important because it explains why some studies report high rates of adjustment 
while the other studies report low rates. 
 Second, empirical studies generally focus on investigating the trade-off theory while 
they ignore the possibility that leverage adjustment toward the target leverage ratio may 
occur in the manner proposed by the pecking order theory. An understanding of how 
firms adjust their leverage when firms have  financial surplus or deficit is also important 
because it helps to determine whether the firms adjust leverage immediately to offset 
the effects of the accumulation of earnings and losses or for other considerations such as 
the bankruptcy risks of surplus and deficit 
Third, empirical studies generally focus on investigating the pecking order theory when 
firms face financial deficit only, while they ignore its predictions regarding the firms’ 
financing behaviour when they face financial surplus, not deficit. Moreover, no studies 
investigate how sensitive firms are to their surplus and deficits or whether they respond 
to surplus and deficit similarly or differently. An understanding of how firms respond to 
and how sensitive they are to surplus and deficit is very important too because it helps 
determine whether the firms respond to surplus in a manner proposed by pecking order 
theory or agency theory. It also helps determine whether the impetus of reducing 
leverage when firms have surplus is similar to or different from that of increasing 
leverage when they have deficit. 
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Finally, the pecking order theory and target-off theory are widely tested in the context 
of developed countries, while little evidence is available from developing countries. The 
current study tries to full these gaps in literature by testing the pecking order and trade-
off theories in the Jordanian context.  
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CHAPTER 3- EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF DETERMINANTS 
OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we presented the theoretical framework and empirical evidence 
of the most influential theories of capital structure; the pecking order theory and the 
trade-off (target capital) theory. In general, the existing empirical research on the issue 
of capital structure choice has analysed the role of firm-specific characteristics that 
represent taxation, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, information asymmetries. However, 
the extant empirical research on this field has been restricted to the US and other 
developed countries, and received little attention in developing countries where capital 
markets are small, less developed, less competitive and suffering from the lack of 
compatible regulations and sufficient supervision.29 Different views (i.e. Mayer, 1990 
and Kunt and Maksimovic, 1994) have suggested that the financial decisions in 
developing countries are somehow different from those of developed ones because of 
their institutional differences such as the level of transparency and investor protection, 
besides the bankruptcy and tax laws. In light of this argument, the lessons learned from 
one business environment cannot be generalised to countries with different legal and 
institutional framework, increasing the need to address the issue of determination of 
capital structure in small and less developed counties. 
 An investigation of the determination of the capital structure choice in developing 
countries helps determine whether the capital structure choice in these countries is 
related to factors similar to those influencing the capital structure choice in developed 
countries. This may also indicate how much more severe the market frictions are in 
developing countries.30 Furthermore, while the extant empirical research has focused on 
the suggestions of the trade-off theory in interpreting the results obtained regarding the 
determinants of capital structure, an obvious extension to this study is to introduce the 
possible explanations that might be relevant in the context of pecking order theory, 
                                                          
29
 Only in recent years,  a few studies have addressed the use of capital structure choice in developing 
countries, i.e. Booth et al (2001); Chen (2004); and Singh (1994) 
30Although the fact that developed countries have woken up early to asymmetric information and agency 
problems, there is evidence suggesting that the market frictions still one of the main problems in these 
countries, although their capital markets are more developed and highly competitive ( see, Fazzari el at 
(1988) and Charton el at (2002).  
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which may provide reasonable explanations as to why the previous empirical studies 
vary in the variables’ signs.  
Jordan provides an ideal ground for examining the most influential theories of capital 
structure, the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory and their implications for 
developing countries.31 The Jordanian capital market is has recently adopted an 
advanced trading pattern. It also seeks to model itself as a regional capital market. 
Moreover, extensive efforts and measures have been taken to move toward the free 
market and integrate this market into the world market. As a result, substantial 
transformation of the institutional set-up within which firms have been operating, has 
given more flexibility to the Jordanian financial managers in choosing the capital 
structure of the firm. This adds another motivation to conduct this study. Therefore, this 
chapter continues the theme of capital structure and investigates the determinants of 
optimal leverage for Jordanian firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
during the period 1997-2005. The chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 presents 
determinants of the capital structure, theoretical background and defines variables. 
Section 3.3 reports and discusses descriptive statistics, while section 3.4 discusses the 
estimation results of the empirical models, with a conclusion.  
 
3.2  Determinants of Capital structure and Model  
This section is divided into two sections. Section 3.2.1 explains the determinants of 
capital structure, their background and definitions. Section 3.2.2 presents the empirical 
model. 
 
3.2.1 Determinants of Capital Structure and theoretical background and definition 
A substantial amount of research has been carried out on the determinants of capital 
structure.32 Most of these empirical studies employ models which involve the regression 
of the observed leverage ratio against a number of explanatory variables. Typically, the 
explanatory variables include; profitability, asset structure, size, non-debt tax shields, 
                                                          
31
 The previous studies that have conducted a comparative analysis of  capital structure choice in 
developing countries use data from Jordanian market (i.e. Kunt and Maksimovic, 1994; Booth et al, 2001; 
Chen, 2004; and Singh, 1994)  
32
 Titman and Wessels (1988); Harris and Raviv (1991); Rajan and Zingales (1995); Bevan and Danbolt 
(2002, 2004); Chen, 2004; Booth et al 2001 and Eriotis, (2007), amongst others. 
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growth opportunities and earnings volatility.33 For the purpose of this analysis, this 
study measure leverage as the total debt divided by total assets. In fact various capital 
structure theories have not specified which leverage measurement should be used (see, 
Ragan and Zingales, 1995). However, the vast amount of exact research on the issue of 
capital structure choice has employed this measure for leverage. In what follows, we 
explain the theoretical relationship between leverage and the variables that suggested in 
literature as determinants of the optimal leverage ratio.   
 
3.2.1.1  Profitability 
Capital structure theories have different views on the relationship between leverage and 
profitability. In their seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue that firms 
generally prefer debt for tax considerations. Profitable firms would, therefore, employ 
more debt because increased leverage would increase the value of their debt tax shield.34 
In addition to the tax advantage of debt, agency and bankruptcy costs may encourage 
highly profitable firms to have more debt in their capital structure. This is because 
highly profitable firms are less likely to be subject to bankruptcy risk because of their 
increased ability to meet debt repayment obligations. Thus, they will demand more debt 
to maximise their tax shield at more attractive costs of debt. Moreover, managers of 
highly profitable firms may have excess cash to consume more perquisites, or to invest 
in less profitable projects for the firm, but more in their own interests (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976 and Jensen, 1986). High debt may reduce the agency costs of free cash 
flow because the interest burden reduces the amount of funds available under 
management control. For these considerations, the trade-off theory predicts a positive 
relationship between leverage and profitability.  
However, the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) 
predicts the opposite. It predicts a negative association between leverage and 
profitability because high profitable firms will be able to generate more funds through 
retained earnings and then have less leverage. Compared with debt and equity, retained 
                                                          
33
 Some variables are excluded from this analysis such as R&D expenditures (the data is not available), 
tax shields ( we tests for the effect of tax shields as one of the main determinants of leverage, but the 
results provide evidence suggesting that their effect is not statistically significance. Therefore, we use 
non-debt tax shields in stead of using tax shields.  
34
 Fama and French (1998) and Panno (2003) argue that the gain from leverage is surely higher for more 
profitable firms. So they conclude that in Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) tax model, profitability is the 
main determinant of leverages, and a positive relationship between profitability and leverage is predicted. 
Modigliani and Miller (1963), however, ignore the agency and bankruptcy costs of debt which may 
outweigh the tax benefit of debt, and therefore reduce the firms’ incentive to generate more debt. 
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earnings have no adverse selection problem, and hence, they are the cheapest source of 
finance.35 However, when outside funds are necessary, firms prefer debt to equity 
because of lower information costs associated with debt issues. We test these two 
contradicting predictions by examining the relationship between leverage and the 
profitability of Jordanian firms. Following Titman and Wessels, (1988); Rajan and 
Zingales, (1995), we use the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to the total assets 
as a measure of profitability. 
 
3.2.1.2  Tangibility 
The tangibility of assets represents the effect of the collateral values of assets on the 
firm’s leverage level. The underlying argument behind the use of tangible assets as 
collateral for debt is the higher liquidation value of these assets in the event of financial 
distress or bankruptcy (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). The risk of lending to firms with 
more tangible assets is expected to be low and, hence, lenders will demand a low risk 
premium. Furthermore, firm’s opportunities to engage in asset substitution can be 
reduced by issuing secured debt. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) 
point out, shareholders of levered firms may have an incentive to invest sub-optimally 
in order to expropriate wealth from the firm’s bondholders which gives rise to conflict 
between shareholders and debt-holders. If the debt can be collateralised, the borrower is 
restrained or limited to use the funds for a specified project, reducing the agency costs 
of asset substitution and hence, the costs of debt. Therefore, the trade-off theory predicts 
a positive relationship between leverage and the tangibility of assets.  
In their asymmetric information approach, Myers and Majluf, (1984) conclude that 
issuing debt secured by property, avoids the costs associated with issuing shares. This 
suggests that firms with more collateralised assets (fixed assets) will be able to issue 
more debt at an attractive rate as debt may be more readily available. This results in a 
positive association between leverage and tangibility. We test the predictions of the 
trade-off theory and pecking order theory in the Jordanian market by investigating the 
relationship between leverage and tangibility. Following Rajan and Zingales (1995) and 
Bevan and Danbolt, (2004), we use the ratio of fixed assets to the total assets as a 
measure of tangibility.  
                                                          
35
  The adverse selection problem arises when the outside investor fund the “wrong” firm due to the 
insufficient information about the firm.    
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3.2.1.3  The firm’s Size 
There is considerable empirical evidence that firm size plays a key role in the capital 
structure decision. The most obvious explanation relies on the bankruptcy costs which 
are related to the firm size (Warner, 1977). Warner (1977) argues that there are “scale 
economies” regarding bankruptcy costs, such that these costs constitute a larger 
proportion of the firm’s value as that value decreases. Consistent with this view, Titman 
and Wessels (1988) argue that large firms are more diversified and less susceptible to 
bankruptcy than smaller ones. This suggests that firm size is an inverse proxy of the 
probability of bankruptcy and, hence, larger firms have higher debt capacity and can 
borrow at more favourable risk-adjusted interest rates than smaller firms. Consequently, 
the trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between leverage and the size of 
firm. 
Size can be regarded as a proxy for information asymmetry between managers and 
outside investors. Large firms are subject to more news than small firms because the 
investment community would be more concerned with gathering and providing 
information about large firms (Kadapakkam et al., 1998). This makes large firms more 
closely observed by analysts and less subject to information asymmetry than small 
firms. Thus, they should be more capable of issuing equity which is more sensitive to 
information asymmetry and have lower debt (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). This suggests 
a negative association between leverage and the size of firm.  
We test these two contradicting predictions of the trade-off and pecking order theories 
in the Jordanian market by examining the relationship between leverage and the size of 
firm. Following Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995), we use the 
natural logarithm of total assets as proxy for the size of the firms. 
  
3.2.1.4  Non-debt tax shields  
The trade-off theory suggests that the main advantage of borrowing is the tax advantage 
of interest payment. Therefore, firms that are subject to corporate tax will increase their 
leverage in order to reduce their tax bill (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). However, firms 
with other tax shields, such as depreciation and investment tax credit deductions, will 
have less incentive to increase leverage for tax considerations. This is because these 
deductions are independent of the way a firm chooses to finance its investments, 
whether it uses debt or not (Ozkan, 2001). Therefore, firms with tax deductions for 
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depreciation and investment tax credits can consider these deductions as a substitute for 
the tax shield. Furthermore, the existence of non-debt tax shields makes leverage more 
expensive because the marginal tax savings from an additional unit of debt decreases 
with increasing non-debt tax shields (DeAnglo and Masulis, 1980). This is because of 
the probability of bankruptcy increases with leverage, which makes the marginal benefit 
low. Ross (1985) supports this view. To test the prediction of trade-off theory in the 
Jordanian market, we test the hypothesis that leverage and non-debt tax shields are 
negatively related. Following Titman and Wessels (1988) and Ozkan (2001), we use the 
ratio of annual depreciation to total assets as a proxy for non-debt tax shield.36 
 
3.2.1.5  Growth opportunities 
Growth opportunities represent the expected growth of firm’s intangible assets that is 
created by managerial skills, goodwill and competence. Since these assets have no 
collateral value and decline rapidly in value if bankruptcy or financial distress occurs, 
this will lower the ability of firms to raise their debt financing and consequently, going 
toward equity financing as suggested by Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and 
Zingales (1995). Furthermore, the agency costs are higher for growing firms because 
they have more flexibility in choosing their future investments and thus to expropriate 
wealth from banks and bondholders (Titman and Wessels, 1988). As a result, lenders 
will demand higher risk premium if the debt is not collateralized, making debt more 
expensive. For these considerations, the trade-off theory predicts a negative relationship 
between leverage and growth opportunities. 
However, the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) 
predicts that leverage and growth are positively related. For growing firms, internal 
funds may be insufficient to finance their positive investment opportunities and, hence, 
they are likely to be in need of external funds. According to the pecking order theory, if 
external funds are required, firms will prefer debt to equity because of lower 
information costs associated with debt issues. This results in a positive relationship 
between leverage and growth opportunities. We test the two conflicting predictions of 
the trade-off theory and pecking order theory by investigating the relationship between 
leverage and growth opportunities. Following Rajan and Zingles (1995) and Bevan and 
                                                          
36
 Ozkan (2001) point out that this proxy for the non-debt tax shield may be taken as a proxy of growth 
option or tangibility, since firms with high depreciation ratio are expected to have relatively high growth 
option and more tangible assets. This would imply a positive association between non debt –tax shield 
and leverage. 
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Danbolt (2002, 2004), we use the ratio of market-to-book value as a proxy for growth 
opportunities. 
 
3.2.1.6  Earning Volatility 
Firms with high earnings volatility face a risk of the earnings level dropping below their 
debt servicing commitments, thereby incurring a higher cost of financial distress 
(Bhaduri, 2002).  Accordingly, these firms should reduce their leverage level to avoid 
the risk of bankruptcy or to rearrange their funds at high cost. Therefore, the trade-off 
theory predicts a negative relationship between leverage and the volatility of a firm’s 
earnings. The pecking order theory allows the same prediction, but the reasoning is 
different. In the context of this theory, firms with high earnings volatility try to 
accumulate cash during good years to avoid under-investment problems in the future 
(Myers, 1977). As DeAnglo and Masulis (1980) point out, an adverse selection problem 
is more severe to firms with highly volatile earnings. To avoid adverse selection 
problem, firms with financial surpluses should retire debt or invest in cash or 
marketable securities, to preserve their debt capacity for future financing needs or to 
avoid issuing equities at higher costs (Myers, 1984). This results in a negative 
association between leverage and earnings volatility.  
We test the prediction of both theories in the Jordanian market by examining the 
relationship between leverage and earnings volatility. Following Titman and Wessels 
(1988), we use the standard deviation of return on assets as measure of volatility of 
earnings, where the return on assets for each year is measured by the ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes to the total assets. 
Table 3.1 summarises the predictions of trade-off theory and pecking order theory for 
the relationship between leverage and the variables which are suggested as determinants 
of optimal leverage. As can be seen, pecking order theory and trade-off theory have no 
common predictions for most of the proxy variables.  
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Table 3.1: The theoretical sign of the proxy variables. 
 
**This table is constructed depending on the theoretical 
discussion of the variables included in model (3.1) as presented in 
section (3.2.1)  
  
 
 
3.2.2   The Model 
We employ the following static model to investigate the determinants of optimal 
leverage ratio for listed Jordanian firms on the Amman Stock Exchange. In this model, 
the observed leverage is modelled as a function of various firm-specific factors. The 
time and industry dummy variables are also included in the model to capture the time-
and industry-specific effects on leverage.37 We test the model using alternative 
techniques: pooled and panel analysis.38 Panel data which are usually estimated by fixed 
and random effects techniques, helps capture the effects of the firm-and time-specific 
heterogeneities.39  
                                                          
37We test for the industry effect by using industry dummy variable. However, the results show that the 
estimated coefficient on the  industry dummy variable is statistically insignificant, suggesting that 
Jordanian firms experience the same financing behaviour regardless of the firm’s sector. This, besides the 
small size of services and industrial sample are the reasons for not testing optimal leverage of industrial 
levels. It is also the reason for not testing the target reversion rates of industry levels in chapter 5.   
38As Gujarati (2003, p637) points out, panel data give more informative data, more variability, less 
collinearity among variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency. Moreover, they are better 
suited to study the dynamics of change. 
39
 This is shown clearly in Bevan and Danbolt (2004) who extend their work of 2002 by using pooled and 
panel data analysis, finding a significant difference between the results for pooled and panel analysis. The 
reason for this is the effect of the time and firm-specific heterogeneity that is not considered in pooled 
OLS model.  Chen (2004) and Eriotis, et al. (2007) find the same difference (pooled and panel techniques 
are briefly discussed in chapter one-section 1.4).  
Variables Trade-off  
theory 
Pecking order 
theory 
 
Profitability Positive Negative 
 
Tangibility Positive Positive 
 
Size Positive Negative 
 
Non-Debt tax shields Negative - 
 
Growth opportunity Negative Positive 
 
Volatility Negative Negative 
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 The model: 
itititititititit VOLGRNDTSZTANPROLEV εβββββββ +++++++= −−−−− 161514131_2110  
                                                                                                                                      (3.1)   
                                                       
 
Where LEVit is the leverage ratio of firm i in year t and measured by the ratio of total 
debt (short term and long term) to total assets.  PROit (Profitability), TANit (Tangibility), 
SZit (Size), NDTit (Non-debt tax shields), GRit (Growth), VOLit (Volatility) are the 
explanatory variables and as measured in section (3.3.1). Following Tong and Green 
(2005); Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Bevan and Danbolt (2004), the study uses the 
one year lag value of each explanatory variable to avoid the causality between leverage 
and its determinants. The testable null hypothesis under the static model 3.1 (H0) is that 
all slope coefficients of explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero, while the 
alternative hypothesis (H1) is at least one slope coefficient (beta) is not equal to zero. 
 
3.3  Statistical analysis 
This section consists of two subsections where section 3.3.1 shows the descriptive 
statistics of the variables. Section 3.3.2 shows and discusses the empirical results.  
 
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics are reported for the pooled sample of firms listed on Amman 
Stock (ASE) over the period of 1997-2005. The study is confined to 114 non-financial 
(62 industrial companies and 52 services companies) that have been continuously listed 
on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) during the period of study.40 The data collected 
was for firms that had published data continuously for at least 9 years and had not 
changed their financial years (the financial year starts at 1/1 and ends at 31/12). 
Consequently, if a firm is new or its past information is unavailable, the firm may not 
have the necessary 9- year period required for this study, it would not appear in the 
                                                          
40
 This number corresponds to 55.61% of all companies listed on ASE at the end of year 2005 and 
71.25% of all non- financial companies listed at the end of year 2005,making the study sample consists of 
significant proportion of listed companies in the ASE during the nine–year–period 1997- 2005. This 
sample will be used later on chapter 4 and 5 for testing pecking order and target adjustment theory. 
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sample (the criteria that the current study applied to select the study sample are briefly 
discussed in section 1.4). Hence, 45 financial firms and 46 non-financial firms (22 
industrial companies and 24 services companies) are excluded. The data extracted from 
the firm’s annual reports, and from Amman Stock Exchange’s publications (The Yearly 
Shareholding Companies Guide and Amman Stock Exchange Monthly Statistical 
Bulletins).41 Table 3.2 reports descriptive information for the full sample of firms used 
in this study. It contains the mean values and standard deviations and the minimum and 
maximum values of the key variables used in the study. 
The results presented in Table 3.2 show that leverage has a mean value of 0.283 and 
standard deviation of 0.209. It is interesting to compare the level of leverage in this 
study with the results reported by some of the studies that have been conducted in the 
context of developed countries. Rajan and Zingales (1995) report that U.S and German 
firms have similar mean leverage of around 0.38 and for the UK, Adedeji (1998) reports 
a mean leverage of 0.38. However, in a more recent time period, Hovakimian et al. 
(2001) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) in the US report a mean leverage of around 
0.25 and 0.27 respectively, suggesting that US firms have changed their financing 
behaviour from debt to equity or retained earnings. The mean leverage in this study is 
quite similar to what is reported in developed countries. 
 
Table 3.2 : Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables 
N=114 company 
Variables Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
LEV 0.283 0.209 0.008 0.922 
PRO 0.089 0.105 -0.587 0.826 
TAN 0.325 0.241 0.001 0.902 
SZ 16.334 1.202 14.064 20.178 
NDT 0.038 0.041 0.012 0.376 
GR 1.525 .863 0.653 14.365 
VOL 0.031 0.035 0.0034 0.281 
 Notes: Leverage (LEV) is the short and long term debt over total assets. Profitability 
(PRO): earning before interest and taxes over total assets. Tangibility (TAN): net fixed 
assets over total asset. Size (SZ): the natural logarithm of total assets. Non-debt tax 
shields (NDT): depreciation expenses over total assets Growth (GR): the market to book 
ratio. Volatility (VOL): the standard deviation of earning before interest and taxes. 
                                                          
41
 Data is readily available in the form of CD and on the website of the Amman Stock Exchange. To 
insure the accuracy of the data, we compared the collected data from the firm’s annual reports, and 
Amman Stock Exchange’s publications (The Yearly Shareholding Companies Guide and Amman Stock 
Exchange Monthly Statistical Bulletins). with those available on CDs and on the website. 
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It also shows that firms on average faced low profitability where the mean value is 
amounted to 0.089 with standard deviation of 0.105. The profitability variable shows a 
high deviation in its observations with minimum value of -0.589 and maximum value of 
0.826. These figures are normal results for the sampled firms in the study, where most 
of the firms in the Jordanian market are largely affected by the political conditions in 
the Gulf area and Palestine. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Jordan was 
subjected to isolation by the Arab Gulf States because it refused to join the international 
alliance opposing Iraq and kept close ties with this country. Consequently, the primary 
markets of their products are largely affected, resulting in decreasing exports to Gulf 
country markets (Export and Finance Bank, 2002a). The growth variable, which   is 
measured by the market to book ratio, shows a mean value of 1.525 with standard 
deviation of 0.863.  Tangibility   which is measured by total net fixed assets divided by 
total assets has a mean value of 0.325 with 0.241 standard deviation value.  
It is possible that the selected explanatory variables may be correlated, so the chosen 
proxies may actually measure the effects of several different variables. To address this 
problem the study tests for the multicollinearity (which is generally referred to the 
correlation among two or more independent variables). The presence of 
multicollinearity, makes the estimation and hypothesis testing about individual 
coefficients in regression not possible (Gujarati, 2003). This is because multicollinearity 
makes the regression coefficients undefined or unstable and the standard errors for the 
coefficients wildly inflated, making these coefficients significantly not different from 
zero. Moreover, variables may be dropped from the regression, not because they have 
no effects, but because the sample is inadequate to isolate the effect precisely. In other 
words, it becomes difficult to identify the separate effects of the variables. This result 
occurs despite possibly high R2 and highly significant F statistic. 42 
The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is a commonly used for assessing multicollinearity 
problems. It shows the degree to which each independent variable is explained by other 
independent variables.  As a rule of thumb, a VIF greater than 10 indicates the presence 
of harmful collinearity (Gujarati, 2003). The results of VIF show that the mean VIF for 
all the variables included in the model is 1.20, since the VIF for all variables are ranged 
                                                          
42
 A tip-off of multicollinearity problem is a regression with high R2 and highly significant F statistic, but 
virtually no significant t-statistics on the individual coefficients. Hence, if t-statistics are significant, then 
even with a high R2, we need not worry about multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003).  
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between (1.01 – 1.37) which indicates that the model does not suffer from any 
multicollinearity problem.  
 
Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Variable 
 
PROF 
 
TANG 
 
SZ 
 
NDTS 
 
GRO 
 
VOL 
 
PRO 
 
1.000      
TAN 0.163 
(0.000) 
1.000     
SZ 0.097 
(0.003) 
0.155 
(0.000) 
1.000    
NDT -0.325 
(0.000) 
0.352 
(0.000) 
-0.047 
(0.155) 
1.000   
GR 0.079 
(0.023) 
-0.002 
(0.964) 
0.026 
(0.466) 
-0.058 
(0.103) 
1.000  
VOL 0.388 
(0.000) 
-0.010 
(0.755) 
-0.094 
(0.005) 
-0.109 
(0.001) 
0.018 
(0.622) 
 
1.000 
 
Another technique for detecting multicollinrearity is through the use of a correlation 
matrix. A high correlation between two of the independent variables may indicate the 
presence of collinearity. However, the problem here is that there is no agreement when 
correlation is too high. Kennedy (1998) claims that an absolute correlation coefficient of 
0.80 or 0.90 is a high correlation.  Anderson et al. (1999) consider an absolute 
correlation coefficient high if it exceeds 0.70, whereas Brayman and Cramer (2001) 
consider independent variables in excess of 0.80 may be suspected of exhibiting 
multicollinearity. This study uses the correlation matrix to provide some explanation to 
later study findings regarding the empirical investigation of pecking order and target 
adjustment theory.  
Table 3.3 displays the correlations among the explanatory variables for the full sample. 
Examination of the correlation matrix indicates that a high level of correlation is not 
found between any two of the independent variables.  Moreover, analysis of correlations 
shows several observations which are noteworthy. Firstly, there is evidence that larger 
firms are more profitable, less volatile, exhibit lower growth and have more tangible 
assets.  Secondly, growth firms have fewer tangible assets and exhibit more non-debt 
tax shields.  
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In addition to multicollinearity, we test for the validity of other assumptions of 
regression such as homokedasticity, normality, linearity, no serial correlation.43 The 
significance of these assumptions stems from the fact that the failure of data to meet 
these assumptions may lead to abased estimates of coefficient and standard of error. It 
may make the p values of t-test and F-test invalid. The study uses many diagnostic tests 
to verify that data have met the assumptions of regression to avoid any misleading 
results. Since the pooled data are the combination of both time series and cross sectional 
data, the presence of heteroskedasticity or non–homogeneity of variance of the 
regression disturbances is likely (Gujarati, 2003). The study uses Breuch-Pagan test to 
detect heteroskedasticity problem. The test is based on the use of Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) residuals regression under the null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is 
homogenous.  
As heteroskedasticity tests are more sensitive to the assumption of normality, we firstly 
test for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk W test. It tests the null hypothesis that the 
residuals are normally distributed.44 The Shapiro-Wilk W. test provides evidence against 
the null hypothesis that the residual is normally distributed, implying that some 
transformation of the variables may be necessary (log transformation).45The 
transformation has improved the result of normality, since it is found to be statistically 
insignificant, accepting the null hypothesis that residuals are normally distributed (p-
value is 0.154). The result of the Breuch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity implies that 
the heteroskedasticity problem does not exist for the sample of this study since the chi-
square distribution was not statistically significant (it is 0.43 with the p value of 0.511).  
Consequently, we accept the null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is 
homogenous.  
For the regression to be statistically well-defined, it also requires the relationship 
between the response variable and the predictors to be linear because the presence of 
non-linear effects may decrease the strength of the relationship.46 Scatter plots were 
utilised in this study to assess the degree of linearity and to detect any non-linear pattern 
                                                          
43
 The study uses Gujarati (2003) and Green (2003) to discuss these assumptions and to choose the 
appropriate diagnostic test for each assumption. 
44
 Normality of residuals is only required for valid hypothesis testing not to obtain unbiased estimates of 
the regression coefficients. Moreover, it is for the residuals not for the predictor variables. The regression 
merely requires that the residuals (errors) be identically and independently distributed. 
45
 It is worth noting that the failure to meet regression assumptions may lead to biased estimates of 
coefficients and especially biased estimates of the standard errors.    
46
 The importance of this assumption is that the concept of correlation represents only the linear 
association between variables and non-linear effects will not be represented in the correlation value (Hair 
et al, 1998). 
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in the data (their results are not reported). The scatter plots showed an acceptable degree 
of linearity, taking into consideration that perfect linearity in behavioural association is 
not possible. As we test for homogeneity and normality of the residuals, we test for the 
assumption of no serial correlation of the residuals. This assumption implies that the 
errors associated with one observation are not correlated with the errors of any other 
observation. For this purpose, we perform the Durbin-Watson Test (DW) for correlated 
residuals. The DW statistic requires the residuals to be normally distributed (Stata 9.1 
provides the direct estimation of DW values) and tests for residuals correlation under 
the null hypothesis that there is nor serial correlation. The result provides evidence 
suggesting that there is no serial correlation, since d- statistic is found to be 1.932 which 
is higher the upper limits (1.842).   
 
3.3.2 Estimation results 
Table 3.4 reports the random effects estimation results for the static model 3.1 that the 
study has developed to investigate the determinants of capital structure in Jordan. As 
signified by the significant Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and insignificant Hausman tests, 
the random effects model (which is generally estimated by The Generalized Least 
Squares) is found to be the preferred specification. In first step, model 3.1 is run without 
preserving the time series variation in leverage. In the next one, a dummy variable for 
each year is added to the model as additional explanatory variables.47 The results show 
that the explanatory power of model 3.1 is not significantly improved by including the 
time dummies. They are found to be statistically insignificant and not different from 
zero as the Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients of 
time dummies are jointly zero.48 Compared with the restricted model (without time 
dummies), the magnitudes and significance of estimated coefficients from unrestricted 
model are not significantly changed. 
The main reason for considering the time dummies is to investigate any change in 
movement over time. The study period has witnessed a remarkable increase in stock 
prices, the adoption of conservative credit policies by Jordanian banks, freeing interest 
rates, adopting a flexible policy to manage exchange prices, removing lending limits, 
                                                          
47
 The combined time and firm-specific effects in panel data model minimizes the omitted variables bias 
arising both from unobservable variables that are constant over time and from unobserved variables that 
are constant across firms (Gujarati, 2003). 
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accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and Free Trade Agreements with the 
USA. These transformations with the measures that have been taken to increase the 
capital market efficiency (i.e. the transparency act and the new Electronic Trading 
System) have given more flexibility to the Jordanian financial managers in choosing the 
capital structure of the firm. As 90% of financial liberalization and privatization was 
achieved at the end of 1990s, the study reinvestigates model 3.1 with a time dummy 
which equals one for the period 1997-2000 and zero otherwise, instead of using a 
dummy for each year. The main reasons for segmenting the sample into sub-samples: 
(1997-2000) and (2001-2005) is to investigate whether these transformations affect the 
level of firm’s optimal capital structure or the rates of adjustment. The estimated 
coefficient is found to be positive, but statistically not different from zero which 
suggests that Jordanian firms’ optimal leverage ratio does not change over the study 
period, implying that these transformations may affect the speed rates of adjustment 
towards the target leverage ratio. This view seems to be relevant in Jordan where the 
Jordanian bankruptcy and tax acts have not been changed during the period of this study 
with regards to changing the firms’ incentive to change the levels of their target 
leverage ratios. 
As this study uses panel data to investigate the optimal leverage ratio for the full and 
two sub- sample periods using dataset contains data on 114 firms with different sizes, it 
is very possible that the residuals are not independent, causing what is known as the 
heteroscedasticity problem. To detect the heteroscedasticity problem, the study plots the 
residuals against the size variables. The results suggest that there might be some outliers 
and some possible heteroscedasticity. Although Breuch-Pagan test for 
heteroskedasticity does not provide evidence against the null hypothesis that the null 
hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is homogenous, we use robust standard 
errors regression cluster option since it may effectively deal with this problem.49 The 
robust regression results show that the coefficients and standard errors are quite similar, 
and the t-values and p-values are also quite similar to those obtained without using this 
option. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
48
 The F test between the restricted model (without time dummies) and unrestricted (with time dummies) 
is found statistically insignificant, suggesting that no time effect exists. 
49
 It is worth noting that the failure to meet regression assumptions may lead to biased estimates of 
coefficients and especially biased estimates of the standard errors.  As a robust test, the study uses 
regression with robust standard errors with a cluster option. It can deal with a collection of minor 
concerns about failure to meet assumptions, such as minor problems about normality, heteroscedasticity, 
or some observations that exhibit large residuals, leverage or influence.  
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The results presented in Table 3.4 show that determinants of optimal capital structure in 
Jordan are generally similar to those documented in the empirical studies in both 
developed countries and other developing countries. 
 
1. Profitability 
Inconsistent with what has been reported in the majority of the literature, profitability is 
found to be positively related to leverage and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
This result supports the prediction of trade-off theory over that of pecking order theory. 
This finding suggests that high profitable Jordanian firms are less likely to experience 
bankruptcy costs, consequently enabling them to raise more debt at an attractive rate 
(Tong and Green 2005; Baskin, 1989). An alternative explanation for this result is that 
Jordanian firms may have the desire to be at their target leverage ratios. Due to their 
conservative credit policies, Jordanian banks usually offer debt to less risky firms at 
lower rates of risk premium. Since high profitable Jordanian firms may be less likely to 
experience bankruptcy costs, this will increase their ability to reduce the costs of 
moving toward their target. To the extent that is the case, the past firms’ profitability is 
an important determinant in Jordanian banks decision to grant loans to Jordanian firms. 
2. Tangibility  
The tangibility of assets is found to be positively related to leverage but statistically 
insignificant. This result is not consistent with the predictions of trade-off and pecking 
order theories. However, it may support the view of Kunt and Maksimovic (1994) and 
Booth et al. (2001) that markets for long term debt are not effectively functioning in 
developing countries. For a sample of 114 non-financial firms, the mean value of long-
term debt to total debt is found 8.09 percent. This mean is quite similar to the mean 
value reported by Booth et al. (2001). For a sample of 38 Jordanian firms, he reports a 
mean value of 11.7%. However, the low level of long term debt may suggest that 
Jordanian firms face high asset substitution problems, increasing the need to use short 
term debt to avoid the agency costs of asset substitution (Myers, 1977). 
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Table 3.3: The estimation results of model 3.1 
              (Dependent variable: Leverage ratio) 
 Notes: All independent variables are the same as defined in Table 3.1 
and   taken by one year lag. YES /NO refers to the inclusion of 
variables in the regression.  Figures in brackets below the coefficient are the 
probabilities of significance based on the standard errors which are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity. 
 
 
3. The firm’s size  
The size of the firm which is measured by the logarithm of total assets is positively 
related to leverage and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Bevan and Danbolt (2002, 2004), 
among others. This finding supports the prediction of the trade-off theory over the 
pecking order theory and suggests that borrowing capacity for Jordanian firms is 
significantly limited by their bankruptcy or financial distress risks.50 It also supports the 
view that larger firms may be more diversified and fail less often. As large Jordanian 
                                                          
50
 The prediction of trade-off theory denotes that larger firms might be less susceptible to financial 
distress and therefore more able to generate debt at more attractive interest rates (Titman and wessels, 
1988). 
 
Independent variable 
 
TD/TA 
  
Intercept -4.903 
(0.000) 
 
PRO 0.148 
(0.000) 
 
TAN 0.042 
(0.104) 
 
SZ 0.254 
(0.000) 
 
NDT -0.510 
(0.008) 
 
GR -0.339 
(0.000) 
 
VOL -0.829 
(0.000) 
 
DMyear YES 
 
R2 
P-value 
N 
0.48 
 (0.000) 
912 
 
LM test 
 
  1887.88 
 (0.000) 
 
Hausman test 8.57 
(0.199) 
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firms are diversified in their product markets (Gulf markets, Iraq, Palestine, among 
others), their risk to face financial distress is expected to be low, where the failure of 
one market can be compensated by another. To the extent that this is the case, this 
finding implies that the cost of bankruptcy or financial distress is one of the main 
determinants of the leverage ratio for the Jordanian listed firms.   
 4. Non-debt tax shields  
Consistent with the prediction of the trade-off theory, non-debt tax shields are found to 
be negatively related to leverage and statistically significant at the 5 % level. Similar 
evidence is reported by Ozkan (2001); Banerjee, et al. (2000) and Flannery and Rangan 
(2006).  The inverse relationship supports the view that the existence of non-debt tax 
shields, such as depreciation, reduces the importance of the fiscal advantage of debt and 
consequently, reducing the need to raise debt for tax consideration. This view seems to 
be relevant in the Jordanian market where the Jordanian tax law prevents firms from 
making more tax benefit on debt. It does not allow loss carry backs and hence, it is not 
important for risky Jordanian firms or for firms that experience losses (Adjusted income 
tax law, No14. 1995). For these firms, the marginal savings from an additional unit of 
debt will be low. As the probability of bankruptcy increases with debt, these savings 
will also significantly be declined in the presence of non-debt tax shield, making debt 
too expensive. This might be the reason why Jordanian firms depend on other tax 
shields, such as depreciation, to reduce their tax bill.51  
5. Growth opportunities 
 The market-to-book ratio, which is used as a proxy for firm’s growth opportunities, is 
negatively and significantly related to leverage at the 1% level.52 This finding supports 
the view that the agency and financial distress costs are significantly high for high 
growth firms. This view seems to be relevant in the Jordanian context where there is 
evidence suggesting that growing Jordanian firms have fewer tangible assets and hence, 
banks will demand higher risk premiums in their loans.53 The higher rates are likely to 
                                                          
51
 According to Adedeji (1998), this kind of tax system may encourage firms to equity more than debt. 
52
 It is not worth noting that we use the growth rate of total assets as an alternative proxy for growth 
opportunities. The result shows a positive association between leverage and the growth rate of total assets 
and is in line with those who use this proxy for growth opportunities, i.e. Titman and wessels (1988); 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Chen (2004). The reason for this difference may be attributed to the fact 
that growth rate of total assets may also reflect the growth in tangible assets, providing better collateral 
for lenders. This might provide an explanation as to why the previous empirical studies vary in the 
variables’ signs.   
53
 Analysis of correlation in this study shows a negative correlation between growth opportunities and 
tangibility.  
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deter growth Jordanian firms from borrowing, pushing them toward equity financing as 
Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) point out. An alternative 
explanation for this finding is that increases in stock prices in the recent years on ASE 
have reduced the cost of equity capital, encouraging Jordanian firms to go to the stock 
market for financing. This is because firms with higher market valuation can issue 
equity at lower costs of information asymmetries, saving their borrowing capacity for 
the future financing requirements (Kayham and Titman, 2007). This supports the view 
of Baker and Wurgler (2002) that at higher market-book ratio, equity market is strongly 
favourable for increasing funds externally.  
7. Volatility of earnings 
The results show a significant negative relationship between leverage and the volatility 
of earnings. This finding is in line with the predictions of the trade-off theory and the 
findings Banerjee et al. (2000) and Miguil and Pindado (2000). This finding indicates 
that the earning volatility of Jordanian firms exerts a negative impact on their ability to 
issue debt. This supports the view that firms with high earnings volatility carry the risk 
of bankruptcy or financial distress, reducing their desire to raise debt. This view seems 
to be relevant in Jordan where the Jordanian bankruptcy law emphasises on the role of 
lenders, while it puts less emphasis on the firm as an ongoing concern. The law is not 
conductive to re-organisation of firms; in contrast, firms entering bankruptcy are usually 
liquidated. Furthermore, Jordanian banks are the main source of financing for Jordanian 
firms and their credits need to be repaid or renewed on a regular basis. As the obligatory 
bankruptcy in Jordan occurs if the firm cannot pay its obligation, firms with high 
earnings volatility may carry the risk of bankruptcy or rearrange the funds at a high cost. 
For these considerations, Jordanian firms may keep their leverage ratio low to avoid the 
bankruptcy risk.  
 
3.4  Conclusion 
This chapter of the study extends the empirical work on capital structure on the context 
of developing countries by using Jordanian firm-level data.  A static model has been 
developed to explain how the optimal capital structure of Jordanian firms is determined. 
In addition to the pooled data model, the panel data which are usually estimated using 
either fixed or random effect techniques are used and the random effects specification is 
found to be the preferred model.  
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The estimated static model indicates that the financing decisions of the Jordanian firms 
can be explained by the determinants suggested by the typical corporate finance models. 
The empirical results suggest that firm size, profitability and tangibility are positively 
related to leverage, while volatility of earnings, growth opportunities and non-debt tax 
shields are negatively related to leverage. These results mean that there would appear to 
be significant constraints on the supply of debt to Jordanian firms such as the 
bankruptcy and agency costs, indicating that the borrowing capacity of Jordanian firms 
is mainly affected by the expected risks of their bankruptcy as well as the expected costs 
of assets substitution problems (the agency costs of debt). Accordingly, we can 
hypothesise that the relatively low leverage of Jordanian firms is due to the nature of 
Jordanian bankruptcy law (the mean value of leverage is 0.283). This law emphasises 
on the role of lenders and put less emphasise on the firm as an ongoing concern. It is not 
conductive to re-organization of firms; in contrast, firms entering bankruptcy are usually 
liquidated at higher costs. Thus to avoid bankruptcy, Jordanian firms may keep their 
leverage ratio low. Moreover, the presence of tax deduction for depreciation makes debt 
financing for Jordanian firms too expensive, providing no incentives for them to raise 
debt for tax considerations and pushing them toward internally generated funds 
(retained earnings) or equity funds for financing. In light of above results, we can also 
hypothesise that the low mean value of leverage is due to the deficiency of the effective 
means to mitigate the agency conflicts.  
This conclusion suggests that the estimation coefficients on the variables of 
profitability, firm size, and tangibility, volatility of earnings, growth opportunities and 
non-debt tax shields are largely consistent with the explanations of trade-off theory not 
the pecking order theory.   
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CHAPTER 4 - EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF PECKING 
ORDER THEORY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter three has presented the empirical evidence on the determinants of capital 
structure for the Jordanian listed firms during the period 1997-2005. It tested the 
predictions of both pecking order theory and trade-off theory with respect to each of the 
explanatory variables used in the static model (3.1). However, the new models of 
pecking order theory such as those proposed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and 
Frank and Goyal (2003) assume that firms raised debt only under pressure of an internal 
funds deficit, implying that the pecking order theory is a competitor to the conventional 
leverage regression. If so, the financing deficit variable should obscure the effects of 
other explanatory variables. In the context of pecking order theory, firms prefer internal 
funds to external funds for the transactions and information costs which are associated 
with raising funds externally. However, when external funds are needed, they prefer 
debt to equity which is rarely issued, because equity issues are more likely subject to a 
higher degree of market mis-valuation when compared with debt issues. In case of 
funds surplus not deficit, pecking order theory predicts that firms will use up surplus to 
pay off debt, or invest in cash or marketable securities in order to save their debt 
capacity or to avoid the higher costs of reissuing equity. These predictions suggest that 
firms respond to surplus and deficit differently, i.e. increasing debt when they have a 
deficit and retiring debt or investing in cash or marketable securities when they have a 
surplus. However, the pecking order theory ignores the potential effects of other market 
frictions such as the bankruptcy costs and agency costs of free cash and debt, besides 
ignoring other institutional factors that might affect the firm’s choice of financing, 
instruments such as the level of interest rate, borrower-lender relations, tax system, and 
the government intervention (Adedeji, 1998). 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the previous studies that have tested the 
pecking order theory ignored the possibility that firms may respond to financial surplus 
and deficit, similarly not differently, if the agency costs of free cash flow are 
significantly large and the shareholders are strongly enough to force managers to take 
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on debt to soak up free cash flow (surplus).54 Furthermore, they ignored, even if the 
firms respond to surplus and deficit differently, the possibility that firms may be more 
or less sensitive in increasing debt to finance deficit than in retiring (reducing) debt to 
save their debt capacity.  An investigation of these issues is very important in obtaining 
accurate evidence on the pecking order theory, because if firms are more sensitive in 
reducing leverage to absorb surplus than in increasing leverage to finance deficit, the 
less than one slope coefficient from models such as those proposed by Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) cannot be interpreted as evidence 
contradicting the pecking order theory. Similarly,  if the effects of surplus and deficit on 
the change in total debt level are symmetric rather than asymmetric, the unity slope 
coefficient reported by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) may fall short of unity when 
the surplus values are excluded from the deficit variable (these arguments will be 
discussed further in the model development sections). 
The present chapter continues the theme of testing the pecking order theory and 
considers the potential symmetric effects of financial surplus and financial deficit on the 
change in total debt level using data from the Jordanian market. It also considers the 
potential difference in the firm’s sensitivity to financial deficit and surplus when their 
effects on the change in total debt are different. The chapter is structured as follows: 
Section 4.2 explains the models employed to investigate the pecking order theory. 
Section 4.3 discusses the results of estimating models. Section 4.4 is a conclusion. 
 
4.2  Pecking order models 
This study adopts three models to test the pecking order theory in the Jordanian market. 
All the models are tested using three alternative econometric techniques: Pooled OLS, 
fixed effects and random effects approaches. Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and Hausman 
tests are used to identify which of the three alternative techniques will be the preferred 
specification for dataset.  The following three sub-sections offer a brief discussion of the 
empirical models used in this study to investigate the pecking order theory. 
 
                                                          
54
 For example, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Nuri and Archer (2001), Adedeji (2002), and Frank 
and Goyal (2003)  
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4.2.1 The first model specification  
In the context of pecking order theory, the need for external funds arises when there is 
an imbalance between internal cash flow, net of dividends, and real investment 
opportunities (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Frank and Goyal, 2003). Hence, firms 
whose investment opportunities exhaust internally generated funds will turn to the 
capital market to raise funds externally through debt and/or equity. According to Frank 
and Goyal (2003), the total amount of debt issued and/or equity issued from one year to 
another year must be equal to the total deficit at the end of the year as given by the 
following equation: 
 
                                               ititit DEFED =∆+∆                                                   (4.1) 
 
where itD∆  is the net debt issued by firm i in year t , itE∆  is the net equity issued by 
firm
 
i in year
 
t 55 , itDEF  is the internal funds deficits of firm i at year t and calculated as 
follows: 
 
                                                 ititititit CFWCIDIVDDEF −∆++=                         (4.2) 
  
where itDIVD  is the cash dividend payments of firm i in year t, itI  is the net investment 
(capital expenditures) of firm i in year t and calculated as the difference between fixed 
assets at t-1 and t for each firm. itWC∆  is the change of working capital for firm i in 
year t. It is calculated as the difference between working capital at t-1 and t for each 
firm while the working capital (WC) is calculated as the difference between current 
assets (CA) and current liabilities (CL).  CF
 it   is the operating cash flow after interest 
and taxes for firm i in year t. 56 
                                                          
55
 ∆E
 it equals sale of common stock minus stock repurchases from yeart to yeart+1. 
56
 This definition of Cash Flow (CF) excludes taxes and interest payments which may magnify the 
amount of fund deficit and increase the need for leverage to finance that deficit. This implies that no 
reverse causality between leverage and deficit exists. In other words, leverage does not influence the 
deficit.  
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For firms following the pecking order theory, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), 
Adedeji (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2003) argue that new debt issues should have a 
one –to-one relationship with firm‘s financing deficit.57 This implies that the financing 
deficit should be financed entirely by debt and hence, itTE∆  will be zero. In other 
words, itTD∆    should equal itDEF .  By scaling itTD∆    and  itDEF   by total assets as a 
precaution against heteroskedasticity and a method of controlling for differences in firm 
size, the above argument can statistically be formalized as:58  
 
                                                 ititit DEFATDA εαα ++=∆ 10                                     (4.3) 
 
Where, α0 and α1 are the coefficients to be estimated, itTDA∆    is the change in total debt 
of firm i between year
 
t and year
 
t+1 scaled by total assets, itDEFA  is the internal funds 
deficits of firm
 
i at year
 
t scaled by total asset, and εit is the error term with usual 
properties; uncorrelated with itself, uncorrelated with the explanatory variables 
( itDEFA ), homoscedastic and normally distributed. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) contend that if the 
pecking order theory holds, the intercept should equal zero (α0=0), and the coefficient 
on DEFA variable should be one (α1 =1. This is the case where the financing deficit has 
the dollar-for-dollar impact on corporate debt. While if the coefficient of the deficit 
variable is less than one, equity with debt are used to finance the firm’s financing 
deficit.  Follow Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Nuri and Archer (2001), Adedeji 
(2002), and Frank and Goyal (2003), the study tests the hypothesis that the slope 
coefficient of deficit variable is equal one and the intercept is equal to zero. 
It is important to mention one major limitation of model 4.3. The DEFA coefficient 
obtained from model 4.3 does not indicate whether the effects of financial deficit and 
surplus on the change in total debt are symmetric or asymmetric or whether the impetus 
                                                          
57
 One-to-one relationship exists for firms whose leverage falls below their debt capacity. According to 
Myers and Majluf (1984), when the costs of financial distress are serious, the firm considers issuing 
equity for financing or to pay down debt rather than issuing debt. 
58
 Frank and Goyal (2003) claim that pecking order theory does not require any scaling for variables. 
However, they argue that scaling is most often justified as a method of controlling for differences in firm 
size. In an algebraic equality if the right-hand-side and left hand side are divided by the same value, the 
equality remains intact. 
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of increasing debt when firms have financial deficit is similar to or differing from that 
of retiring debt when they have a financial surplus. As noted in the introduction, the 
possibility of having symmetric effects or having asymmetric responses to financial 
deficit and surplus may result in slope coefficient differs from that obtained using model 
4.3. To test for these, we modified model 4.3 using the interaction dummy form model. 
In addition, we develop a model that allows for the DEFA coefficient to vary depending 
on whether the firms have financial deficit or financial surplus. These models are briefly 
discussed in the following section.  
 
4.2.2 The second model specification 
It has been argued that in pecking order theory, no attention is given to the sign of 
deficits (positive or negative) (Nuri and Archer, 2001). Moreover, Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) claim that the simple pecking order’s predictions do not depend on the 
sign of itDEFA . In principle, the firm could become a net lender if surplus funds persist; 
therefore, they used the positive and negative values of funds deficit in their study.  
Based on the definition of the financial deficit variable in equation (4.2), a positive 
value of itDEFA   implies that a firm has a deficit and that external funds should be 
raised through debt first and then equity as a last resort, whilst the negative value of 
itDEFA indicates that it has a surplus (free cash flow) that can be used to retire debt, 
invest in cash or marketable securities. If the surplus persists, it may gradually increase 
its target pay-out ratio or retire equity (Myers, 1984:581). This suggests that the firm 
does not issue or retire outside equity first and then debt, due to the higher costs of 
issuing outside equity. As a result, the pecking order theory predicts that surplus firms 
will first retire debt and then invest in cash and marketable securities, finally increasing 
target pay-out ratio or retiring equity. While for deficit firms, it predicts that they will 
first issue debt and then equity as last resort. If so the pecking order theory would 
predict that the coefficients on the surplus and deficit should be different but positive.  
The difference between the two coefficients depends on how sensitive the firms are to 
their financial surplus and deficit, i.e. if   firms are more sensitive in retiring debt 
(reduce) to save their debt capacity and avoid the higher costs of issuing equity than in 
increasing debt to finance their deficit, the coefficient on surplus variable should be 
higher than that of deficit variable. If so, including the surplus values with deficit values 
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in model 4.3 will reduce the effects of deficit values on the change in total debt level. 
Adedeji (2002) asserts that considering the surplus amounts in Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) regression would have reduced the influence of financing deficit variable 
on new debt issues. Adedeji vindicates his argument on the basis that the negative 
values of itDEFA  are not internal financial deficits or requirements for external finance 
to be covered by issuing debt.  However, he points out that it would be difficult to 
estimate by how much they affect the regression results when they are considered in 
regression.  
It is important to note that the suggestion of pecking order theory as well the view of 
Adedeji (2002) ignores the agency costs of free cash flow that might exist due to the 
separation between ownership and management.59 According to Jensen and Meckling 
(1967) and Jensen (1986), when  managers  of the firm have more cash flow than is 
needed to fund all of the firm’s available profitable projects there is an incentive for 
them to invest the excess cash in unprofitable projects (over investment problem), 
causing a conflict of interest between shareholders and managers of the firm.  Debt is 
suggested as a mechanism to mitigate this conflict and thereby the agency costs of free 
cash flow (financial surplus). To the extent that this is the case, combining the surplus 
and deficit values in the same variable as in model 4.3 will reduce the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficient on deficit variable as firms with surpluses take on debt rather than 
retiring debt which creates spurious evidence on the pecking order theory.  
To address the above issues, we develop two models to investigate how sensitive the 
firms are to their financial deficits  and  financial surpluses,  how sensitive the 
regression results are to how surplus values are treated and to test the hypothesis of 
symmetric effects of financial deficit and surplus on the change in total debt. For the 
purpose of the first model specification, we introduce two dummy variables as 
additional explanatory variables with itDEFA : DefitD  is a dummy variable which equals 
one for the positive financial deficits ( oDEFAit > ) and zero otherwise ( oDEFAit < ) 
and the interaction dummy term variable which is constructed by multiplying 
Def
itD by itDEFA . This form is known as the interaction dummy form. The two dummy 
variables in this model are used to differentiating between the intercept and slope 
coefficients of the surpluses and deficits (see, Gujarati, 2003:308). Consider the 
following model: 
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                       itit
Def
it
Def
ititit DEFADDDEFATDA εββββ +∗+++=∆ )(3210             (4.4) 
 
where itTDA∆  and itDEFA   are defined the same as in model 4.3, B0 = α0 and B1 = α1 
are the same as in model 4.3. B2 is the differential intercept coefficient and measures the 
potential difference in the intercept for firms with financial deficit and firms with 
surplus. B3 is the differential slope coefficient and measures by how much the slope 
coefficient of the financial deficit differs from that of the financial surplus. Accordingly, 
for deficit firms, the intercept will be (B0 + B2), while the slope coefficient will be (B1 
+B3).  This can be written as: 
 For deficit firms ( 1=DefitD ):    
                     
                                             ititit DEFABTDA εβββ ++++=∆ )()( 3120                 (4.4a) 
 
While for surplus firms ( 0=DefitD ):  
            
                                                ititit DEFATDA εββ ++=∆ 10                                   (4.4b) 
 
Based  on the definition of interaction dummy term, the significant positive (negative) 
β3 suggests that the impetus of firms to expand debt when they face financial deficits is 
higher (lower) than that of retiring (reducing) debt when they face financial surpluses, 
while the insignificant B3 implies that the motion of firms are not different. Similarly, a 
significant differential intercept coefficient B1 suggests that the two regressions (surplus 
and deficit regressions) have different intercept and vice versa. Restricted Least Squares 
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 Jensen (1986: 323) defines free cash flow as “cash flow in excess of that required for funding all 
projects that have positive net present value when discounted at the relevant cost of capital” 
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F-test is employed to test the null hypothesis that β2 = β3 = 0.60 A significant F-test leads 
to the rejection of the null hypothesis.  
It is important to mention one major limitation of model 4.4. It does not allow for 
testing the individual null hypotheses 131 =+ ββ , which is required for the pecking 
order to hold, and the joint test )( 311 βββ += . Therefore, we propose a new model 
allowing for testing the hypothesis of symmetric as well as asymmetric effects of 
financial deficit and financial surplus on the change in total debt level. In this model, a 
distinction between positive financial deficit and negative financial deficit (surplus) is 
being made to whether the financial deficit is positive ( oDEFAit > ) or negative 
( oDEFAit < ). As a result, the deficit variable is divided into two variables; the positive 
deficit variable ( DefitPDEFA ) and the negative deficit (surplus) variable ( SuritNDEFA ), as 
follows: 
it
Def
it DEFAPDEFA =   if 0>itDEFA , and zero otherwise. 
it
Sur
it DEFAPDEFA =   if   0<itDEFA , and zero otherwise. 
 
By substituting DefitPDEFA  and 
Sur
itNDEFA  for itDEFA , model 4.3 can be rewritten as: 
 
                          it
Sur
it
Def
itit NDEFAPDEFATDA εϕϕϕ +++=∆ 210                        (4.5) 
 
This specification allows for the pecking order coefficients to vary depending on 
whether the firm has a financial deficit or surplus. It also allows for testing the 
individual null hypotheses 01 =ϕ  and 02 =ϕ , and the joint test 21 ϕϕ = . Recalling  
                                                          
60
 F-test is made between the restricted and unrestricted models; the unrestricted model contains DefitD  and 
it
Def
it DEFAD *  dummy variables as additional explanatory variables with itDEFA  variable and the 
restricted model contains only itDEFA  variable as explanatory variable. And calculated as follows: 
F= kRR ru /)( 22 −  divided by )/()1( 2 knRu −− , where, K is the number of regressors in the unrestricted 
model. 2uR   and 
2
rR are the explanatory power of unrestricted and restricted models respectively. 
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that 11 =ϕ , 02 >ϕ  is required for the pecking order to hold, while 02 <ϕ implies that 
firms respond to their financial surplus by expanding debt, not by retiring debt as the 
pecking order theory suggests, indicating that shareholders are strong enough to force 
managers to raise debt to reduce the amount of free cash available under management 
control.  Wald test is employed to test the null hypotheses individually and jointly. The 
null hypothesis can be rejected if the Wald test is found to be statistically significant.  
As this study also compares the pecking order models between small and large firms, 
the Chow test is employed to investigate whether the two sample regressions are 
different or not. This test differentiates between the two sample regressions under the 
null hypothesis that they are statistically the same (i.e., no structural change or break). 
The two sample regressions are different, if the calculated F value exceeds the critical 
value at the chosen level of significance; otherwise, the two regressions can be 
considered similar.61 The underlying assumption behind this test is that the variances of 
the two samples are the same. The null hypothesis in the variance test is that there is no 
difference between the variances.62 If the test’s results reject the null hypothesis, then 
the variances are different and we cannot proceed to calculate the Chow test (Gujarati, 
2003:297). 
 
4.2.3 The third model specification 
Although models 4.3 and 4.4 are used to empirically investigate pecking order theory, 
they ignore all variables that might affect the willingness of suppliers to supply debt to 
firms (Adedeji, 2002). These models take in consideration only the demand side and the 
effect of raising external funds especially equity funds, on the wealth of existing 
stockholders. Frank and Goyal (2003) claim that if the pecking order theory holds, the 
financing deficit should obscure the effects of other explanatory variables such as tax, 
growth opportunities, size and tangible assets.  According to Adedeji (2002), the best 
way to test pecking order theory against the trade-off theory is to add the deficit variable 
as one of the explanatory variables in the conventional leverage regression. 
Consequently, if the suggestion of pecking order theory is correct, the deficit variable 
should wipe out the effects of the other explanatory variables in the conventional 
leverage regressions. If it does not, then firms take other variables into consideration 
                                                          
61
 Chow test: F= (RSSR – RSSUR)/K divided by (RSSUR)/ (n1+n2-k), where RSSR is the restricted residual 
sum of square, RSSUR is the unrestricted residual sun of square (RSSS +RSSL), k and (n1 + n2 − 2k) are 
the degree of freedom in the numerator and denominator, respectively. 
62
 The variance test is F=б21/ б22.  
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when setting their leverage. However, Frank and Goyal (2003) argue that conventional 
leverage regression explains only the level of leverage not the change in leverage level 
(as the pecking order theory explains). Therefore, in addition to the conventional 
leverage regression, they use the conventional leverage specification in the first 
differences.63 Regardless of the specification used, the findings of Frank and Goyal 
(2003) and Adedeji (2002) have revealed that the financing deficit is one factor among 
many that firms trade off when funding their investment. Inconsistent with their 
findings, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) find that nesting the pecking order model 
and target-off model leads to the rejection of the pecking order model. 
Therefore, for the purposes of the third model specification, this study considers the 
static model 3.1 developed in chapter three to investigate the main determinants of 
optimal leverage in Jordan. The deficit variable (DEFit) is added as one of the 
explanatory variables in that model (3.1).  
 
),,,,,,,( 1_1_1_1_1_1_1_1_ ititititititititit DEFGROVOLTNDTSLIQSZTANGPROFfLEV =                             
(4.6) 
 
Individuals: i =1,…, 114; time: t = 1, … , 9. All explanatory variables are included in 
the regression with a  one-year lag and are the same variables that have been suggested 
in model (3.1) as determinants of optimal leverage which is defined as the ratio of total 
debt to total assets64. These explanatory variables are PROFit (Profitability), TANGit 
(Tangibility), SZit (Size), NDTSit (Non-debt tax shields), LIQit (Liquidity), GRTHit 
(Growth), VOLit (Volatility) with internal fund deficits (DEFit)  added as new 
explanatory variables. 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), if the costs of financial distress are ignored, the 
firm funds real investment by issuing the safest   security it can. 65 However, when the 
costs of financial distress are severe, the firm considers issuing equity for financing or 
to pay off debt. This implies that as long as the firm does not reach it maximum debt 
                                                          
63
 However, Frank and Goyal (2003) argue that conventional leverage specification in the first differences 
may result in lower R2 , less accuracy and may bias the estimated coefficients toward zero. 
64
 All the explanatory variables in model (4.6) except DEFit
-1 are briefly discussed in chapter three which 
investigates the empirical evidence on the determinants of capital structure for Jordanian firms.  
65
 Here, ‘safe’ means not affected by any revelation of managers ‘inside information’. In practice, this 
means that firms which can issue investment-grade debt will do so rather than issue equity. 
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capacity, it will demand more debt to meet its financing requirements. This suggests a 
positive association between the leverage ratio and the funds deficits. 
  
 
4.3  The estimation results of pecking order models 
4.3.1 The estimation results of model 4.3 
The results presented in Table 4.1 suggest that the model with random effects is found 
to be the preferred specification, since the Hausman test is insignificant and the 
hypothesis that no firm-specific effects exist is rejected (as signified by the significant 
Lagrange multiplier test). The model is also significant overall as the null hypothesis 
that all slope coefficients are jointly zero is rejected at the 1% level. 
 
Table 4.1: The estimation results of model 4.3 
(Dependent variable: the change in total debt, ∆TDA it   ) 
Independent 
variable 
1997-2005 1997-2000 2001-2005 
 
Intercept -4. 970 
(0.000) 
 
-5.254 
(0.000) 
-4.307 
(0.000) 
 
DEF 0.417 
(0.000) 
 
0.439 
(0.000) 
0.357 
(0.000) 
 
DMyear 
 
YES YES YES 
R2 
P-value 
N 
0.20 
(0.000) 
912 
0.25 
(0.000) 
342 
0.18 
(0.000) 
456 
 
LM Test 116.17 
(0.000) 
 
77.63 
(0.000) 
112.92 
(0.000) 
Hausman 
Test 
11.24 
(0.116) 
 
8.03 
(0.264) 
13.76 
(0.112) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the net debt issued in year 
t scaled by total assets   DEF: the firm’s internal funds 
deficits and defined as DEF= (D it +I it +∆WC it) -C it 
divided by total assets. YES /NO refers to the inclusion of 
variables in the regression.  Figures in brackets and in bold 
below the coefficient are the probabilities of significance based on 
the standard errors which are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
 
The results provide no support for the pecking order theory in Jordan. Although the 
estimated coefficient on the deficit (DEF) variable is positive and statistically 
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significant at the1% level, the slope coefficient is statistically different from one. 
Moreover, the intercept (α0) is also found to be statistically significant, suggesting that 
other sources of external financing are used with debt to finance a firm’s funds deficit. 
Consequently, the proposed hypotheses that α0 =0 and α 1 =1 are soundly rejected. This 
finding suggests that debt financing does not dominate equity financing. In contrast, 
equity issues track the financing quite closely, while debt does not do so.66 
Although the financial system in Jordan is a bank-based financial system, the finding of 
this study is in line with those of studies of market based financial systems67.  Adedeji 
(2002) finds that debt finances only around 20% of the financing deficit in the UK while 
equity finances more of the deficit.  Nuri and Archer (2001) receive the similar results 
using data from the UK and other European countries.  Frank and Goyal (2003) 
conclude that equity issues are a significant component of external finance in the US 
and net equity issues are generally larger that net debt issues. This finding is also 
consistent with the finding of Singh (1994) in 10 developing countries68. Singh (1994) 
provides evidence suggesting that firms in these countries rely heavily on external funds 
and particularly on new shares issues on the stock market to finance their investment.  
 This finding may be attributed firstly to the large increases in stock prices in recent 
years on ASE which made equity issues relatively more attractive for financing 
corporate investment in the Jordanian market. The demand for equities rose in response 
to the Jordanian government’s promotional policies for stock market expansion. Since 
1997, foreigners have been allowed to own up to 100% of the stock of all listed 
companies. Moreover, many measures have been taken to make the market signal price 
information to the market participants, increasing market efficiency. These measures 
have increased the attractiveness of using new equity to finance deficits because, once 
market efficiency increases, investors are rationally willing to pay more for stock. The 
finding may also be explained by the relatively high interest rates on credit facilities 
granted by Jordanian banks.  The relatively costly access to that credit made Jordanian 
                                                          
66
 This study tests the effect of internal funds deficits(DEF) on equity issues by using the following 
model: 
∆EA it = β0+ β1 DEFA it + u it, where ∆EA it: is the net equity issued in yeart divided by total assets. The 
estimated coefficient on DEF variable is 0.587 and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that 
equity levels are more sensitive to change in cash flow balance.   
67
 Although Jordan is one of the Islamic countries, the business culture in Jordan is not dominated by 
Islamic values or Islamic Laws. Overall, it is similar to that in western countries. 
68
 Singh (1994) investigated how the top hundred largest listed firms in 10 less developed countries 
(India, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Jordan, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey, and Zimbabwe) 
financed their investment during the period 1980-1990. 
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firms rely more heavily on shareholders’ capital. The adoption of conservative credit 
policies in Jordanian banks since the end of 1990s and the removal of restrictions on 
interest rates on lending and deposits increased the cost of borrowing and deterred these 
companies from obtaining debt financing (Jordanian Central Bank, 2005).  
Consistent with this, the mean value of debt- to-equity ratio in the dataset is lower in 
2001-2005 (0.239) than it is in 1997-2000 (0.397). This reduction suggests that the use 
of equity has increased since 2001 on account of debt financing. However, it may also 
mean that both equity and debt financing have increased, but equity has increased more 
than debt. Therefore, as a robust test, we divide the sample period into two, 1997–2000 
and 2001–2005. The distinction between the two periods is made by the time dummy 
variable ( timeitD ) which equals one for the observations in 2001–2005, and zero 
otherwise (i.e., for observations in 1997–2000). The Chow test is found to be significant 
(the calculated F value exceeds the critical value at the 1% level), suggesting that the 
two periods regressions are different, and thereby the financing behaviour of the 
Jordanian firms. 
The results presented in Table 4.1 show that the estimated coefficient for deficit variable 
has declined from 0.439 for the period 1997-2000 to 0.357 for the period 2001-2005, 
indicating that the readiness of Jordanian firms to use debt for financing has declined in 
the period 2001-2005. For the two periods, the estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant, but statistically different from one,  suggesting that debt and equity are used 
to finance their financial deficit, with equity being higher than debt.69  These findings 
support the view that increases in stock prices have encouraged Jordanian firms to go to 
the stock market for financing and also that the cost of debt has increased due to 
conservative credit policy and removal of restrictions on deposit and lending interest 
rates. Furthermore, it supports the view of Baker and Wurgler (2002) that higher market 
valuation makes the equity market more attractive for financing.70 Consistent with this, 
we provide evidence, in chapter three, suggesting that leverage is negatively related to 
the growth opportunities (measured as the ratio of market value to book value). 
 
                                                          
69
 The Wald test regarding the null hypotheses that 00 =α  and 11 =α  are statistically significant at the 
1% level. 
70
 Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that low-levered firm tends to be that raised funds when its valuations 
are high, and conversely high leverage firm tend to be those that raised funds when its valuations are low. 
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4.3.1.1  The estimation results of model 4.3 for small and large firms  
It has been argued that the pecking order theory approach is particularly relevant for 
small firms, since the cost of external equity may be higher for small firms than for 
large ones for a number of reasons related to transaction, adverse selection costs, and 
control considerations (Chittenden et al., 1996). This is also consistent with the view of 
Frank and Goyal (2003) that pecking order theory should perform better in small firms 
than large ones, because equity issuance of small firms is subject to high adverse 
selection. Large firms are more closely observed by analysts and tend to provide more 
information to outside investors than smaller firms do. So, they should be more capable 
of issuing information-ally more sensitive equity and have lower debt (Rajan and 
Zingales 1995).  
Jordan et al. (1998) support the view that small firms adopt a pecking order approach 
when funding their activities. They claim that owners of small companies who are 
reluctant to give up control are, in general, willing to finance expansion first through 
internal funds, then through debt, and finally via equity. In addition to the adverse 
selection costs and control consideration, transactions costs are especially high for small 
firms because of their small issuances of debt or /and equity (Rudebusch and Oliner, 
1989; 1992). Therefore, one can expect that small firms are more likely to follow the 
pecking order theory because of difficult in accessing external financing sources. 
However, Frank and Goyal (2003) find the opposite. Their sample of large firms 
provides more support for the pecking order theory than their small-firm sample.  
For the purpose of this analysis, we divide the sample firms into two sub-sample 
groups; small firms and large firms. Firms with logarithm of total assets above the 
median are classified as large firms ( )1=SizeitD , while those with logarithm of total assets 
below the median are small firms ( )0=SizeitD . This classification will be adopted in 
testing for the size effect under all models in the study. The pecking order theory 
predicts that leverage and size is negatively related (see, section 3.2.1.3), suggesting that 
small firms tend to use debt more than large firms. However, the results presented in 
Table 4.2 provide no supports for this suggestion. For small firms, the estimated 
coefficient on the deficit variable is 0.322 compared to 0.469 for large companies, 
indicating that small Jordanian firms use debt lower than large firms. The two estimates 
are found to be statistically different from each other. The F value is calculated to be 
26.25 which is greater than the critical value at the 1% level, and hence, the null 
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hypothesis that the two sample (small and large firms) regressions are the same is 
soundly rejected.  However, the results generally provide no support for the pecking 
order theory for either small or large companies. For both groups, the estimated 
coefficients on the deficit variable are statistically significant, but significantly different 
from one, suggesting that small and large Jordanian firms use debt as well as equity to 
finance their internal funds deficit.71 
 
Table 4.2 : The estimation results of model 4.3 for small and large firms 
Dependent variable: the change in total debt, ∆TDA it    
Independent 
variable 
Small firms Large firms 
 
Intercept -6.093 
(0.000) 
-4.010 
(0.000) 
 
DEF 0.322 
(0.000) 
0.469 
(0.000) 
 
DMyear 
 
YES YES 
R2 
P-value 
N 
017 
(0.000) 
456 
0.24 
(0.000) 
456 
 
LM Test 89.63 
(0.000) 
141.92 
(0.000) 
Hausman 
Test 
7.23 
(0.275) 
15.96 
(0.102) 
 
 
Consistent with this, the mean leverage ratio is higher for large Jordanian firms (0.321) 
than it is for small Jordanian firms (0.199). This finding may be attributed to the fact 
that Jordanian banks usually offer debt to high quality (less risky) firms. From the 
lender’s point of view, small Jordanian firms are more risky, so their cost of debt is 
expected to be high. There is evidence suggesting that small Jordanian firms are less 
profitable, highly volatile, and have high growth opportunities with fewer tangible 
assets (see, analysis of correlation in section 3.3.1). As a result, they are more likely to 
experience bankruptcy costs, and consequently deterring them from raising more debt at 
an attractive rate. Increases in stock prices along with the conservative credit policies of 
the Jordanian banks induce small companies to rely on equity funds more than debt 
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 The Wald test regarding the null hypothesis that α
 1 =1 is found to be 166.52 and 173.25 for small and 
large firms respectively (significant at the 1% level), and hence the null hypothesis that α
 1 =1 is soundly 
rejected. 
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funds to finance their internal funds deficit.72 In fact, the financial liberalization that 
Jordan has been following since 1990 has helped remove the barriers that restrict small 
companies’ access to capital market. 
 
4.3.2  The estimation results of model 4.4 and 4.5 
Model 4.4 investigates whether the impetus of increasing debt when the firm has a 
deficit is similar to that of retiring (reducing) debt when it has a surplus. The model with 
random effects is found to be the preferred specification for the dataset. As Hausman 
(insignificant) and Lagrange Multiplier (significant) tests suggest. Overall, the model is 
found to be significant and the null hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly   zero is 
soundly rejected.  
The results presented in Table 4.3 show that the estimated coefficients on the deficit 
variable and the positive interaction dummy variable ( itDefit DEFAD * ) are statistically 
significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively. The intercept differential coefficient is 
found to be statistically insignificant; suggesting that the difference in the slope 
coefficients is the only source of the difference between the two regressions. This 
difference is found to be statistically significant as the significant Restricted Least 
Squares F-test suggests (the calculated F value exceeds the critical value at the 5% 
level). This finding suggests that Jordanian firms are less sensitive in expanding debt to 
meet their financing requirements than in retiring debt to absorb surpluses. The negative 
differential slope coefficient (-0.126) indicates that the slope coefficient of the positive 
deficit variable is lower than that of financial by 0.126. As calculated from equation 
4.5a ( 1=DefitD ), the coefficient on the positive deficit variable is 0.493 (0.619-0.126) 
compared to 0.619 on the negative surplus variable. However, the  computed coefficient 
on positive deficit variable (0.493) is higher than that obtained from model 4.3 when the 
surplus and deficit values are considered in the same variable (0.417), suggesting that 
including the surplus values in model 4.3 has reduced the effect of deficit values on the 
change in total debt level. This finding supports the view of Adedeji (2002) that 
including funds surpluses could reduce the effect of the deficit variable on the 
dependent variable. These results are strongly supported by the results obtained from 
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  For small firms, the estimation results of regressing ∆E/TA it   on DEF/TA it,( ∆E/TA it is the net equity 
issued in year t divided by total assets (∆E/TA it = β0+ β1 DEF/TA it + u it))suggests that these firms use 
equity than debt. The estimated coefficient (β1) is 0.64 and significant at the 5% level.  
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model 4.5 which is used in this study to test for the hypothesis of symmetric effect of 
financial surplus and deficit variable.  
 
Table 4.3: The estimation results of model 4.4 and 4.5 
Dependent variable: the change in total debt, ∆TDA it 
 
Independent 
variable 
Model 
4.4 
Model 
4.5 
   
Intercept -4.505 
(0.000) 
 
-4.505 
(0.000) 
 
DEF 0.619 
(0.000) 
 
 
- 
DDef 0.226 
(0.648) 
 
 
- 
Ddef *DEF -0.126 
(0.030) 
 
 
- 
DefPDEF   
- 
0.482 
(0.000) 
 SurNDEF   
- 
0.591 
(0.000) 
 
D year YES 
 
YES 
 
R2 
P-value 
N 
0.32 
(0.000) 
912 
0.35 
(0.000) 
912 
LM Test 97.34 
(0.000) 
86.74 
(0.000) 
Hausman Test 2.31 
(0.520) 
1.97 
(0.423) 
 Notes: DEF: the same as in Table 4.1. DDef: a dummy variable  which 
equals one for oDEFAit > and zero otherwise. DDef * DEFit: the 
interaction dummy variable. DefPDEF is the positive financial deficit. 
SurNDEF is the negative financial deficit. YES /NO refers to the 
inclusion of variables in the regression.  Figures in brackets and in bold 
below the coefficient are the probabilities of significance based on the 
standard errors which are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
 
As can be seen from Table 4.3, the estimated coefficients on the positive financial 
deficit variable ( DefitPDEF ) and negative financial deficit variables ( SuritNDEF ) are 
significantly positive at the 1% level, but higher for surplus variable (0.591) than for 
positive deficit variable (0.482). Moreover, the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients of DefitPDEF and 
Sur
itNDEF  ( 21 ϕϕ = ) are not different, since it is found 
to be statistically significant at the 1% level. Again the results suggest that the 
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willingness of Jordanian firms to expand debt when they face financial deficits is lower 
than that of retiring (reducing) debt when they face financial surpluses, indicating also 
that the effects  of  the financial surplus and deficits on the change in total debt level are 
different or asymmetric. The statistically significantly positive slope coefficient on 
surplus variable suggests that Jordanian firms tend to use up their financial surplus to 
retire their debt, indicating that shareholders are very weak and hence, don’t force 
managers to take on debt to soak up free cash flow (Financial surplus).    To the extent 
that this is the case, these findings imply that the bankruptcy and agency costs of debt 
are very critical in the Jordanian market; therefore, Jordanian firms tend to maintain 
their debt level low and retire debt to save their debt capacity for future needs. Although 
the exclusion of negative values (surplus) has increased the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient on DefitPDEF  variable, it remains statistically different from one, suggesting 
that debt financing does not dominate equity financing.  Similarly, the estimated 
coefficient on SuritNDEF  is found to be statistically significantly different from one (For 
both coefficients, the Wald test is found to be statistically significant at the 1% level). 
As Jordanian firms do not use financial surplus to retire equity, the non-unity coefficient 
on the surplus variable suggests that besides retiring debt, Jordanian firms tend to invest 
their financial surplus in cash or marketable securities which can be liquidated later 
when the need for funds arises.73  
Overall, the finding of this study does not support the argument of Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) and Nuri and Archer, (2001) that support for pecking order theory is not 
affected by the sign of deficit variable. In light of this finding, we have to be careful in 
interpreting the results obtained from model 4.3. Although the effects of financial 
surplus and deficit are found to be asymmetric, it does not mean that these effects might 
not be symmetric when the shareholders are strong enough to force managers to create 
debt to reduce the amount of free cash available under their control. Hence, the unity 
slope coefficient may not necessarily mean that the pecking order theory is held because 
it could fall short of unity if the effects of financial surplus and deficit are symmetric. 
 
4.3.2.1  The estimation results of model 4.5 for small and large firms  
In this section, we test the hypothesis of asymmetric effects of financial surplus and 
deficit on the change in debt level for small and large firms to investigate whether they 
                                                          
73
 For all sample firms, stock repurchases are found zero. 
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are different or not. More precisely, we investigate, if they are different, whether the 
impetus of increasing debt to finance deficit and that of retiring debt to absorb surplus 
are higher/lower for large firms than for small firms.  As in section 4.3.1.1, the sample 
firms are divided into two; small and large firms. The Chow test regarding the null 
hypothesis that small and large firms’ regressions are not different is found to be 
statistically significant (the calculated F-value exceeds the critical value at the 5% 
level), suggesting that the two regression are different and consequently, implying that 
the financing behaviour of small and large firms is different.   
 
Table 4.4: The estimation results of model 4.5 for small and large firms 
Dependent variable: the change in total debt, ∆TDA it 
Independent 
variable 
Large  
firms 
Small 
Firms 
   
Intercept -5.433 
(0.000) 
-3.536 
(0.000) 
 
DefPDEF  0.421 
(0.000) 
 
0.592 
(0.000) 
 
SurNDEF  0.589 
(0.005) 
 
0.648 
(0.010) 
 
D year YES 
 
YES 
 
R2 
P-value 
N 
0.42 
(0.000) 
456 
0.27 
(0.000) 
456 
LM Test 91.37 
(0.000) 
91.37 
(0.000) 
Hausman Test 2.01 
(0.570) 
2.01 
(0.570) 
 
Moreover, for both sized groups, the results presented in Table 4.5 support the 
hypothesis that the effects of financial deficit and surplus are asymmetric or different, 
where the estimated coefficients on the surplus ( SuritNDEF ) and deficit ( DefitPDEF ) 
variables are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that Jordanian firms tend 
to expand debt when they have deficit and retire debt when they have financial surplus. 
However, the estimated coefficients are lower for DefitPDEF (0.421 and  0.592 ) for small 
and large firms respectively)  than for  SuritNDEF   (0.569 and 0.648), implying that 
small and large Jordanian firms are less sensitive in increasing debt for financing than in 
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reducing debt for soaking up surplus.74 However, as cleared, small Jordanian firms are 
less sensitive than large ones in increasing debt to finance their positive financial deficit 
and retiring debt to soak up surplus. When  the estimated coefficients are individually 
tested, the null hypotheses, 11 =ϕ  and 12 =ϕ  are soundly rejected, suggesting that the 
slope coefficients for both variables are statistically different from one (the Wald test is 
found to be statistically significant at the 1% level for both size groups), indicating that 
small and large Jordanian firms use both debt and equity to finance their deficit, but 
equity issues track the financing deficit quite closely in small firms.  While, the less 
than one slope coefficient on surplus variable indicates that besides retiring debt, small 
and large Jordanian firms tend to invest their financial surplus in cash or marketable 
securities. However, small firms tend to invest in cash and marketable securities more 
that large firms do, suggesting that these firms face difficulties in raising debt funds 
from banks. 
 
4.3.3 The estimation results of model 4.6 
The main objective of developing model 4.6 is to test for the prediction of pecking order 
theory that firms tend to raise debt only under pressure of an internal funds deficit. If so, 
the deficit variable should wipe out the effects of the other explanatory variables in the 
conventional leverage regressions. The only difference between model 3.1 and the 
model under investigation is that, the deficit variable (DEFit) is added as an additional 
explanatory variable in model (4.6). Model (3.1) is the static model that the study has 
developed to investigate the determinants of capital structure of Jordanian firms listed 
on the ASE. 
The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) which is used to test for multicollinearity indicates 
that the model does not suffer from any multicollinearity problem. The VIF for all 
variables are ranged between 1.05 – 1.42 with average amounted to 1.21. As the 
significant Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and insignificant Hausman tests suggests, the 
model with random effects is the preferred specification. 
 
                                                          
74
 The null hypothesis that 21 ϕϕ =  is soundly rejected (for both size groups, the Wald test is found to be 
statistically significant at the 1% level). 
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Table 4.5: The estimation results of model 4.6 
(Dependent variable: Leverage (TD/TA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: All independent variables are taken by one year lag and 
defined the same as in the model 3.1 DEF: the firm’s internal funds 
deficits and defined as DEF= (D it +I it +∆WC it) -C it. YES /NO 
refers to the inclusion of variables in the regression.  Figures in 
brackets and in bold below the coefficient are the probabilities of 
significance based on the standard errors which are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. 
  
 
 
 
 
The results presented in Table 4.6 reveal that adding the deficit variable does not change 
the magnitude, sign and significance of the estimated coefficients of model 3.1. The 
variables which are found to be statistically significant in model 3.1 are found to be 
significant in model 4.7 and have the same signs, with no change in the significance of 
the variables which have been found statistically insignificant in model 3.1. 
Furthermore, the results show that the deficit variable is positively related to leverage 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. Consequently, adding the deficit variable to 
model 3.1 does not overwhelm the effect of other explanatory variables on leverage as 
 
Independent 
 variables 
 
Full  
Sample 
  
Intercept -4.827 
(0.000) 
 
PRO 0.148 
(0.000) 
TAN -0.021 
(0.623) 
SZ 0.261 
(0.005) 
NDT -0.502 
(0.035) 
GR -0.29 
(0.005) 
VOL -0.792 
(0.000) 
DEF 0.184 
(0.003) 
DMyear YES 
 
R2 
P-value 
N 
0.53 
(0.000) 
912 
 
LM test 
 
1267.91 
(0.000) 
Hausman test 13.32 
(0.602) 
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the pecking order theory suggests. Moreover, it improves the explanatory power only 
slightly.  This finding suggests that a funds deficit is just one factor among many that 
firms trade off when funding their investment.75 The finding is in the line with Frank 
and Goyal (2003) for the USA, and Adedeji (2002) for the UK. 
 
 
 
4.4  Conclusion 
This chapter has tested the pecking order theory using data from the Jordanian market. 
While  the extant research has tested the pecking order theory without investigating 
whether the firms respond to their financial deficit and surplus differently or similarly, 
or whether they are more or less sensitive in increasing to finance deficit than in retiring 
debt to save debt capacity, an obvious extension to this study is to test firstly, for the 
hypothesis of symmetric impact of financial deficit and surplus on the change in total 
debt level; and secondly, for the possibility that the impetus of expanding debt is 
differing from that of retiring debt. We have tested for these by estimating two 
empirical models designed to capture symmetric impact of financial deficit and surplus 
on debt, besides the ones that have been used in literature for the comparison purposes.  
A number of interesting insights have been found. Firstly, of the three models 
considered, the estimated coefficient on the deficit variable is statistically significantly 
which suggests that internally generated funds by Jordanian firms are not sufficient to 
meet their financing requirement, implying that external funds are needed. The finding 
of less than one slope coefficient means that Jordanian firms use debt as well as equity 
for financing; with equity issues follow the financing deficit quite strictly.  Secondly 
and importantly, the estimated models support the prediction of pecking order theory 
that financial deficit and surplus affect the change in total debt differently. However, 
Jordanian firms are more sensitive in retiring debt to save their debt capacity than in 
expanding debt to finance deficit. This finding suggest that there would   appear to be 
significant constraints on the supply of loans to Jordanian firms such as the bankruptcy 
and agency costs of debt. The finding of asymmetric impact of surplus and deficit on 
debt indicates that the agency costs of free cash flow are low or the shareholders are 
very weak and hence, do not force managers to employ debt to soak up surplus (free 
cash flow). However, the hypothesis of symmetric impact may not be rejected in the 
market where the agency costs of free cash flow are significantly large and shareholders 
                                                          
75
 We run the conventional leverage regression in first differences and reach to the same conclusion. 
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(i.e. large institutional shareholders) are strong enough to force managers to raise debt 
to take up surplus. Another interesting results obtained is that splitting the values of 
deficit variable into surplus and deficit values has increased the estimated slope 
coefficient of the deficit variable when compared with that obtained when the two 
values are considered in the same variable, suggesting that including the surplus values 
would reduce the  impact  of  deficit variable in the pecking order model. 
Contrary to many other countries, the empirical result of this study does not support the 
pecking order theory in the Jordanian market. This finding may be attributed firstly, to 
the fact that investors in the Jordanian market prefer dividend payments, making the 
supply of internally generated funds from retained earnings inelastic. This is because the 
taxation system encourages cash payments of dividends. Secondly, the increase in 
interest rates on loans due to the financial liberalization and the adoption of 
conservative credit polices by the Jordanian banks force Jordanian firms, in general, and 
the small ones, in particular, to finance their investment opportunities by equity. This 
along with the remarkable increase in the stock prices on ASE during the study made 
equity financing less expensive than debt financing, encouraging Jordanian firms to go 
to the stock market for financing. It is worth noting that when stocks are overvalued, the 
asymmetric information costs to the firm are expected to be low which may encourage 
firms to maintain their borrowing capacity for the future by using equity funds for 
financing. 
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CHAPTER 5 - EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF TARGET 
ADJUSTMENT THEORY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter four has presented the empirical investigation on the pecking order theory for 
114 non-financial Jordanian firms listed in Amman Stock Exchange. The results have 
revealed that equity tracks the financing deficit more than debt, implying that equity is 
not the last resort as the pecking order theory predicts. Furthermore, the results have 
revealed that financial surplus and deficit have affected leverage differently. This 
finding is consistent with the pecking order theory that firms tend to expand debt if they 
face deficit and retire debt if they have surplus. However, the results showed that 
Jordanian firms are more sensitive in using up surplus for retiring debt than in 
expanding debt for meeting their financing requirements. 
The other competing theory is the trade off theory, or the target adjustment theory. 76 
This theory suggests that there is an optimal (target) level of leverage under which the 
firm’s value is maximized, implying that if the firm’s leverage level deviates from its 
target, it will move gradually towards its target leverage by substituting debt for equity 
or equity for debt until the target level is reached and the firm’s value is maximized. 
However, target reversion depends on the costs of adjusting leverage (adjustment costs) 
as well as on the costs of being far from the target level (the benefits of moving back 
towards the target level). In general, the presence of transaction costs may prevent 
leverage adjustment until the benefits from adjusting leverage outweigh these costs. 
Previous studies have investigated the target adjustment theory with the assumption that 
the adjustment costs of increasing and reducing leverage are symmetrical.77 Moreover, 
they have also assumed that the benefits of moving back towards the target leverage 
ratio by the firm being below its target leverage level are similar to those of being above 
the target level. If these assumptions are not valid, the adjustment rates may vary 
                                                          
76
 Trade-off theory is also called the target adjustment theory of capital structure. As the analysis in this 
chapter is focusing on the target level that a firm is trying to reach, we use the target adjustment concept 
instead of the trade-off concept. 
77
 For example: Syham – Surder and Myers (1999); Banerjee et al. (2000); Ozkan (2001); Miguel and 
Pindado (2001); Mira and Gracia (2002); Hovakiman et al. (2001, 2004); Cai and Chosh (2003); Leary 
and Roberts (2005); Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Antoniou et al. (2008), amongst others. 
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depending on whether the leverage is below or above its target level. As well as this, if 
the adjustment costs constitute a major portion of the total costs of changing leverage 
level, firms with leverage away from its target leverage ratio will alter their leverage 
ratios only if they are sufficiently far away from the target leverage ratio, making the 
rates of adjustment vary depending on whether the deviations from the target leverage 
ratio are significantly large or small. The key question here: is the dynamic adjustment 
of leverage symmetric or asymmetric? 
As mentioned in chapter two (the literature review), leverage expansion may be 
constrained by the costs associated with increasing leverage (the bankruptcy and agency 
costs), and also by the availability of debt at an attractive rate. In addition, it may be 
affected by other market frictions such as transaction costs and taxes. Hence, firms may 
be forced to incur significant adjustment costs in the form of the diversion of financial 
resources to revert back to the target.78  When the firm is scaling down its level of 
leverage however, such adjustment costs either simply do not arise or they are less 
likely to be significant. Although leverage expansion may create tax benefits, the 
marginal tax savings of any additional unit of debt decreases as leverage goes up 
because of the probability of bankruptcy increases with leverage. The bankruptcy of 
debt become more critical as a firm moves above its target leverage level because at 
leverage above its target, these costs will be much higher than its benefits. If so, the 
incentive for reducing leverage when firms are above their target leverage ratios will be 
higher than that for increasing leverage when they are below their target ratios, 
suggesting different rates of adjustment for above-and below-target leverage ratios.  
 
 As large firms are expected to have large investment projects and consequently large 
issues of debt or /and equity, adjustment costs will be proportionally small for larger 
firms than for small firms, implying that larger firms should adjust to the desired capital 
structure more readily than smaller firms. Larger firms may also find it easier to access 
capital by issuing equity or debt, possibly because more information is available about 
them.  Another important point is missed in literature that firms may have a target 
leverage ratio but follow the pecking order theory, suggesting that the adjustment may 
take place in a way consistent with the pecking order theory. Hovakiman et al. (2004) 
                                                          
78
 Adjustment costs are the costs of switching from debt to equity and equity to debt. According to 
Olinear and Rudebusch (1989 and 1992) these costs are the compensation for the dealer placing the issue, 
and other expenses such as legal, accounting and printing costs, registration fees and taxes. 
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and Leary and Roberts (2005) conclude that firms may set their own target leverage 
ratio, but prefer internal funds to external, and debt funds to equity funds.79 If so, the 
rates of adjustment may vary depending on whether the firms have financial surplus or 
deficit, with higher rates for deficit than for surplus. Firms with fund deficit tend to 
increase their leverage which makes leverage adjustment much faster than those with 
fund surplus, whilst firms with fund surplus are expected to retire debt and then move 
away from the target level, increasing the size of deviation and then the time required 
moving back towards their target.80 However, if the bankruptcy and agents costs of debt 
are very critical, firms with surplus are expected to adjust their leverage faster than 
those with deficit.  This might also suggest that firms with financial surplus or deficit 
may experience different rates of upward and downward adjustment: i.e., firms face 
surplus (deficit) with leverage below (above) the target level are expected to adjust their 
leverage slower than those with leverage above (below) the target (these arguments will 
be discussed further in sections 5.3.1.2 and 5.3.2.2). 
These gaps in literature, besides the lack of research in developing countries in general 
and Jordan in particular, motivated the researcher to carry out  this study to investigate 
the financing practices of Jordanian listed firms where many issues, like those discussed 
above, are still not clearly developed. As mentioned in chapter two, the movement of 
the Jordanian economy towards the free market economy may provide opportunities for 
Jordanian firms to optimally determine their leverage and move toward their target level 
if any deviation from that target exists. Therefore, this chapter investigates the empirical 
evidence on the target adjustment theory in the Jordanian market.  The chapter is 
structured as follows: section 5.2 discusses the empirical models that this study uses to 
investigate the target adjustment theory, such as symmetric and asymmetric partial 
adjustment models and the error correction model. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 present and 
discuss the estimation results. Finally, section 5.5 is a conclusion.  
 
                                                          
79However, Hovakiman et al. (2004) and Leary and Roberts (2005) have not investigated whether the 
rates of adjustment are different between surplus and deficit.  
80
 However, Cai and Ghosh (2003) point out that if the optimization hypothesis is true, there should be 
more firms adjusting their capital structure toward the optimal point to maximize the firm’s value instead 
of moving away from the mean. Cai and Ghosh (2003, p 21) argue that therefore, the number of times a 
firm adjusted its capital structure toward the optimal capital structure (N), is greater than the number of 
times a firm’s capital structure moved away from the optimal capital structure during n periods (M). 
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5.2 Target adjustment models 
To investigate whether the Jordanian listed firms have targeted leverage ratio and 
moved gradually toward their target ratios when their leverage deviates from their 
target, symmetric as well as asymmetric partial adjustment models are adopted and 
tested. Contrary to a symmetric model, an asymmetric adjustment model tests the 
hypothesis of asymmetric adjustment costs of increasing and reducing leverage. In 
addition, we use the error correction model to investigate the short and long term effects 
of target leverage ratio on the actual leverage ratio.  All the models employed are 
estimated using different methodologies, namely pooled OLS, fixed effects and random 
effects methods. The following three sub-sections offer a brief discussion of the 
empirical models used in this study to investigate the target adjustment theory in the 
Jordanian market. 
 
5.2.1 Symmetric adjustment model 5.1 
Target adjustment theory assumes that firms optimally balance the costs of debt, i.e. 
distress risk and bankruptcy frictions, with the benefits, typically tax savings. Firms are 
expected to move toward their target leverage and conduct their marginal financing 
accordingly, although timing their transactions due to costs of adjustment.81 According 
to Myers (1984) and Flannery and Rangan (2006), the presence of adjustment costs may 
restrict the firms’ ability to revert back to their target capital structure immediately, 
suggesting the occurrence of partial adjustment toward the target level. The partial 
adjustment mechanism allows for the firms’ observed leverage ratio not always being 
equal to their target level. This mechanism suggests that firms make leverage 
adjustment if the costs of being away from the target leverage ratio are higher than those 
of moving toward the target; otherwise it is not rational for these firms to make leverage 
adjustments, because the adjustment costs will be large enough to cancel out the 
benefits of moving toward the target level. However, it assumes that adjustment towards 
the target occurs at symmetrical rates. No distinction is being made between the below-
target leverage ratio and the above-target leverage ratio, suggesting that the adjustment 
costs as well as the benefits of increasing and reducing leverage are symmetrical. As 
                                                          
81
 Adjustment costs are the costs of switching from debt to equity and equity to debt. According to 
Olinear and Rudebusch (1989 and 1992) these costs are the compensation for the dealer placing the issue, 
and other expenses such as legal, accounting and printing costs, registration fees and taxes. 
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one of the main objectives of this chapter is to test the hypothesis of asymmetric 
adjustment as well as the symmetric adjustment toward the target leverage ratio, we 
refer to the current model as the symmetric adjustment model. 
For the purpose of this model, we construct the itTRAC  variable to measure how far the 
actual leverage ratio deviates from the target leverage ratio. The itTRAC  variable is 
defined as the difference between a firm’s target leverage ratio at year t and the actual 
leverage ratio at year t-1 ( )1* −− itit LEVLEV .  This variable is used in the model to predict 
whether the Jordanian firms are moving towards their target leverage ratios. As the 
target leverage ratio ( )*itLEV  is unobservable, we use the estimated fitted values from 
conventional leverage regression as a proxy for the target leverage ratio.82 To test the 
pecking order theory against the target adjustment theory, itDEF  variable is included in 
the model as an additional regressor and is defined as the same in model 4.4.83   
 Based on the discussion above, we can formalise the symmetric (partial) adjustment 
model as:  
 
                                   itititit DEFTRACLEV ελλλ +++=∆ 210                   (5.1) 
 
 where 1λ  is the adjustment coefficient that captures the desired extent of adjustment to 
the target leverage ratio. The hypothesis in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
is 10 1 << λ , indicating partial adjustment towards the target, but implying positive 
adjustment costs. Consequently, a significant coefficient on the itTRAC  variable 1λ  
would suggest that firms have a target leverage ratio and adjust their leverage to match 
their target ratio. As the adjustment coefficient 1λ  is inversely related to the adjustment 
costs, the low adjustment coefficient would suggests that firms face large adjustment 
                                                          
82
 Literature suggests three proxies for the target leverage ratio; the fitted values estimated from 
conventional leverage regression, the mean of the firm’s leverage ratio over the study period and the 
industry mean over the study period. The fitted values, which are used as proxy for the target leverage 
ratio in this study, are estimated from the static model (3.1) in chapter 3. We tested all the models by 
using the other alternative proxies for target leverage ratio, but their results are not reported. However, the 
estimation results gave roughly the same magnitudes of coefficients, signs and significance. 
83
 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) find that nesting the pecking order and target adjustment models in 
the same regression leads to the rejection of the pecking order model. The partial adjustment model in 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) is ( )11 −∗− −=− itititit LEVLEVLEVLEV λ  
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costs and consequently move slowly toward their target. It is worth noting that the target 
adjustment theory does not require the estimated coefficient on the deficit variable to be 
statistically not different from zero to hold, but a significant coefficient would indicate 
that the deficit variable is simply one of the factors that influence the firm’s capital 
structure. Model 5.1 assumes that 1λ  is symmetrical for leverage above and below the 
target leverage ratio, suggesting that the costs of being away from the target leverage 
ratio and the costs of moving toward that target are not different for below and above 
the target leverage ratio. If this is not so, firms may experience different rates of 
leverage adjustment depending on whether they are below-or above-target leverage 
ratio. For the purpose of this analysis, we develop the asymmetric adjustment model 
which is briefly discussed in the following section. 
 
5.2.2  Asymmetric adjustment models 5.2 and 5.3 
Adjustment toward the target leverage ratio may differ depending on whether the actual 
leverage ratio is above or below its long run equilibrium level. Cai and Ghosh 
(2003:p21) argue that by assuming that the goal of the firm is to maximise the value of 
the firm, firms with capital structure away from its optimal capital structure will try to 
“correct” it. This suggests that when a firm’s gearing is below the optimal (target) 
gearing ratio, the firm adjusts its gearing upward, whilst the firm adjusts its gearing 
ratio downward when gearing is above the target gearing ratio. Cai and Ghosh (2003, p 
28) propose an answer to the question that why does a firm adjust its debt level toward 
the industry mean when it is above the mean, while it is indifferent when the debt level 
is below the mean? Their explanation is that when a firm’s debt level reaches a 
significantly high level, the high costs of leverage makes the reduction of the debt is a 
meaningful task, while a firm where its debt level is below the average debt level of the 
industry, does not put consideration of debt level as its first priority. This suggests that 
downward adjustment occurs at a faster rate than  upward  adjustment, implying that the 
benefits of reducing leverage (the reduction in bankruptcy and agency costs) are greater 
than those of increasing leverage (tax savings). Firms with below-target leverage ratio 
may benefit from increasing leverage with tax benefits; however, it is not as critical that 
they revert to their target as for those with above-target leverage ratio because of the 
bankruptcy costs which reduce the marginal tax savings of debt. 
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 However, this might not be the only explanation as to why firms adjust above-target 
leverage ratio faster than below-target leverage ratio. Another explanation for the quick 
downward adjustment could be the adjustment costs of increasing leverage are greater 
than those associated with debt reduction. Therefore, the asymmetric adjustment model 
has been developed to allow for the rate of adjustment to vary depending on whether the 
firm’s leverage ratio is below or above the target leverage ratio. The underlying 
assumption behind this model is that the adjustment costs and benefits of increasing and 
reducing leverage are not symmetrical.  
Based on the definition of the itTRAC  ( )1* −− itit LEVLEV  variable, 0>itTRAC  indicates 
that the firm’s leverage ratio is below its target ratio, while 0<itTRAC  indicates that its 
leverage ratio is above the target ratio. For the purpose of the asymmetric adjustment 
model, we split the values of the itTRAC  variable and construct the 
below
itTRAC  and 
above
itTRAC  variables as follows: 
 
it
below
it TRACTRAC =  if 01
* >−
−itit LEVLEV  and zero otherwise. 
it
above
it TRACTRAC =  if 01
* <−
−itit LEVLEV  and zero otherwise. 
 
By substituting belowitTRAC  and 
above
itTRAC  for the itTRAC  variable in model 5.1, this 
model can be rewritten as   
 
                             itit
above
it
below
itit DEFTRACTRACLEV εγγγγ ++++=∆ 3210             (5.2) 
 
This specification allows for the rate of adjustment to vary depending on whether the 
leverage is above or below its target leverage ratio. It also allows for testing the 
individual null hypotheses 01 =γ  and 02 =γ , and the joint test 21 γγ = , bearing in mind 
that 01 >γ , 02 >γ  is required for convergence. Hence, the two adjustment coefficients, 
1γ  and 2γ , capture the size of the response of leverage ratio when it is, below and above 
its target level respectively. If the adjustment costs of increasing leverage are higher 
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than those of reducing leverage, 1γ  will be lower than 2γ , suggesting that the adjustment 
speed for leverage below the target ratio is slower than that of the above target leverage 
ratio, and vice versa. It also suggests that the costs of being above the target leverage are 
higher than those of being below the target level.  
As the costs of being away from the target ratio (the bankruptcy and agency costs for 
the above-target leverage ratio and the tax benefits reduction for the below-target 
leverage) are rising at an increasing rate as firms move above or below their target 
leverage ratio, firms with higher deviations from the target are expected to be more 
sensitive in adjusting leverage than those with lower deviations. This assumption, along 
with the adjustment costs which may depend on the size of deviation from the target 
leverage ratio, makes the adjustment rates vary depending on the size of dis-
equilibrium, that is, whether the deviation is large or small.  To investigate this, we 
develop a model using the threshold level for leverage below and above the target 
leverage ratio. The model will be able to capture two types of asymmetric adjustment. It 
allows  firstly for the adjustment coefficients to vary depending on whether the firm’s 
leverage ratio is below or above the target leverage ratio which is the same as in model 
5.2; and secondly, for these adjustment coefficients to vary depending on whether the 
deviations from the target are large or small. For the purpose of this analysis, we split 
the values of the belowitTRAC  and 
above
itTRAC  variables according to the mean value of 
each variable as follows:84 
For belowitTRAC  
 
            
below
it
belowC
it TRACTRAC =
−
 if otherwiseTARCmeanTRAC belowCit
below
it ,0, =<
−
  
            
below
it
belowC
it TRACTRAC =
+
 if otherwiseTARCmeanTRAC belowCit
below
it ,0, =>
+
 
 
 
                                                          
84
 The result showed that TRAC variable is normally distributed which makes the mean value is good 
measure of the threshold. However, the study used the median as another measure, but there results are 
not reported.  
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For aboveitTRAC
85
 
 
            
above
it
aboveC
it TRACTRAC =
−
 if otherwiseTARCmeanTRAC aboveCitaboveit ,0, => −  
             
above
it
aboveC
it TRACTRAC =
+
 if otherwiseTARCmeanTRAC aboveCitaboveit ,0, =< +  
 
By substituting −+− aboveCitbelowCitbelowCit TRACTRACTRAC ,,  and 
+aboveC
itTRAC  for the 
below
itTRAC  and 
above
itTRAC  variables in model 5.2,   this model can be rewritten as: 
   
it
above
it
aboveC
it
belowC
it
belowC
itit TRACTRACTARCTRACTDA εψψψψψ +++++=∆ +−+− 43210        (5.3) 
 
This specification allows for both asymmetries and threshold points, beyond which 
leverage becomes more sensitive to deviations from its targets, i.e. firms may become 
less sensitive in adjusting leverage ratio when the deviation from the target level is 
small, while they are more sensitive in adjusting leverage when their leverage ratios 
exceed or fall below the thresholds, implying that the costs of being away from the 
target are higher for large deviations than small deviations.  
 
5.2.3 Error Correction model 5.5 
The error Correction Mechanism (ECM) is generally referred to what is known in 
literature as Granger Representative Theorem (Gujarati, 2003). The current study adopts 
the ECM to investigate whether target leverage ratio has any long-run effect on the 
current leverage ratio. The single-equation error correction model is adopted to develop 
the regression model which is used in this study to investigate the target adjustment 
theory of capital structure. This single-equation model can be explained by the 
following equation: 
                                                          
85
 As the negative values of the TRAC variable indicates that leverage is above the target level, the large 
negative values indicates that leverage is above its threshold level. The negative and positive signs of C 
subscript indicate that leverage is below and above the thresholds respectively. 
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                                  ( ) ititititit LEVLEVLEVLEV εββαα +∆+−−=∆ −− *0* 11110       (5.4)  
 
It is worth noting that co-integration between these times series ( itLEV  and *itLEV ) is 
required for ECM to provide non-spurious regression. However, it also requires these 
series to be individually integrated; that is, they both are I (1) or they individually 
contain a unit root. In general, if the linear combination of non-stationary random 
variables results in a stationary series then the combined variables can be described as 
co-integrated (Granger, 1983). According to Gujarati (2003) and Keele and Boef 
(2004), the error correction mechanism is the preferred method for the estimation when 
two integrated time series are co-integrated since the error correction mechanism can be 
properly derived from the properties of integrated time series.86 Based on this argument, 
itLEV  and 
*
itLEV   will be co-integrated if they have a long-term, or equilibrium, 
relationship between them.  Their long run relationship is the equilibrium to which the 
actual leverage ratio converges over time, and the error term can be interpreted as the 
disequilibrium error or the distance that the actual leverage ratio is out or away of 
equilibrium at time t. According to, Keele and Boef (2004), if the variables are co-
integrated, the model can yield both the long-run relations among variables and the 
short-run adjustment dynamics towards the long-run target leverage ratio.  
Hence ECM requires the estimation of long relationship and short run dynamics of the 
variables under considerations. The long run relationship between itLEV  and
*
itLEV   
)( 1β  can be estimated by regressing itLEV  on *itLEV     as follows: 
  
                                   
ititit LEVLEV εβ += *
                                                           (5.4a) 
 
The coefficient of  *itLEV   on the co-integration regression (5.4a) reflects the 
equilibrium effect of the target leverage ratio on the actual (existing) leverage ratio, 
often referred to as the long run effect.  The error term itε  can be calculated from 
                                                          
86
 The study uses the random walk without drift to test for the unit root as the following : 
ittit YY ερ += −1    where, 11 ≤≤− ρ  
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equation (5.4a) ( *ititit LEVLEV βε −= ). This residual will be used to test whether the 
variables are co-integrated. 
 
For short run dynamic adjustment, the single-equation error correction model is adopted 
to develop the regression model which is used in this study to investigate the target 
adjustment theory of capital structure. This single-equation model can be explained by 
the following equation: 
 
 
                                  
( ) ititititit LEVLEVLEVLEV εββαα +∆+−−=∆ −− *0* 11110
      (5.4) 
 
 
Where ( )1−−=∆ ititit LEVLEVLEV  is the net change in leverage, ( * 111 −− − itit LEVLEV β ) 
represents the Error Correction Term, which is renamed later as ECT it-1. It reflects the 
degree to which the actual leverage and long-run leverage ratio (target one) are outside 
of their equilibrium in the previous time period. As in the partial adjustment model, re-
equilibration in the error correction model is not immediate, but occurs over future time 
periods (Keele and Boef, 2004). This suggests that at equilibrium (
*
111 −− − itit LEVLEV β ) 
= 0. But in the short run, disequilibrium exists, this term ( 0
*
111 ≠− −− itit LEVLEV β ) is 
non-zero, and α1 measures the speed of adjustment of the current leverage ratio. 
*
itLEV∆
 is the change in target itself and its coefficient Β0 reflects the contemporaneous 
or short-run effect of the target leverage ratio on the actual leverage ratio.  
Based on the previous analysis, itLEV  and 
*
itLEV  are co-integrated of order I (1,1) if 
and only if an ECM exists. Before empirically testing the ECM, we therefore test for the 
existence of a co-integrating relationship between itLEV  and 
*
itLEV . For this purpose, 
we use the Dickey-fuller test (DF tests hereafter) for the existence of a unit root in the 
residual or error term obtained from the co-integration regression (5.4a) as follows: 
 
                                                         
ttt uu εϕ +−=∆ −1
                                      (5.4b) 
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The DF tests the null hypothesis that the residuals are I(1) (the variables are not co-
integrated) against a I(0) alternative. The rejection of null hypothesis suggests that the 
residual or error term is stationary; that is, it is I(0), implying that  itLEV  and *itLEV  
variables are co-integrated (Gujarati, 2003) and consequently, the regression model is 
not is not spurious. The t-statistic for the estimated coefficient ϕ  from equation (5.4b) 
provides an indication regarding the co-integration for the two variables. However, the 
t-statistic or F-statistic, however; cannot be referred to the critical values in the standard 
t table or F table. As it does not have the usual t distribution, Dickey and Fuller have 
tabulated these critical values. Gujarati (2003) has supplied a clearer DF critical values 
table in Appendix D- table D.7, pp 976. The estimation result of equation 5.4b has 
showed that ϕ  has the correct negative sign with a t-statistic of -3.274. Compared with 
the 1% Dickey-fuller critical τ value (which is -2.58 for a number of observations more 
than 500), it is found to be much more negative than (-2.58). Hence, the residuals or the 
error terms obtained from co-integration regression are stationary (the residuals are I 
(0)), implying that itLEV  and *itLEV  variables are co-integrated. Granger’s 
Representation Theorem (Granger, 1983) has shown that whenever co-integration exists 
between non-stationary series there must be an ECM maintaining it. Therefore, this 
finding suggests that there exists an error correction mechanism, implying that the 
actual leverage ratio reverts back to the long run target leverage ratio adjusts.    
To simply specify the empirical ECM (5.4), we substitute 1−itECT for 
( * 111 −− − itit LEVLEV β ) and adding the itDEF   variable as an additional explanatory 
variable. Therefore, model 5.4 can be written as: 
 
                           ititititit DEFLEVECTLEV εψψψψ ++∆+−=∆ − 3*2110                 (5.5)                             
 
where 1−itECT  is the error correction term that captures the long-run relationship 
between the actual leverage ratio and long-run target leverage ratio. Therefore, 1ψ  is the 
error correction rate, while 2ψ   measures the short run effect of the target leverage ratio 
on the actual leverage. The statistically insignificant 2ψ  suggests that the short run 
effect does not exist, while the insignificant 1ψ  suggests that error correcting behaviour 
does not occur. 
  106
5.3  The estimation results  
This section consists of three sub-sections, offering the results of investigating the target 
adjustment models: the symmetric and asymmetric partial adjustment model and the 
error correction model. Furthermore, they offer the results of comparing the target 
adjustment models between small and large firms as well as surplus and deficit firms. 
 
5.3.1 The estimation results of symmetric adjustment model 5.1 
Table 5.1 reports the random effects estimation results for the partial adjustment model. 
As signified by the significant Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and insignificant Hausman 
tests, the model with random effects is the preferred specification.  The results strongly 
support the target adjustment theory over the pecking order theory. The coefficient on 
the deficit variable is significantly positive but statistically different from one, 
suggesting that Jordanian firms use debt and equity to finance their financial deficit, 
with equity higher than debt. Moreover, the estimated coefficient is quite similar to that 
obtained from model 4.3 in chapter four (0.417) suggesting that nesting the pecking 
order and target adjustment models in the same regression does not affect the magnitude 
and the significance of deficit variable. This finding is not consistent with the finding of 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) that the trade-off theory is more powered than the 
pecking order theory when they are jointly tested. They find that coefficients of the 
target adjustment model remain statistically significant, while the pecking order model 
is rejected.   
With respect to the TRAC coefficient estimates, it is found to be statistically significant, 
suggesting that Jordanian firms have a target leverage ratio and move gradually toward 
that target if any deviation exists. However, the results indicate that Jordanian firms 
adjust their actual leverage much more slowly. The estimated coefficients on the TRAC 
variable are 0.213, suggesting that 21.3% of the deviation from the target level can be 
eliminated within a year. Under the assumption that the speed of adjustment is constant, 
these results indicate that Jordanian firms need 2.91 years to adjust half of the deviation 
of their actual leverage ratios.87 Overall, these results are lower than those reported in 
other countries. Shyam and Myers (1999) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) report 0.59 
                                                          
87
 The study uses the following formula to calculate the time required to eliminate half of the deviation of 
the actual leverage ratio from the target one: ln (1/2) / ln (1-TRAC coefficient).  
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and 0.34 in the US respectively, while in the UK, Ozkan (2001) reports 0.57. For 
Spanish data, Miguel and Pindado (2001) report 0.79.  
  
Table 5.1: The estimation results of symmetric adjustment model 5.1 
(Dependent variable: the change in total debt/total asset) 
Independent 
variable  
Full sample 
period 
1997-2005 
 
   1997-2000            2001-2005 
    
Intercept -3.571 
 (0.000) 
-4.245 
 (0.000) 
 
-3.541 
 (0.000) 
 
TRAC 0. 213 
 (0.000) 
0.246 
 (0.020) 
 
0.178 
 (0.033) 
 
DEF 0.402 
 (0.000) 
0.451 
 (0.000) 
 
0.364 
 (0.003) 
 
DMyear YES YES YES 
 
R2 
P-value 
N 
0.26 
(0.000) 
912 
0.29 
(0.000) 
432 
0.24 
(0.000) 
456 
 
LM Test 167.37 
(0.000) 
85.32 
(0.000) 
75.03 
(0.000) 
 
Hausman Test 15.38 
(0.166) 
1.98 
(0.324) 
3.21 
(0.456) 
Note: TRAC is the partial adjustment variable and is used to measure the speed of 
adjustment. The TRAC variable is defined as LEV*t -LEVt-1. Deficits variable is 
the same as defined in model 4.2. DM year is the time dummy variables. Figures in 
brackets are the probabilities of significance based on the standard errors which are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
 
As the speed coefficient ( 1λ ) is inversely proportional to transaction costs, the relatively 
low coefficient suggests that Jordanian firms have relatively large transaction costs 
when they borrow from banks, leading to higher agency costs between shareholders and 
creditors. This might be possible for Jordanian firms because these firms rely less 
heavily on banks to raise long term debt. As firms trade off the costs of being away 
from the target level with those of moving toward that target to rebalance their leverage 
ratio leverage, the low adjustment coefficient also indicates that these costs are much 
higher than those of staying away from the target. The low costs of being away from the 
target leverage ratio may be attributed to the Jordanian tax system which does not 
provide Jordanian firms with more tax advantage on debt. It just allows loss to carry 
forward, not carry back and accordingly, it is not important when firms experience 
losses. This finding may also be explained by the high costs of debt itself. Together with 
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the fall in the relative costs of equity capital due to the increases in stock prices recently 
on the ASE, it has reduced the impetus of Jordanian firms to make a fast adjustment 
toward their target leverage ratios. 
 The time dummy variables, which are included in model 5.1 to capture the 
unobservable time specific effects, are statistically significant, suggesting that there is a 
change in movement over time. To investigate this movement, we divide the sample 
period into two, 1997–2000 and 2001–2005. The distinction between the two periods is 
made by using the time dummy variable ( timeitD ) which equals one for the observations 
in 2001–2005, and zero otherwise (i.e., for observations in 1997–2000). The Chow test 
(the calculated F value exceeds the critical value at the 1% level) suggests that there is a 
structural break, and hence the two periods regressions are different.  For the two 
periods, the random effects estimation results (as presented in Table 5.1) indicate that 
Jordanian firms have target leverage ratio, but adjustment toward that target occurs 
slowly. However, this adjustment is slower in 2001-2005  ( 0.178)  than it is in 1997-
2000 (0.246 ), supporting the view that increases in the stock prices, as well as the costs 
of debt, made Jordanian firms less sensitive in adjusting leverage when the adjustment 
requires an increase in the leverage level. In what follows, we compare the target 
adjustment model between small and large Jordanian firms. 
 
5.3.1.1  The estimation results of model 5.1 for small and large firms 
In this section, we investigate whether the leverage adjustment speed is different 
between small and large firms. We hypothesize that large Jordanian firms adjust their 
actual leverage ratio faster than small firms. The underlying argument behind this 
hypothesis is that costs of issuing debt or/and equity are much higher for small firms 
than large firms, and thereby the transaction costs are also (Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
Consistent with this view, Rudebusch and Oliner (1989, 1992) argue that transaction 
costs of issuing both debt and equity are higher for small firms than for large firms 
(Rudebusch and Oliner, 1989; 1992). Compared to large firms, small size firms are 
expected to have small investment projects and consequently have small issues of debt 
or/and equity which maximizes their transaction costs. Moreover, they are more likely 
to be subject to the bankruptcy costs (Titman and Wessels, 1988).  
 To   the extent that this is the case, small firms are expected to be slower than large 
ones when the adjustment requires an increase in leverage level because the costs of 
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adjusting leverage will be large enough to reduce their incentive to revert quickly to 
their target level of leverage ratio. 
  
Table 5.2: The estimation results of symmetric adjustment model 5.1 for small and 
large firms 
Dependent variable: the change in total debt/total asset 
 
 
 
 
The results presented in Table 5.2 support the proposed hypothesis that small firms are 
slower than large firms in adjusting their leverage ratio toward the target ratio. The 
Chow test rejects the null hypothesis eLSmall argλλ = , since the calculated F value exceeds 
the critical value at the 5% level. For small firms, the results show that the estimated 
coefficient on TRAC variable is 0.166, compared to 0.287 for large firms. All 
coefficients are statistically significant. This finding supports the view that transaction 
costs are higher for small firm than for large ones, implying that small firms are slower 
when the adjustment requires an increase in leverage level. Another possible 
explanation for this low adjustment speed could be that for small firms, the cost of 
being off target is relatively low compared to the cost of adjusting leverage. This is 
somehow reasonable because small Jordanian firms are less profitable and highly 
earnings volatile, suggesting that they are more risky (see analysis of correlation in 
chapter three). As the Jordanian tax system is relatively less important for high risk 
firms, these firms gain low tax advantage on debt, making the cost of being away from 
the target level relatively low. In what follows, we investigate whether the Jordanian 
Independent 
variable 
Large  
firms 
Small 
firms 
   
Intercept -4.298 
 (0.001) 
-2.456 
 (0.000) 
 
TRAC 0. 166 
 (0.005) 
0.287 
 (0.000) 
 
DEF 0.319 
 (0.000) 
0.476 
 (0.000) 
 
DMyear YES YES  
 
R2 
P-value 
N 
0.25 
(0.000) 
456 
0.28 
(0.000) 
456 
 
LM Test 77.17 (0.000) 101.54 (0.000) 
Hausman Test 1.91 (0.210) 2.77 (0.372) 
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firms have different adjustment speed depending on whether they face financial deficit 
and surplus.  
 
5.3.1.2  The estimation results of symmetric adjustment model 5.1 for surplus and 
deficit firms 
 In this section, we investigate whether the adjustment occurs in a manner consistent 
with the pecking order theory. Hovakimian, et al. (2004) provides evidence suggesting 
that firms have a target leverage ratio but also prefer internal financing over costly 
external financing. This implies that firms may make adjustments in a manner 
consistent with the prediction of the pecking order theory. The pecking order theory 
suggests that, due to the adverse selection costs, firms prefer internal financing  over 
costly external ones, while if external financing is needed, firms prefer debt funds to 
equity funds. Accordingly, firms with financial deficits tend to issue debt rather than 
issuing equity, while those with financial surpluses are expected to retire debt rather 
than equity to avoid the higher costs of re-issuing equity and to save their debt capacity 
for future financing requirements. If so, firms with financial deficits are expected to 
adjust their leverage faster than those with financial surpluses.  
Contrary to this argument, firms with financial surplus may likely be less subject to the 
risk of bankruptcy or financial distress, reducing the cost of capital and consequently 
raising debt at more attractive rates. If so, these firms will be faster than those with 
financial deficit when the adjustment requires an increase in the leverage level. 
Therefore, we examine these two conflicting arguments by testing the hypothesis that 
leverage adjustment speed is different between financial surpluses and deficits.  For this 
purpose, we divide the sample firms into two; firms with financial surplus and those 
with financial deficit.   
The results presented in Table 5.3 show that the estimated adjustment coefficients are 
higher for surplus firms (0.360) than those for deficit firms (0.141). This difference is 
statistically significant as the null hypothesis that the two regressions are not different is 
soundly rejected (the calculated F value exceeds the critical value at the 1% level). 
These results generally suggest that surplus Jordanian firms are significantly faster than 
deficit ones when the adjustment requires an increase in the leverage level, supporting 
the view that they are less risky than deficit ones. This finding does not support the 
hypothesis that firms make their leverage adjustment in a way proposed by the pecking 
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order theory.  However, the results obtained from the symmetric adjustment model 
should be carefully interpreted. If the adjustment costs of increasing and reducing 
leverage are not symmetrical, the estimated coefficient on the TRAC variable may be 
higher/lower depending on whether the adjustment cost of increasing leverage is 
lower/higher than those of reducing leverage.  The hypothesis of asymmetric adjustment 
costs will be examined in the following section. 
 
 
Table 5.3: The estimation results of model 5.1 for surplus and deficit firms 
Dependent variable: the change in total debt/total asset 
Note: TRAC is the partial adjustment variable and is used to measure the 
speed of adjustment. The TRAC variable is defined as LEV*t -LEVt-1. DM 
year is the time dummy variables and included in the regression to control for 
the time effect. YES /NO refers to the inclusion of variables in the regression. 
Figures in brackets below the coefficient are the probabilities of significance 
based on the standard errors which are heteroskedasticity-robust. 
 
 
 
 
5.3.2 The estimation results of asymmetric adjustment models 5.2 and 5.3. 
 The asymmetric partial adjustment model examines the hypothesis of asymmetric 
adjustment costs for increasing and reducing leverage by considering the situations of 
leverage below and above the target level. The results presented in Table 5.5 shows that 
the estimated adjustment coefficients 1γ  and 2γ  are statistically significant, but they are 
statistically significantly different as the null hypothesis that 21 γγ = is soundly 
Independent 
variable 
Deficit 
 Firms 
Surplus 
Firms 
   
Intercept 
-5.357 
 (0.000) 
-5.614 
 (0.000) 
 
TRAC 0.141 
 (0.036) 
0.360 
 (0.000) 
 
DMyear YES YES 
  
R2 
P-value 
N 
0.09 
(0.000) 
516 
0.20 
(0.000) 
396 
 
LM Test 124.17 (0.000) 166.77 (0.000) 
Hausman Test 2.13 (0.310) 2.56 (0.351) 
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rejected.88  However, the adjustment coefficient is higher for leverage above its target 
ratio (0.314) than for leverage below its target (0.151), suggesting that the adjustment 
costs of increasing leverage are higher than those of reducing it. It also suggests that the 
costs of being above the target level are higher than those of being below the target. 
This finding provides  an  answer to the question raised by  Cai and Ghosh (2003, p 28)  
“why does a firm adjust its debt level toward the industry mean when it is above the 
mean, while it is indifferent when the debt level is below the mean?”. 
Overall, these findings suggest that Jordanian firms are more sensitive in reducing 
leverage than in increasing leverage when their leverage ratios are out of their target 
ratios, implying that the benefit of reducing leverage (the reduction in bankruptcy and 
agency costs) is higher than that of increasing it (tax savings). Consequently, they are 
slower when the adjustment requires an increase in leverage level than a reduction in 
leverage level. Based on the assumption that the adjustment is constant over time, these 
results suggest that the time required for upward adjustment (increasing leverage) is 
approximately twice the time required for downward adjustment (reducing leverage). 
On average, Jordanian firms need 3.9 years to eliminate half of the divergence from 
their target leverage level when they are below the target level compared to 1.9 years 
when they above the target level.  
A possible explanation for this finding is that the bankruptcy and agency costs are rising 
at an increasing rate as leverage moves up, reducing the marginal tax savings and 
consequently making firms less sensitive in increasing leverage to match its target. 
These costs become more critical as a firm moves above its target leverage ratios, 
making firms more sensitive in reducing leverage to avoid the bankruptcy risks. 
Together, with the finding above that the adjustment costs of increasing leverage are 
higher than those of reducing leverage, this makes target adjustment (reversion) faster 
for leverage above its target ratio than for leverage below its target ratio. This also 
makes leverage adjustment more sensitive to the size of deviations (small or large) from 
the target level, regardless of being below or above the target, i.e. firms with large 
deviations below their target leverage ratios have low leverage and consequently incur 
low costs of bankruptcy. Hence, these firms may benefit (tax savings) from increasing 
leverage. However, these savings become significantly lower when a firm increases its 
leverage ratio to the point close to its target, making the firm less sensitive to 
                                                          
88
 The Wald test regarding the null hypothesis that 21 γγ =  is found to be statistically significant at 
the 1% level (15.69 with a p- value of 0.000) 
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eliminating the small divergence from its target level.  The random effects estimation 
for model 5.3 provides results supporting this hypothesis.  
 
Table 5.4: The results of asymmetric adjustment models 5.2 and 5.3  
Dependent variable: the change in total debt/total asset 
Independent 
variable 
 
 Model 5.2 
1 
  
Model 5.3 
2 
Intercept -3.494 
(0.003) 
 
-2.348 
(0.000) 
 belowTRAC  0.151 
(0.000) 
 
 
- 
aboveTRAC  0.314 
(0.000) 
 
 
- 
−belowC
itTRAC  - 
 
0.060 
(0.405) 
 
+belowC
itTRAC  - 
 
0.179 
0.008) 
 
−aboveC
itTRAC  - 
 
0.236 
(0.000) 
 
+aboveC
itTRAC  - 
 
0.374 
(0.000) 
 
DEF 0.379 
(0.000) 
 
0.409 
(0.005) 
DMyear YES 
 
YES 
R2 
P-value 
N 
0.29 
(0.000) 
912 
 
0.42 
(0.000) 
912 
LM Test 70.89 
(0.000) 
214.25 
(0.000) 
Hausman Test 14.10 
(0.197) 
1.87 
(0.875) 
Note: belowTRAC and  aboveTRAC  are the below-and above-target 
leverage ratio. DEF is the deficit variable and is defined the same as in 
model 4.4. DM year is the time dummy variables. Figures in brackets 
below the coefficient are the probabilities of significance based on the 
standard error which are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
 
 
As mentioned in section 5.2.2, model 5.3 allows the rates of adjustment to vary 
depending firstly, on whether the leverage is above or below the target level; and 
secondly on whether the deviations (above and below) from the target level are large or 
small. The results of estimating model 5.3 are reported in column 2 of Table 5.5. Again 
the results support the asymmetric adjustment, and suggest that leverage adjustment 
(target reversion) is faster for leverage above its target level than for leverage below its 
target. Furthermore, the results support quicker leverage adjustment for large deviations 
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than for small deviations, with smaller below-target leverage deviations exhibiting 
greater persistence. This difference is statistically significant as the null hypotheses 
+−
=
belowCbelowC
21 ψψ   and +− = aboveCaboveC 21 ψψ  is soundly rejected. The estimated 
coefficient on the −belowCitTRAC  variable is found to be statistically insignificant, while it 
is statistically significant for the −aboveCitTRAC variable, suggesting that no leverage 
adjustment takes place when there are small below-target leverage deviations (the null 
hypothesis that 01 =
−belowCψ  cannot be rejected). In this case, adjustment   may be 
delayed by the presence of high transaction costs and the low benefit of increasing 
leverage because the probability of bankruptcy increases with leverage. This might be 
the reason as to why firms with leverage above their target level are more sensitive in 
reducing leverage, with quicker adjustment for large deviations. The estimated 
coefficients on the −aboveCitTRAC  and 
+aboveC
itTRAC  variables are 0.236 and 0.374 
respectively. These results suggest that the costs of having and keeping leverage above 
its target are critical for the Jordanian firms. 
In what follows, we test the hypothesis of asymmetric adjustment costs for small and 
large firms to investigate whether the adjustment occurs at different rates for large and 
small firms when they have leverage above or below their long run target leverage ratio.  
 
 
5.3.2.1 The results of asymmetric adjustment model 5.2 for small and large firms 
 
In the previous section, we have provided evidence suggesting that adjustment costs of 
increasing leverage are higher than those of reducing leverage. Moreover, the estimation 
results of the adjustment speed for small and large size groups in section 5.3.1.1 provide 
evidence suggesting that the adjustment costs for small Jordanian firms are higher than 
those for large ones. This along with the fact that there are economies of scale in 
bankruptcy (Warner, 1977) makes the adjustment costs differential between increasing 
and reducing leverage level likely to be different for large firms than for small ones.89 
Based on the view of Warner (1977), small firms may have a weak desire to make 
leverage adjustment when the adjustment requires an increase in the leverage level, 
while they will be highly sensitive in reducing leverage when the adjustment requires a 
reduction in the leverage level. This is because of the higher costs of having and 
                                                          
89
 In chapter three, we provided evidence suggesting that borrowing capacity for Jordanian firms is 
significantly limited by their bankruptcy risk, where leverage ratio is found to be positively related to a 
firm’s size. 
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keeping above-target leverage (bankruptcy and agency costs) for small firms than for 
large firms. Therefore, we firstly hypothesize that for both size groups, the adjustment 
costs of increasing and reducing leverage are not symmetrical, with costs being higher 
for increasing than reducing leverage. Secondly, we hypothesize that small Jordanian 
firms with leverage below/above the target level are slower/faster than large ones when 
the adjustment requires an increase/reduction in the leverage level.  
Table 5.5: The estimation results of asymmetric model 5.2 for small and large 
firms 
Dependent variable: the change in total debt/total asset 
 
Independent 
variable 
Small 
Firms 
 
Large 
Firms 
Intercept -4.274 
 (0.000) 
-2.874 
 (0.000) 
 belowTRAC
 0.094 
 (0.090) 
0.191 
 (0.005) 
 
aboveTRAC
 0.251 
 (0.003) 
0. 304 
 (0.000) 
 
DEF 0.329 
 (0.000) 
0.479 
 (0.000) 
 
DMyear YES YES  
R2 
P-value 
N 
0.27 
(0.000) 
456 
0.37 
(0.000) 
456 
 
LM Test 79.55 
(0.000) 
71.43 
(0.000) 
 
Hausman Test 1.91 
(0.309) 
3.36 
(0.466) 
 
 
The results presented in Table 5.6 support the proposed hypotheses. For both size 
groups, the results show that the adjustment costs of increasing leverage are higher than 
those for reducing leverage. This finding supports the proposed hypothesis that upward 
adjustment costs are higher than downward adjustment costs. Moreover, it also suggests 
that the cost of having and keeping leverage above the target level are much higher than 
those of having leverage below the target level. This finding is signified by the rejection 
of the null hypothesis that 21 γγ = , since the Wald test is found to be statistically 
significant at the 5% level for small and large firms. Therefore, Jordanian firms are 
expected to have a downward adjustment faster than their upward adjustment.  
However, the results suggest that small and large Jordanian firms have different 
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adjustment costs for increasing and reducing leverage and consequently, have different 
speeds of adjustment. This difference is found to be statistically significant where the 
Chow test suggests the rejection of the null hypothesis that the two (small and large 
firms) regressions are not different (the calculated F value is found to be greater than the 
critical value at the 1% level). 
For small firms, the estimated coefficients on the belowitTRAC ( 1γ ) and aboveitTRAC ( 2γ ) are 
0.094 and 0.251 compared to 0.191 and 0.304 for large firms. All coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 1% level expect for small firms, 1γ  is found to be 
statistically marginally significant, suggesting that small firms have very weak impetus 
to make adjustment when it requires an increase in leverage level. For small firms, this 
finding suggests that the costs of moving towards the target level are significantly large 
which supports the view that costs of bankruptcy, as well as transaction costs are high. 
Moreover, it implies that costs of having and keeping leverage below the target level are 
relatively not large. However, for the estimated coefficient on the aboveitTRAC ( 2γ ) the 
difference between small and large firms is not noticeably large, indicating that the costs 
of having leverage above the target level are too significant for small as well as large 
firms. This, together with the lower adjustment costs for reducing leverage, makes small 
and large Jordanian firms show a relatively strong desire to make adjustment when it 
requires a reduction in the leverage level. In the following section, we test the 
hypothesis of asymmetric adjustment costs for firms with financial surpluses and 
deficits. 
 
5.3.2.2  The estimation results of asymmetric adjustment model 5.2 for surplus and 
deficit firms 
In this section, we test the hypothesis of asymmetric adjustment costs of increasing and 
reducing leverage level for surplus and deficit firms. As previously mentioned, there is 
evidence that firms have target leverage ratios but also prefer internal funds over 
external funds (Hovakimian et. al., 2004). So one can expect that firms make leverage 
adjustment toward their target depending on whether they have surpluses or deficits. 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), borrowing through debt instruments, especially 
the less risky ones, helps firms avoid the adverse selection costs of issuing equity. 
Therefore, firms which have fund deficits tend to raise debt, while those with surpluses 
are expected to retire debt to save their debt capacity for future financing requirements. 
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If so, leverage adjustment for firms with deficits is faster than those with surpluses. This 
might also suggest that firms with fund surpluses or deficits may experience different 
upward and downward adjustment speeds: i.e., firms facing surpluses (deficits) with 
leverage below (above) the target level are expected to adjust their leverage slower than 
those with leverage above (below) the target. In this case, leverage adjustment occurs in 
a way consistent with the prediction of the pecking order theory, where the dominant 
factor in a firm’s decision to increase or reduce leverage is the adverse selection costs.90  
This manner of leverage adjustment ignores the adjustment costs of moving towards the 
target level, which are expected to be different between increasing and reducing 
leverage. It also ignores the costs of financial distress or bankruptcy, which are rising at 
increasing rates as firms move above their target leverage ratio. Although firms with 
leverage below the target may benefit from an increase in leverage, it is not as critical 
for them to correct the divergence of a below-target leverage ratio as an above-target 
leverage ratio. This, together with the fact that firms with financial surpluses are 
expected to be less subject to the risks of financial distress or bankruptcy, makes 
adjustment costs differential for increasing and reducing leverage level likely to be 
higher for firms with deficits than for with surpluses. Based on the previous evidence 
that firms with financial surpluses are faster when the adjustment requires an increase in 
the leverage level, we hypothesise that upward and downward adjustments occur at 
different rates for surplus and deficit firms. More precisely, we hypothesise that firms 
with deficits with leverage below the target level are slower than those with surplus, 
while they are faster than surplus firms when they are above their target leverage ratio.    
 
The results presented in Table 5.7 show that surplus and deficit sample groups 
experience different adjustment costs. The results show that upward adjustments for 
firms with surpluses are faster than those with internal fund deficits. The estimated 
coefficient on belowitTRAC  is higher for firms with surpluses (0.283) than those with 
deficits (0.085), suggesting that they are faster than deficit ones when the adjustment 
requires an increase in the leverage level. This finding supports the proposed hypothesis 
that surplus firms are less likely to experience bankruptcy costs, indicating that they will 
be able to raise leverage at more attractive rates. 
 
                                                          
90
 The current study provides evidence in chapter four suggesting that adverse selection costs are only one 
of many factors that firms take into account when making financing decision. 
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Table 5.6: The estimation results of asymmetric model 5.2 for surplus and deficit 
firms 
Dependent variable: the change in total debt/total asset 
 
 
For leverage ratio above the target ratio, the estimated coefficient on aboveitTRAC is higher 
for firms with surplus (0.233) than those with deficit (0.207), indicating that they are 
faster when the adjustment requires the reduction in leverage level. The results 
generally suggest that for leverage below and above the target leverage ratio, the 
adjustment costs of increasing and reducing leverage are higher for deficit firms than for 
surplus firms. The difference is statistically significant as the Chow test suggests (the 
calculated F value exceeds the critical value at the 5% level). Furthermore, for surplus 
and deficit firms the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that 21 γγ =  at the 1% level, 
suggesting that the adjustment costs of increasing and reducing leverage is different. 
However, for deficit firms, the results  support proposed hypothesis that adjustment 
costs of increasing leverage are larger than those of reducing leverage, while for surplus 
firms they are not, where the estimated coefficient is found to be larger for belowitTRAC  
than for aboveitTRAC . These results suggest that firms with surplus make upward leverage 
adjustment faster than their downward leverage adjustment, indicating that adjustment 
costs of increasing leverage level are lower than those of reducing leverage level. 
However, this might not be the case. These firms might benefit greatly from increasing 
leverage when they are below the target leverage ratio, while it is not critical for them to 
move back toward the target level if the costs of keeping above-target leverage are not 
significantly large. As analysis of correlation suggests, surplus Jordanian firms are 
Independent 
variable 
Deficit 
 Firms 
Surplus 
 Firms 
   
Intercept -5.781 
(0.001) 
-6.783 
 (0.000) 
 belowTRAC  0.085 
(0.065) 
0.283 
(0.000) 
 
aboveTRAC  0.207 
(0.040) 
0.233 
(0.000) 
 
DMyear YES YES 
 
R2 
P-value 
N 
0.21 
(0.000) 
516 
0.30 
(0.000) 
396 
 
LM Test 271.95 
(0.000) 
275.03 
(0.000) 
Hausman Test 1.69 
(0.998) 
2.43 
(0.992) 
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highly profitable firms with more tangible assets and hence they are less likely to 
experience bankruptcy and agency costs. Moreover, they are expected to gain more tax 
benefit on debt than deficit firms do.91 This finding may also suggest that large 
Jordanian firms are making adjustment in a way consistent with the pecking order 
theory, while small firms are not.  
This paragraph discusses the estimation results of model 5 in Byoun (2008).92 Byoun 
(2008) used this model to examine the capital structure adjustment conditional on the 
required external capital changes as measured by a financial deficit/surplus. 
surplus
itD
 is 
found to be statistically significant, suggesting that firms tend to change  leverage to 
move back to their target leverage, while   
deficit
itD
 was marginally significant with a 
positive sign, implying that increasing leverage is restricted by  the probability of 
bankruptcy risk.  For 
above
itit DTDE
 and 
below
itit DTDE
 with surplus, the results show that 
they are statistically significant, with the coefficient higher for below–target leverage 
ratio than for above–target leverage ratio, suggesting that Jordanian firms with a surplus 
are less likely to be subject to a high bankruptcy risk, and consequently are able to raise 
debt at more attractive interest rates compared with deficit firms. This finding is 
somehow different from what is reported by Byoun (2008) who finds that firms with 
surplus retain above-target leverage even if they use their surpluses to retire debt. For 
above
itit DTDE
 and 
below
itit DTDE
 with surplus, the estimated coefficients are 0.213 and 
0.291 respectively compared with 0.301 and 0.089 for the same variables in Byoun 
(2008) respectively.  While for 
above
itit DTDE
 and 
below
itit DTDE
 with surplus, the 
coefficients on the two variables are found to be 0102 and 0.219 respectively which are 
not consistent with what is reported by Byoun. The results obtained from model 5 in 
Byoun (2008) are not significantly different from those obtained from estimating model 
5.2, suggesting that the findings of testing the hypothesis of asymmetric adjustment  for 
                                                          
91
  Analysis of correlation shows a positive correlation between the SuritNDEF variable and profitability 
(0.201) and between SuritNDEF  and tangibility (0.089).  
92
 The model: ( ) itbelowititdeficititsurplusitaboveititdeficititsurplusitdeficititsurplusititit DTDEDDDTDEDDDDAD εββββββ ++++++=∆ )()(/ 654321
 
where itit AD /∆  is the leverage ratio, 
above
itit DTDE
 is the above-target leverage ratio, 
below
itit DTDE
 is 
the below-target leverage ratio, 
surplus
itD and  
deficit
itD
 are dummy variables for surplus and deficit 
financial funds respectively,  while 
above
itD
 and 
below
itD
 are dummy variables for leverage above and 
below its target leverage ratio respectively.  
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below-and above-target leverage for firms with surplus and deficit are not affected by 
the methodology used . 
 
5.3.2.3 The estimation results of error correction model 5.5 
The error correction model allows for the estimation of both short run and long run 
effects of long run target leverage ratio on the actual leverage ratio. Table 5.7 presents 
the random effects estimation results for the Error Correction Term model. The 
significant Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and insignificant Hausman tests suggest that the 
model with random effects is the preferred specification. The coefficients estimate of 
error correction term (ECT) suggests that Jordanian firms have long run target leverage 
ratio and these firms change their actual leverage ratio relative to the long-run target 
level of leverage. However, the small magnitude of error correction rate indicates that 
Jordanian firms correct the divergence of their actual leverage ratios from the long run 
target level slowly. The estimated coefficient on ECT is 0.231 and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that one fourth of the divergence is eliminated in 
the following period.  
Table 5.7: The estimation results of ECT model 5.5 
Dependent variable: the change in total debt/total asset 
Independent  
variable 
Full  
sample 
Small 
firms 
Large 
firms 
Deficit 
firms 
Surplus 
Firms 
 
Intercept -4.926 
(0.000) 
-3.001 
(0.000) 
-5.540 
(0.000) 
 
-3.895 
 (0.000) 
 
-4.635 
 (0.000) 
 
ECT -0. 231 
(0.000) 
-0.175 
(0.060) 
-0. 297 
(0.005) 
 
-0.086 
(0.090) 
-0. 370 
(0.020) 
 
*
itLEV∆  0. 108 (0.245) 
0.009 
(0.116) 
0. 094 
(0.065) 
 
0.042 
(0.145) 
-0. 142 
(0.033) 
 
DEF 0.407 
(0.000) 
0.325 
(0.000) 
0.462 
(0.000) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
DMyear YES YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
R2 
P-value 
N 
0.22 
(0.000) 
912 
0.18 
(0.000) 
456 
0.24 
(0.000) 
456 
0.19 
(0.000) 
516 
0.26 
(0.000) 
396 
 
LM Test 266.93 
(0.000) 
226.15 
(0.000) 
212.03 
(0.000) 
165.91 
(0.000) 
188.03 
(0.000) 
Hausman Test 6.05 
(0.811) 
1.69 
(0.998) 
2.43 
(0.992) 
6.52 
(0.771) 
1.43 
(0.999) 
Note: Deficits variable is defined as DEF= (D it +I it +∆WC it) -C it. . ECT is the error correction 
term and defined as LEVt-1- LEV*t-1. *itLEV∆  is the change in target leverage ratio. DM year is 
the time dummy variables Figures in brackets below the coefficient are the probabilities of 
significance based on the standard error which are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
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Although the magnitude of the estimated coefficients obtained from the error correction 
term model are relatively larger than those obtained from the partial adjustment model, 
the explanatory power of the partial symmetric adjustment model is higher than that of 
the error correction model.  The results show that the estimated coefficient on *itLEV∆  
(which is used in model 5.5 to capture the short run effect) is not statistically significant, 
suggesting that there are no short run effects of the target leverage on the actual 
leverage. However, the results of comparing this model between small and large firms 
and between surplus and deficit firms show that the estimated coefficient on *itLEV∆  is 
significant only for large and surplus firms, indicating that these firms experience short 
run adjustment, although it is not large.   
 
5.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has considered the potential effects of asymmetric adjustment costs on 
leverage adjustment and tested for these by estimating a number of symmetric and 
asymmetric partial adjustment models. It has also considered the potential long run and 
short run effects of the target leverage ratio on leverage adjustments. A number of 
interesting insights into the dynamic behaviour of leverage have been uncovered in 
Jordan and even in developed countries.  
Firstly, the empirical sections estimated a statistically significantly low adjustment 
coefficient which suggests that leverage adjustment is slower for Jordanian firms than 
those in other countries. The finding of lower adjustment rates means that there would 
be significant constraints restricting the Jordanian firms from making faster adjustment 
toward their target when this adjustment requires an increase of leverage level, such as 
the transaction costs, bankruptcy costs and borrowing costs. Secondly and importantly, 
the two models considered are strongly supportive of the proposition that the adjustment 
costs are different between increasing and reducing leverage, and that the adjustment 
costs associated with an increase (expansion) in the leverage level are greater than those 
associated with a reduction in the leverage level. They are also supportive of the 
proposition that the costs of being above the target leverage ratio are higher than those 
of being below the target ratio, implying that the benefit of reducing leverage (the 
reduction on bankruptcy and agency costs) are greater than those of increasing leverage 
(the tax savings).These give rise to relatively slow upward adjustment when the 
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adjustment requires an increase in the leverage level. Conversely, in a downturn, 
adjustment is faster and this mitigates the probability of firms going bankrupt.  
Thirdly, the estimated results support the belief that there are thresholds levels for both 
above and below target leverage ratio beyond which adjustment become more sensitive 
to the size of deviations: large deviations from the target leverage appear to be 
associated with faster adjustment when compared with small deviations from the target 
leverage ratios. Indeed, with a small interval below the target leverage ratio the 
adjustment is not significantly different from zero, which suggests that the marginal tax 
savings from debt become significantly lower when a firm expands leverage to the point 
approximately closed to the target. Fourthly, the results of comparing the target 
adjustment models between small and large firms support the hypothesis of asymmetric 
adjustment costs of increasing and reducing leverage, with higher adjustment costs 
associated with an expansion in the leverage level rather than a reduction in the level. 
Moreover, the two models considered support the view that the adjustment costs for 
small firms are higher than for large firms, suggesting that they are slower when the 
adjustment requires an expansion in the leverage level. However, both groups firms 
experience quicker downward adjustment, this is faster for large firms, when they are 
above their target leverage ratio which indicates that the bankruptcy and agency costs 
are very critical for Jordanian firms. 
 Fifthly, the estimated symmetric adjustment model suggests that target adjustment in 
the Jordanian firms occurs in a manner inconsistent with the suggestion of the pecking 
order theory. Firms with financial surpluses appear to be faster than firms with financial 
deficits in adjusting their leverage toward the target ratios when the adjustment requires 
an increase in the leverage level. However, the estimated asymmetric adjustment model 
supports the proposition that the adjustment costs are not symmetric between increasing 
and reducing leverage for deficit firms only, while surplus firms appear to be faster 
when they are below the target level than above the target level. This finding suggests 
that, for firms with a surplus, adjustment takes place in a way consistent with the 
pecking order theory. However, it also suggests that the costs of having and keeping 
leverage above its target are not significantly large for surplus firms.   
Finally, the estimated error correction model supports the symmetric adjustment model 
that Jordanian firms are slower when the adjustment requires an increase in the leverage 
level. It also does not support any short run effect of the target leverage on the actual 
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leverage in the Jordanian firms. However, the short run effect exists only for large and 
surplus firms. 
This conclusion provides evidence suggesting that Jordanian firms are value-
maximizing firms since they have a target leveraged ratio and move gradually towards 
their target if any deviation from that target level exists. Hence, the target adjustment or 
trade-off theory is relevant to the Jordanian context. In fact, extensive efforts and 
measures have been taken to shift the Jordanian market toward the free economy and 
integrate this market into the world market. More precisely, the government efforts to 
liberalize the financial system, privatize the public sector and increase the capital 
market efficiency firstly, lead to the reduction in the state share or stack on the listed 
firms, secondly, make the market signals price information to its participants, thirdly,   
to result in a substantial transformation of the institutional set-up within which firms 
have been operating. As a result, Jordanian financial managers are given more 
flexibility in choosing the capital structure of the firm and consequently, providing 
those with the incentive to maximize their firms’ values by setting the target level of 
capital structure that maximize the value.   
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CHAPTER 6 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The focus of this study has been the financing behaviour of the Jordanian firms listed on 
Amman Stock Exchange during the period 1997-2005. The study is constructed to 
achieve three objectives: firstly, investigate evidence on the determinants of optimal 
leverage ratio for the Jordanian listed firms. Secondly, investigate evidence on the 
pecking order theory and finally investigate evidence on the target adjustment theory.  
For the purpose of analysis, a sample of 114 non-financial companies (62 Industrial 
Companies and 52 Services Company) was used and analyzed using pooled and panel 
data analysis. The sample data was extracted from two sources; the firm’s annual 
reports and ASE data base (The Yearly Shareholding Companies Guide and the Amman 
Stock Exchange Monthly Statistical Bulletins).  
This chapter aims to present the main conclusions and discuss some of their possible 
implications for the financing policy.  In addition, limitations of the study will be 
discussed. Finally, it ends with suggestions for future research. The chapter is structured 
as follows: section 6.2 provides a summery of the main findings of this study and some 
their possible implications. Section 6.3 provides limitations and some recommendations 
for further research. 
 
6.2  Findings and implications 
The empirical part that comprises chapter three, four and five is devoted to analysing 
and interpreting the results obtained from the econometric analysis. Chapter three 
investigated the empirical evidence on the determinants of optimal leverage ratio for 
Jordanian firms listed in ASE over the period 1997-2005. In this chapter, the study 
developed a static model to investigate these determinants. The results showed that 
firm’s size, profitability and tangibility are positively related to leverage while non-debt 
tax shields, growth opportunities and earnings are negatively related.  These results 
suggest that the borrowing capacity of Jordanian firms is largely limited by their 
expected risks of financial distress or bankruptcy. This is not a surprising result because 
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the Jordanian bankruptcy law emphasizes on the role of lenders and put less emphasize 
on the firm as an ongoing concern. It is not conductive to reorganization of firms; in 
contrast, firms entering bankruptcy are usually liquidated at higher costs. Consistent 
with their conservative credit policies, Jordanian banks usually offer debt to high quality 
firms, to those who have low risks of financial distress or bankruptcy. These findings 
can be considered as an indication that firms generally finance their activity procedure 
implied by the trade-off theory of capital structure not the pecking order theory. 
The second empirical chapter of this study introduced the estimation results of the 
models used to investigate empirical evidence of pecking order theory. The finding did 
not support the pecking order theory. The results showed that the Jordanian firms use 
debt and equity funds to finance their financing deficit with equity issues track the 
financing deficit relatively more closely. Hence equity is not the last resort for financing 
as the pecking order theory predict.  The results also showed that financial surplus and 
financial deficit affect leverage differently, supporting the prediction of pecking order 
theory that firms with funds deficit will tend to raise debt, while those with surplus will 
use up their surplus to retire debt or invest in cash and marketable securities.  However, 
the results showed that Jordanian firms are more sensitive in retiring debt to take up  
surplus than in expanding debt to meet their financing requirement, suggesting that 
expanding debt are constrained by the bankruptcy and agency costs. Although the 
results did not support the pecking order theory for both small and large Jordanian 
firms, small Jordanian firms depend on equity more debt and more than large firms, 
since large firms use debt more than equity to finance their financing deficit. As the 
Jordanian firms do not use surplus to retire equity, the results suggest that Jordanian 
firms use up their surplus to retire debt and invest in cash or marketable securities with 
debt retirement constitute a major portion of the total mounts of surplus. Compared with 
large firms, the results showed that small Jordanian companies use up their financial 
surplus in securities more than retiring debt. Finally, the results showed that the deficit 
variable is one among other factors affect the firm’s financing behaviour where adding 
the deficit variable to the conventional leverage equation does not change the sign and 
the significance of the explanatory variables that have been suggested as  determinants 
of  the optimal leverage ratio in chapter three.  
The last empirical chapter showed the empirical investigation of target adjustment 
theory. The results showed that Jordanian firms have a target leverage ratio; however, 
they have weak desire to move toward that target. The adjustment speed coefficient is 
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found to be positive and statistically significant under symmetric partial adjustment 
model. The estimated adjustment coefficient is quite low, suggesting that target leverage 
adjustment in the Jordanian firms occurs slowly. Beside the explanation of transaction 
costs, increases in stock prices in the Jordanian stock market and the conservative credit 
policies of the Jordanian banks provide another explanation as to why Jordanian firms 
have a slow adjustment toward their target leverage ratio. This is besides the relatively 
higher cost of debt itself and the weak desire of these firms to issue debt for tax 
considerations, since tax deductions for depreciations are found to be negatively related 
to leverage which suggests that Jordanian firms substitute non-debt tax shields for debt 
tax shield. 
The results of asymmetric adjustment model suggest that the rates of adjustment vary 
depending on whether the leverage ratio is above or below its target increasing debt. 
They are higher for above-target leverage ratio than for below-target leverage ratio. This 
implies that Jordanian firms experience downward adjustment faster than their upward 
adjustment. This finding also supports the view that the financing decisions are largely 
affected by the expected risk of bankruptcy. The results for small and large sample 
firms largely support these explanations, since upward adjustment of large firms is 
found to be faster than those for small firms which suggest that large firms are too-big 
to fail and face low transaction costs comparable to those for small firms. When the 
target adjustment theory models are tested with two sub-samples of surpluses sample 
firms and deficit sample firms, it was found that the firms with internal funds surpluses 
moves faster than those with internal funds. The results also showed that speed of 
adjustment is significantly different for small and large firms, since large firms can 
adjust their leverage faster than small firms. This pattern is found under partial 
adjustment and error correction model. These findings support the view that large 
Jordanian firms are able to obtain debt easier than small ones and Jordanian banks offer 
debt to high quality firms.  
The analysis of the previous findings regarding the capital structure theories suggests 
that the trade-off or target adjustment theory is more powerful than the pecking order 
theory in explaining the financing behaviour of the Jordanian firms listed on ASE. 
Hence, it is more relevant to the Jordanian context, implying that Jordanian firms are 
value maximizing firms. Since 1990, Jordan has been implementing a comprehensive 
social and economic reform program (financial liberalization and privatization 
programs), reducing the state share or stack on the listed firms, increasing the capital 
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market efficiency, and giving more flexibility to the Jordanian financial managers in 
choosing the capital structure of the firm which provides those managers with the 
incentive to maximize the value of their firms. The reasons for not making the pecking 
order theory relevant in the Jordanian context are firstly, investors in the Jordanian 
market prefers dividend payments, making the supply of internally generated funds 
from retained earnings inelastic. This may provide another support for the target capital 
theory where paying cash dividend creates a positive reaction from the market that may 
increase the value of the firms. Secondly,  the increase in interest rates on loans due to 
the financial liberalization and the adoption of conservative credit polices by the 
Jordanian banks force Jordanian firms, in general, and the small ones, in particular, to 
finance their investment opportunities by equity. This along with the increase in the 
stock prices on ASE made equity financing less expensive than debt financing, 
increasing the reliance of Jordanian firms on equity funds for financing which is 
inconsistence the prediction of pecking order theory of capital structure.  
Several implications can be drawn from the previous analysis of the study findings and 
conclusions. Firstly, the study demonstrated that much of existing theoretical literature 
on the field of capital structure can be applied to Jordan market as one of developing 
markets. Many of the factors that were found to be significant in the determination of 
capital structure are the same as those found in developed countries. 
Secondly, it is cleared that the findings regarding the pecking order and target 
adjustment theories that Jordanian stock market is not in minimum use. Non financial 
firms in general and small ones in particular use equity more than debt. This shed the 
light on the importance of equity in financing decisions. It also empirically provides 
evidence supporting the measures that the Jordanian government (the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade and the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) Authorities) has taken to 
develop the Amman Stock exchange and to increase its efficiency to make it signals 
price information to its participants. Consequently, the policy makers in Jordan should 
consider the findings of this study to undertake further steps in liberalizing the financial 
system and developing the ASE to encourage the Jordanian firms to this market more. 
Thirdly, the findings also demonstrated the need for improving the bond market in 
Jordan to increase the availability of long-term external source of funds and provide 
Jordanian firms with more alternative sources of finance. A well developed bond market 
is important for financial development in developing market. Moreover, policy makers 
in Jordan should take in consideration the inefficiency of credit management and 
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practices of Jordanian banks. Such inefficient management hinders the objectives of the 
monetary policy to stimulate economic growth and to fix the imbalances in the 
economic sector.  
 
6.3 Limitations of the study 
While this study has provided valuable insight, there are some limitations which may 
limit the generalisabitity of these findings.  
 The first limitation stems from the period of study where, the sample data of the study 
covered the period of 1997-2005. During this period, Amman Stock Exchange has 
witnessed an increase in stock prices with the adoption of conservative credit policies 
by Jordanian banks. Therefore, non-financial Jordanian firms, in general, and the small 
ones, in particular, find better to go to the stock market to raise funds. Hence, the results 
of the study are restricted within the period of the study. Moreover, the results are also 
specific to Jordan, but they do shed light on the generality of the rival models of capital 
structure. Many of the structural characteristics of the Jordanian capital market are 
however, also present in other developing markets. Therefore, the results from this 
study may help to provide the basis for comparative research both in the region and in 
other developing countries. 
The second limitation comes from the data set. It was extracted from the firms’ annual 
reports and the publications of the Amman Stock exchange. The reliability and accuracy 
of that data will, therefore affect the robustness of the results of the current study. All 
efforts have been made to insure the accuracy of the data, but this potential data 
problem remains. However, this problem is not limited only to developing capital 
market; it may be found in developed ones. It is worth noting that the failure of data to 
meet the assumptions underlying regressions may lead to abased estimates of the 
coefficient and standard of error, making the p values of t-test and F-test invalid. 
Therefore, the study has checked how well collected data meet the assumptions of 
regressions. The Stata programs (9.1) that we used to analyze its data has many of these 
methods built-in, and others are available that can be downloaded over the internet. In 
chapter three (section 3.3.1); we explored the methods of testing data and show how to 
verify regression assumptions. For example, we test for unusual and influential data 
(outliers and leverage), that is, a single observation that is substantially different from 
all other observations can make a large difference in the results of your regression 
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analysis. Moreover we test for Multicollinearity, Linearity, Normality and 
Homoscedasticity of Residuals. Furthermore, to insure the accuracy of the data, data for 
the sample of study are compared using four alternative sources of data; the firm’s 
annual reports, the Amman Stock Exchange’s publications (The Yearly Shareholding 
Companies Guide and Amman Stock Exchange Monthly Statistical Bulletins), CDs 
(containing the balance sheet and income statement of each company listed on ASE) 
and the website of ASE. The comparison result shows no difference among the four 
alternative sources of data.  
The third limitation stemmed from the various proxy variables used in the study. 
Although the proxy variables used were defended empirically and theoretically, they 
remain proxies and may not perfectly represent the theoretical propositions. Moreover, 
it is difficult to find the proxies that are not related to another. However, the proxy 
variable issue is a problem common to all empirical studies in the field of capital 
structure.  
 
6.4 Recommendations for further research 
The current study is the first attempt to examine empirically the suggestions of pecking 
order, target adjustment theories and the determinants of capital structure in Jordan 
taking into account a large sample size. A sample data of 114 non financial Jordanian 
firms over the period of 1997-2005 was used. The study has developed new models and 
used a well-defended testing methodology. It has produced a set of results which are of 
interest in themselves. It also has helped to reveal much about the nature of corporate 
finance in Jordan. Moreover, it has provided the basis for testing the explanatory power 
of the most competitive models under the corporate finance theory. The study generally 
provided a number of insights which could form the basis of both further research in 
Jordan, and comparative research in other developing markets. 
Therefore, further research can be carried out to extend the investigation to other 
developing markets such as Middle East and North Africa (MINA), South East Asia 
(such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand), and Latin America (such as Brazil and 
Argentina). The incentives for this kind research on other developing markets come 
from the contradictory results and the limitations of those studies that currently exist. 
Most of the existing studies have sample selection problems since they rely on small 
samples, and even the leading studies have often used samples comprising only large 
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companies in each market. An immediate area of further research therefore would be to 
replicate these studies using more comprehensive and representative samples of firms 
from these countries. 
In the Jordanian context, further research could be conducted to investigate the role of 
the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) in developing the Jordanian economy. Other 
research may be significant in the area of the market efficiency and the corporate 
financial decisions.  
In addition, further research might attempt to extend the current examination of this 
study to include the two remaining sectors (banking and insurance). This would make 
the results of this study more effective; and as a result, provide further evidence for the 
policy implications previously discussed. It also provides empirical investigation to the 
difference that might exist between the capital structure of financial firms and non-
financial ones.  
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